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This thesis explores the role played by philosophical pragmatism in shaping Barack Obama’s 
approach to foreign policy. Extending the efforts of James Kloppenberg’s Reading Obama into the 
foreign policy sphere, the thesis posits that such an approach is more fruitful for understanding 
Obama’s foreign policy presidency than previous efforts which have tended to employ conventional 
IR categories to situate Obama. 
This is a work of intellectual history, taking seriously the notion that we can draw understanding of 
actors in the past through the ideas and contexts which shaped their modes of thinking. This effort 
will thus place key Obama-era foreign policy issues in their proper intellectual context. The Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars, crises in Libya and Syria, the “Pivot to Asia,” and the controversial use of drone 
technology in a continued counterterrorism effort will each be examined.  
Obama’s engagement with philosophical pragmatism will not be argued as being a Deus ex machina 
- that which explains all - but instead forms an explication for a mode of thought that is complex and 
varied, but crucially, also best captures the essence of the central Obamian effort at reconciling 
those same contradictions. The logic of Obama’s foreign policy will thus be found as having greater 
coherence at its heart than prior critiques nominally allow. Philosophical pragmatism will be 















Access Condition and Agreement 
 
Each deposit in UEA Digital Repository is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, 
and duplication or sale of all or part of any of the Data Collections is not permitted, except that material 
may be duplicated by you for your research use or for educational purposes in electronic or print form. 
You must obtain permission from the copyright holder, usually the author, for any other use. Exceptions 
only apply where a deposit may be explicitly provided under a stated licence, such as a Creative 
Commons licence or Open Government licence. 
 
Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone, unless explicitly 
stated under a Creative Commons or Open Government license. Unauthorised reproduction, editing or 
reformatting for resale purposes is explicitly prohibited (except where approved by the copyright holder 
themselves) and UEA reserves the right to take immediate ‘take down’ action on behalf of the copyright 
and/or rights holder if this Access condition of the UEA Digital Repository is breached. Any material in 
this database has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation 
















Joseph Wade, 1923-2019 
























Introduction  Where the perfection begins ............................................................................................ 6 
 
Chapter One  Fair-minded words .......................................................................................................... 29 
 
Chapter Two  Not on reason but on passion ........................................................................................ 67 
 
Chapter Three  Those of us with the best intentions ......................................................................... 103 
 
Chapter Four  With every element of American power ..................................................................... 152 
 
Conclusion  How we have come this far ............................................................................................. 204 
 




















I have many people to thank.  
Firstly, the School of History and HUM faculty who offered the faith and funding for the research to 
commence.  
David Milne has been a constant source of wisdom, advice, patience, and reassurance. I owe him a 
great deal and have grown immeasurably as a historian thanks to him. Similarly, Lee Marsden has 
played a great role in encouraging me to get this far, his advice and insights have always been 
greatly valued. Tori Cann, Nick Wright, Matthew Sillence, Roger Baines, and Thomas Otte each 
helped along the way, as did countless others across the faculty at UEA. 
Michael Kyriacou has been an inspiration, and a reliable source of probing philosophical discussion 
and constant good cheer. Meanwhile, countless hours of conversation with Jack Massie imparted 
upon me a great deal of his own practical wisdom.  
Everyone in the Floor 0 office - while not always being conducive to ‘hard work’ - together we shared 
an environment of kinship, mutual support, and good times. To conduct PhD research can be to 
plough a lone furrow. It was never so with all of them there along the way.  
Thanks to the History boys…even the medievalists. 
Thank you to my family. My parents and brother taught me above all to be a good and diligent 
person. They’ve always believed in me. And I owe them more than I could ever possibly express. 
Last, and of course most of all, thank you to Charlie. She puts up with my nonsense, and has 
supported me without hesitation throughout this project. The perfect research partner in life, she 
















Where the perfection begins 
 
Barack Obama became the 44th President of the United States riding a wave of liberal enthusiasm. 
He promised hope and change and, in repeating the mantra “yes we can,” offered the credo that - 
united across race, religion, geography, and political beliefs – America could dare again to aspire to 
its promised greatness. With an overwhelming sense of optimism among supporters, the ensuing 
presidency was primed to struggle to attain the lofty heights of those expectations. It was also a 
presidency set to raise the hackles of those not so enamoured with him. Republicans opposed him 
en masse, almost reflexively. The party’s leader in the Senate, Mitch McConnell, ultimately declaring 
in 2010 “the single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-
term president.”1   
Obama’s agenda often infuriated those on his right for being too progressive, an affront to American 
values. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer warned his audience of “an ambitious 
president” who intended “to enact the most radical agenda of social transformation seen in our 
lifetime.”2 While another, Jennifer Rubin, suggested that Obama’s legislative programme “would 
permanently refashion the role of the federal government in the lives of every American.”3 Theirs 
was a fear of a President untethered in the pursuit of big government. Simultaneously, he 
disappointed those on his left as being insufficiently radical, failing to grasp the mantle and take 
grand enough steps in that progressive direction, while too often kowtowing to the demands of 
moneyed interests. 
Upon entering the White House, Obama immediately confronted a challenging set of circumstances. 
A failure of the financial system threatened the biggest economic downturn since the Wall Street 
Crash of 1929 and portended a twenty-first century Great Depression. Combined with expensive 
wars and George W. Bush’s tax cuts, the financial crisis served to heighten the problem of an ever 
expanding fiscal deficit. Meanwhile an ideologically polarised polity was incubating ever more hostile 
attitudes across party lines. Ideological zeal and purity had steadily replaced bipartisan concerns. 
Obama had famously declared that there was “not a liberal America and a conservative America; 
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there's the United States of America.”4 The America he became president of, however, failed to 
resemble such a vision. 
Obama faced similar difficulties in global affairs, entering the West Wing with the millstone of two 
Bush era wars as well as an expansive war on terrorism around his neck. The situation was made 
worse by a sense that the foreign policy misadventures of his predecessor had dragged America’s 
reputation through the mud and left it in the bad graces of much of an on-looking world. The 
enthusiasm which met Obama’s election globally was born of hostility to George W. Bush and, a 
growing fascination with a man whose Kansan mother, Kenyan father, and Hawaiian childhood 
(alongside four years in Indonesia), demonstrated that an American president could be cosmopolitan 
and broad-minded. In his own words, he was a “citizen of the world.”5 David Remnick, editor of The 
New Yorker, suggested that “if George W. Bush’s foreign policy was largely a reaction to 9/11, 
Obama’s has been a reaction to the reaction.”6 
Yet, echoing the response to his domestic approach, Obama’s actions on the world stage 
antagonised allies and opponents alike. He conducted foreign policy with a variance of approach 
that defied conventional definition.  In a May 2012 article on Obama’s counterterrorism practices, Jo 
Becker and Scott Shane of the New York Times reported on a memo sent by his campaign national 
security team, advising a course of “pragmatism over ideology.” This was, Becker and Shane noted, 
counsel which “only reinforced the president’s instincts.”7 Obama’s embrace of pragmatism has 
been noted and commented on by a series of scholars, public officials, friends, and wide segments of 
the media and commentariat. Such assessments do not always stray too far beyond surface 
definition, but the persistence of the characterisation is striking. Two thinkers in particular, however, 
have offered deeper considerations of these pragmatist influences. James Kloppenberg and David 
Milne have each sought to consider the ideological taproots of Obama’s thought and have thus 
traced out the implications which are provoked by such a consideration.8    
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This thesis will be focused on the foreign policy of Obama, and will - following examples set by 
Kloppenberg and Milne - seek to examine what a foreign policy informed by philosophical 
pragmatism and its relationship with other ideologies looks like. Obama has often cut a professorial 
figure in his approach to policy. This is perhaps no surprise, given his education at the elite 
institutions of Occidental, Columbia, and Harvard Law School, as well as his long-held role as an 
instructor at the University of Chicago. But he also exhibited depth of insight in the authorship of 
two books and in his propensity for long, nuanced answers in interviews.  It is within this depth of 
thought that we can trace a foreign policy approach that frays the ends of conventional 
interpretation. Each issue was seemingly weighed with a cerebral dexterity that probed for ever 
more detail, balanced options against one another, and sought a more complete picture before a 
decision could be made. 
Perhaps the most incisive book written on Obama is one that - ironically for the purposes of this 
thesis - was published five years before the conclusion of his presidency and that does not touch 
extensively on his foreign policy. The success of James Kloppenberg’s Reading Obama lies in its 
engagement with Obama as a thinker and an intellectual.9 Kloppenberg depicts Obama as a figure 
who has been steeped in great fissures of thought in the American academy for the duration of his 
education. He places great emphasis on the current of philosophical pragmatism running 
consistently through Obama’s education, writings, and proclamations: “locating Obama’s 
development in the frameworks of the history of American democracy, the ideas of philosophical 
pragmatism, and the intellectual turmoil of the 1980s and 1990s reveals how Obama thinks and why 
he sees American culture and politics as he does.”10 
In arguing that pragmatism “has provided a sturdy base for Obama’s sensibility,” Kloppenberg 
asserts that such a sensibility “challenges the claims of absolutists – whether their dogmas are 
rooted in science or religion – and instead embraces uncertainty, provisionality, and the continuous 
testing of hypotheses through experimentation.”11 As such, pragmatism “stands for 
openmindedness and ongoing debate.”12 Kloppenberg acknowledges that “precisely because 
consequences matter to pragmatists, one can never say dogmatically, in advance, that one policy or 
another follows necessarily from the commitment to experimentation.”13 
In this sense, pragmatism does not offer a map for how to proceed, but instead offers a means of 
reading a map. Ascribing a pragmatist worldview to Barack Obama cannot explain how he arrived at 
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specific policy actions, but it does offer a key insight into a sensibility – to borrow Kloppenberg’s 
phrase - which shaped efforts to avoid “swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.”14 It also 
offers an explanation of the means by which Obama trod carefully between the conflicting notions 
of universalism and particularism that Kloppenberg persuasively argues formed a crucial part of his 
thought.  
Kloppenberg defines universalism as an embrace of ‘timeless ideals’ whereby values and truths 
remain absolute and foundational regardless of time and place.15 Such a perspective on the world 
dictates a vision of both the moral and political ways in which it should be organized. A particularist 
worldview, on the other hand, challenges this conception by refuting the notion that universal, 
unchanging truths exist. Instead, meaning is contextual and historical, relying on a constant process 
of interpretation and re-evaluation. Pragmatism plays a complicated role in this dichotomy. As 
Kloppenberg demonstrates, the quintessential pragmatist thought of William James and John Dewey 
was predicated on a connection between uncertainty and democratic politics in which “a culture of 
inquiry should supplant a culture of fixed truths” and “processes of experimentation should replace 
proclamations of dogma.”16 This speaks to a philosophy centred around a particularist conception, 
yet crucially, it is also a philosophy which sought to avoid the trappings of nihilist relativism and 
instead embraced the possibilities of democratic politics, whereby “the most attractive political 
ideas are those that have survived the rigorous historical tests of trial and error, and no politics 
offers as many tools for self-correction as does democracy.”17 In the absence of absolute truths, it is 
a means by which to achieve a consensus that enables lasting change to occur.  
As such, truths may not be absolute, but the advances made towards a better reality become more 
secure in the face of history’s contingencies. This scepticism of absolutes formed the backbone of 
the shifting atmosphere in American universities in the 1980s and 1990s, and thus Obama 
encountered and wrestled with these ideas at Occidental, Columbia, and Harvard Law School.18 
Crucially, Kloppenberg notes that whilst Obama shares “the scepticism of those critics who eroded 
the foundations on which mid-twentieth-century universalism stood” he also understands and is 
“haunted” by “the residual appeal that timeless ideals continue to exert.” For Kloppenberg this 
leaves Obama in a position whereby “as he has been throughout his life, as president he remains 
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caught in the force field between universalism and particularism.”19 Philosopher Bart Schultz offers a 
useful simplification of this tension in Obama’s thought: “from the many, one, from the particular, 
the universal, and from the transient, the permanent.”20 
In outlining the complex contours of Obama’s thought, Kloppenberg achieved considerably more 
than many subsequent accounts of Obama’s foreign policy. Such efforts have often sought to place 
Obama into an ideological box, checked off against a list of characteristics befitting of one 
perspective or another. These are often accompanied by a snappy doctrinal title such as the Truman 
and Bush Doctrines, Eisenhower’s ‘Massive Retaliation,’ Clinton’s ‘Democratic Enlargement’ or, most 
famously, the Cold War era’s ‘Containment.’ But such a designation seems insufficient as a complete 
analysis of Obama as a foreign policy actor. 
It is of course wrong to argue that Obama’s foreign policy was meritorious by virtue of being 
complicated; that it is worthy of praise merely because its essentials cannot be reduced to a bumper 
sticker. Eluding narrow definition does not inoculate his foreign policy from worthy criticisms. Yet it 
does necessitate a more thorough engagement with the ideas that animate it. Following 
Kloppenberg’s example, this thesis seeks to understand Obama as a writer, a politician, and a 
thinker, by examining his arguments as laid out in his books and speeches, but crucially also through 
“placing his ideas in the deeper and broader contexts of the American political tradition.”21 Writing 
in 2011, Kloppenberg suggested that “neither pundits nor prophets who dominate contemporary 
American public discourse” had shown much interest in such an undertaking.22 Not much has 
changed in the years hence. Many critiques of Obama’s foreign policy centre around questions of his 
fealty to the mores of doctrine mentioned above, trying to place his worldview purely in context of 
existing ideological frameworks, such as realism, liberalism, isolationism, retrenchism. Each exacts 
their own yard-sticks to measure success and failure. Under such critiques, Obama’s foreign policy is 
viewed as not realist enough, too liberal, too isolationist, and so on. This comes in contrast to 
considering the means by which his foreign policy was shaped, not simply by those aspirations for 
doctrinal cogency, but instead by his own intellectual predispositions. 
This thesis thus seeks to enter into waters mostly uncharted by Kloppenberg, and tested by Milne - 
applying their methods of intellectual history to Obama’s thinking as it pertains to foreign policy. 
Following Kloppenberg, Milne included Obama in his book Worldmaking - a broader examination of 
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foreign policy intellectuals - and in doing so took the first valuable steps in considering the specific 
means by which Obama’s ideological instincts mapped on to foreign policy.  
In terms of examining Obama’s foreign policy specifically in relation to pragmatism, Brian Butler 
offers perhaps the most thoroughgoing effort, in seeking to evaluate the extent to which Obama’s 
foreign policy was shaped by philosophical pragmatism in the context of international relations 
(PPIR).23 It offers valuable insights into the utility of pragmatism as an explanatory lodestar. Its 
aspiration to be an IR theory competing with traditional IR theories of Liberalism, Realism, and 
Constructivism, however, limits it. The notion of PPIR is still trapped in an IR theory paradigm which 
seeks to limit enquiry to ways in which Obama does and does not exhibit PPIR in his foreign policy. It 
seeks to force Obama into yet another ideological box.  
In the same volume, Shane Ralston offers a more valuable conceptualisation of an IR theory in the 
pragmatist tradition whereby “policy ends are never fixed; theory is integrally related to practice; 
and policy means are always malleable and interchangeable with ends.”24 This sets the stage for 
scholars of International Relations to “forego uncompromising values and grand theories in 
international affairs, embracing instead a situationally-specific approach to understanding and 
addressing emerging global problems,” an approach which he argues to be similar to Obama’s. 
Ralston does however depict Obama as broadly embracing a Deweyan pragmatism in his approach 
to foreign policy.25 Through an examination of two of Obama’s speeches, Ralston emphasises 
Obama’s pragmatist faith in progress, but also the ensuing necessity of foreign policy decisions to be 
made “in the spirit of meliorism.”26  He suggests a prescriptive theoretical framework favouring soft 
over hard power. This is indeed a fair reflection of much of Obama’s worldview, yet it fails to 
encapsulate an approach which still willingly embraces and emphasises ‘hard power.’ It produces a 
narrowing of the implications of pragmatism in foreign policy, and introduces a prescriptive element 
- ascribing specific policies to a pragmatic foreign policy - which does not entirely capture the greater 
breadth of Obama’s ideological approach to the world. 
A turn towards Kloppenberg’s approach of intellectual history offers the means by which to examine 
and emphasise pragmatism’s important role in Obama’s thought, and its influence on foreign policy. 
But it also recognises pragmatism as offering the scope to embody more of a “sensibility” which 
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inspires an approach to the world, and to recognise its connection to other ideas in Obama’s 
toolkit.27  
The result when applying such an approach is to uncover Obama as a foreign policy actor engaged 
with ideas which encourage a more supple and flexible attitude to the world. It seeks to avoid 
imposing a “one-size-fits-all” approach to issues as they arise in different parts of the world. 
Crucially, it emphasises eschewing dogma in favour of context-based solutions which reflect what is 
possible, even if sometimes falling short of what is desirable. 
This approach puts Obama at odds with much of the conventional Washington D.C. establishment 
“consensus.” Jeffrey Goldberg, editor of The Atlantic, notes that Obama “secretly disdains” this 
foreign-policy establishment.28 In an interview with Goldberg, Obama bemoaned the existence of a 
“playbook” which prescribes conventional thinking, arguing “it’s a playbook that comes out of the 
foreign-policy establishment. And the playbook prescribes responses to different events, and these 
responses tend to be militarized responses. Where America is directly threatened, the playbook 
works. But the playbook can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions.”29 
 
=== 
Critiques of Obama’s foreign policy are varied and plenty. As such, it is beneficial to outline the 
broad spectrum they cover. Firstly, one critique argues that Obama has overseen and underwritten a 
process of American retreat which has led to a severe weakening of the nation’s standing in the 
world and its ability to influence world affairs. Instead, the vacuum created by American abdication 
has been gleefully filled by entities hostile to American ideals. Bret Stephens, Robert Singh, and Colin 
Dueck offer cogent explications of these ideas. Stephens argues that under the Obama presidency, 
America retreated from the world, turning instead to isolationism, inviting global disorder.30 Singh 
argues that Obama “took an unprecedented axe to the Pax Americana,” and through a process of 
retrenchment, failed ‘strategic engagement,’ and “an unwillingness to employ America’s military 
might where, when and how it really mattered” significantly lessened America’s standing in the 
world. 31 Dueck meanwhile argues that Obama’s foreign policy strategy is one which “emphasises 
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international retrenchment and accommodation, in order to allow the president to focus on securing 
liberal policy legacies at home.”32 Bleeding into each other, these criticisms all critique Obama for 
exhibiting a combination of wild naivety, fecklessness, and a reckless streak in his approach to 
foreign policy. In failing to exhibit the necessary strength and willing, he has allowed for America’s 
crown to slip and for cracks to appear in the liberal world it forged in the embers of WWII. 
A second prominent strain of criticism has come from those who argue that Obama’s efforts at 
shaping foreign policy were incoherent. This incoherence derived primarily from a perceived failure 
to articulate a clear sense of grand strategy. Such critics take particular umbrage with Obama for 
displaying what Kloppenberg terms to be “vulgar pragmatism,” defined as being “merely an 
instinctive hankering for what is possible in the short term.”33 Under this view, failure to exhibit a 
strong sense of direction, of a singular track, depleted America’s ability to execute effective foreign 
policy, with preference for the expedient undermining any ability to undertake necessary actions. 
Robert Singh suggested that “Obama was a domestic policy president and foreign policy naïf whose 
statecraft proved an improvisation in reactive tactical adjustments.” 34 Vali Nasr, a former State 
Department official in the Obama administration, argues that to allies “constant tactical manoeuvres 
don’t add up to a coherent strategy or a vision of global leadership,” and given the frequent 
adjustment of policy “it seemed everyone was getting used to a directionless America. The best they 
could do was to protect themselves against our sudden shifts and turns.”35 For Nasr, such 
uncertainty about America’s role in the world itself is a cause for global leadership slipping from its 
hands.36 
A third, more distinct, critique of Obama’s policy concerns his use of American military power, 
primarily in his prosecution of a ruthless drone-strike programme. David Remnick summarizes the 
criticisms of the drone policy as “a one-size-fits-all recourse, in which the prospect of destroying an 
individual enemy too easily trumps broader strategic and diplomatic considerations, to say nothing 
of moral ones.”37  Indeed, Pakistani activist Malala Yousefzai, famously a victim of the Taliban’s 
vicious persecution of women, told Obama, in a visit to the White House, that drone strikes were a 
fuel for terrorism and resentment in her homeland.38 
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This critique is also more generally concerned with Obama’s embrace of military action. The prime 
example cited as a case of military excess is the intervention in Libya, whereby Muammar Gaddafi 
was removed from power, while another oft-cited cudgel is that during Obama’s presidency, military 
force was used in seven countries.39 The drone programme and its deployment particularly in 
Yemen, gave rise to criticism of Obama as a man who not only committed violent acts, but who also 
set a dangerous precedent for the use of American power and questions of extrajudicial killings of 
American citizens, foreign combatants, and non-combatants alike.40 For the man who was awarded a 
Nobel Peace Prize, the road to war was taken far too frequently. For critics predominantly from the 
political left, such as Daniel Bessner, Stephen Wertheim, and Perry Anderson contrary to the 
critiques from the likes of Stephens, Singh, and Dueck, Obama’s failure was not in abdicating 
American responsibility and power, but instead was in his lack of a true reckoning with the relentless 
and violent pursuit of U.S. hegemony. It was a failing that condemns him to being a figure not of 
hopeful change, but of disappointing continuity, as Obama’s presidency represented simply more of 
the same in its determination to uphold U.S. imperium. 
Can Obama be both a belligerent hawk, indiscriminately using US military force to uphold an un-
checked imperial regime, whilst simultaneously being a feckless dove, unable and unwilling to use 
American power to reinforce a benevolent order made in its image? Beauty may lie in the eye of the 
beholder, but the dissonance between perceptions of Obama’s foreign policy appears jarring. The 
preferences of those who interrogate matters of international relations and foreign affairs often 
tend towards imposition of an order and simplicity that obscures the complexity of what lies 
beneath. 
Obama told David Remnick that he was “comfortable with complexity.”41 He embraced the 
uncertainty that accompanies the hard decisions faced in office. He continued on to offer perhaps 
the most finely honed exegesis of his thought:  
I think I’m pretty good at keeping my moral compass while recognizing that I am 
a product of original sin. And every morning and every night I’m taking measure 
of my actions against the options and possibilities available to me, understanding 
that there are going to be mistakes that I make and my team makes and that 
America makes; understanding that there are going to be limits to the good we 
can do and the bad that we can prevent, and that there’s going to be tragedy out 
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there and, by occupying this office, I am part of that tragedy occasionally, but 
that if I am doing my very best and basing my decisions on the core values and 
ideals that I was brought up with and that I think are pretty consistent with those 
of most Americans, that at the end of the day things will be better rather than 
worse.42 
This thesis will examine how this mode of thought and its ideological implications shaped Obama's 
foreign policy, focusing primarily on specific areas of international affairs and international incidents 
that have confronted Obama during his time in office. Each chapter will centre around a notable 
speech given by Obama in relation to a specific area of ideology or foreign policy matters, and will 
seek to uncover the ideas underpinning his thought as reflected by his own words. Speeches and 
oratory performed an outsized role in Obama's political ascent and continued to function as a crucial 
means by which he was able to communicate an array of ideas, reflections, and decisions to the 
American people and to the watching world. A gifted orator, Obama’s own input into writing and 
shaping the speeches he gave is important to note. 
Obama is often described as being a writer in spirit, and as such he brought a writer’s mind to bear 
when approaching the messaging of his politics. David Axelrod, Obama’s former strategist and 
advisor, noted that his charge’s “willingness to entrust his words to others is limited.”43 Importantly, 
Jon Favreau, his youthful chief speechwriter from 2007 until 2013, was described by Obama as his 
“mind-reader,” able to channel the president’s thoughts. Together, in honing speeches, there would 
be a process of constant back-and-forth of drafts until both were satisfied they had reached a final 
product.44 The writer in Obama seeps onto the teleprompter, emphasising the value of his speeches 
as narratives that tell a story, oftentimes with his own personal narrative entering in from the 
margins. Above all - whether with the help of Favreau, Favreau’s successor Cody Keenan, or Ben 
Rhodes (the extra pair of eyes on foreign policy matters) - Obama’s voice came through clearly in his 
speeches.  
Former Governor of New York Mario Cuomo famously noted “you campaign in poetry; you govern in 
prose.”45 For a president celebrated for his soaring rhetoric, such a warning is stark: an inspirational 
linguistic spark will only get you so far before the reality of political murk extinguishes it. A 
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consistent criticism of Obama portrayed him as maintaining a belief that his speeches - with a broad 
appeal to hope and reason - could change the enmities of people all around the world, while also 
provoking substantive change in international politics. This, for such critics, displayed excessive 
arrogance and naïveté about how the world works.46 But this perspective undersells the value of 
speeches as a means to express strong convictions, and to convey the thought process and ideals 
held by the highest office in the land. David Axelrod, in discussing speechwriting with Cody Keenan 
argued that: 
The difference between an Obama speech and speeches that a lot of other people 
in politics makes is…often political speeches are a bunch of lines cobbled together 
by connective tissue, but they’re not an argument…they’re not a reasoned 
argument. He makes arguments in his speeches…he develops a case in his 
speeches in a way that I don’t think…any president has done in quite the same 
way since Lincoln.47 
Obama believed, Remnick suggests, “that his words – at microphones from Cairo to Yangon – can 
encourage positive change abroad, even if only in the long run.”48 Obama’s speeches offered a 
crucial vessel for him to develop and put forward a case for his vision of the world. Examining 
Obama through the lens of his speeches is no novel approach, and indeed the likes of Shane Ralston 
and Bart Schultz have utilised just such a method to draw out the pragmatist elements of his 




As with all presidential administrations, it is possible to trace the influence of the philosophers, 
theologians, and scholars who had shaped Obama’s thinking, as well as the circle of individuals 
present in the decision making process. This means through engaging with Obama’s thought it 
becomes necessary to also engage with the thought and dispositions of figures ranging from 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, presidential luminaries James Madison and Abraham Lincoln, and 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas. There also needs to be an engagement with the environments in 
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which Obama was raised, educated, and worked in terms of how they influenced and shaped the 
man before he became president. His education at prestigious academic institutions provided a 
fertile breeding ground for ideas and the complexities of the philosophical world. While his time as a 
community organizer in South Chicago reinforced an altogether different brute reality of a tough 
world with setbacks frequent and victories hard-won.  
 
An intellectual history of Obama’s thought would not be adequate without engaging with those texts 
which he has written himself, the primary two being books written before he became president. The 
first, Dreams From My Father, published in 1995, is a personal memoir reflecting on his youth and 
upbringing, and contextualising a man in search of his identity.50 The second, The Audacity of Hope, 
published in 2006, is a more conventional political meditation timed for an election cycle, but it 





The first chapter will examine the ideas and framework of philosophical pragmatism. The roots of 
pragmatism go deep in American history, and their influence on Obama will be argued to be 
manifold. In particular they hold a key relationship with the means by which Obama developed a 
particular vision of society ideally functioning through the coming together for common goals, and a 
rejection of absolute principles. His reading of the Constitution weaves philosophical pragmatism 
into the very fabric of American political organisation and its history. An important aspect of this 
discussion is the valuable notion of why pragmatist ideas play such a prominent part in Obama’s 
thinking. That contends with the crucial notion of the imperative he held as so important in political 
life: of finding mediation between conflicting ideas.  
The second chapter will consider the concept of “necessary” wars as opposed to wars of choice. It 
primarily focuses on the policy process surrounding the war in Afghanistan. But attention is also 
given to the ideological factors which drove the Iraq war. Obama’s opposition to that war was vitally 
important, and his framing of his opposition in a manner that emphasized the ideological choice 
which underwrote the war, was significant. It spoke to this notion of choice, the ideology behind 
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that choice was significant – but so too was Obama’s affirmation that ideology should not play such 
a role. Philosophical pragmatism will be argued to have been particularly prominent in the means by 
which Afghanistan policy was developed, and especially pertaining to how Obama shaped an 
approach to the conflict that appeared to go against his instincts.  
The third chapter examines Obama’s response to the crises ignited by the Arab Spring, most 
significantly the Libyan intervention, and the decision to forego a similar action in Syria. It will 
consider the ideas expounded in Obama’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, and contend with the 
means by which he balanced his charge to both pursue peace, while also leading America into war. 
The competing philosophies that animated his speech form a dialectic between visions of a universal 
morality which the United States should seek to uphold, and a more restricted vision of humility 
which constrains the belief that any one nation can act to shape the world. Obama’s approach to 
these matters of war and peace were refracted through his own visions of what America’s 
responsibilities in the world are, and the means by which it should be willing to achieve its goals on 
the international stage. For Obama, this was manifested primarily in a desire to seek multilateral 
action, though he nevertheless still embraced a vision of unique American primacy. 
The fourth chapter will examine the relationship between two pivotal planks of the Obama foreign 
policy approach and nascent legacy. The ‘Pivot to Asia’ was a signal policy aimed at ‘rebalancing’ U.S. 
attentions from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region, in the search of economic opportunity, 
but also with an undertow of geopolitical concern over the ascendancy of China as a global power. 
The chapter will show that this strategic turn was counter-weighted by an escalation of the drone 
programme. The use of drones as tools of counterterrorism was a technological development which 
could enable the continued prosecution of the campaign against ‘terror’ - the locus for America’s 
very presence in the Middle East – without the same commitment of forces, and without the same 
risk of being stuck in a continual quagmire. Accompanying these two poles of American foreign 
policy output stands once again the overarching question about what the appropriate role of 
American power in the world is and how it should be calibrated. The chapter will also consider 
aspects of Obama’s identity. 
The concluding chapter will consider the indelible mark left by philosophical pragmatism on Obama’s 
foreign policy. But in doing so, it will also weigh the implications that arise from such a way of 
thinking shaping a worldview. Legacy is an important watchword for any president, and whilst this 
thesis does not concern itself toward the goal of discerning Obama’s legacy, it will nevertheless be 
an unavoidable task to examine the ways in which Obama’s approach could have lasting vestiges in 
the future of U.S. foreign policy. In part, this is tied up in the very nature of the philosophical 
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pragmatism Obama exemplifies, and his world view that rests so firmly on the notion of a “long 
game” and a vision of perfection as a process which is unending. 
A thesis is, by its nature, constrained in scope. As such, there are numerous aspects of Obama’s 
foreign policy presidency which deserve detailed treatment and analysis and yet which here are not 
discussed in such a manner. Primary among these, are a triumvirate of what are arguably Obama’s 
key achievements in foreign policy: the Iranian nuclear deal, the diplomatic opening to Cuba, and the 
Paris Climate accords. These were all achievements which in a sense demonstrated Obama’s foreign 
policy working at its optimal best. They were achievements predicated on the style of multilateral 
diplomacy that other aspects of the thesis will establish as being key to Obama’s outlook.  The 
omission of a more thorough examination of such successes than what follows is due more to the 
nature of the subjects that are discussed in greater depth - those instances of foreign policy that 
challenged Obama more explicitly in drawing out the conflicts, contradictions, and consistencies in 
his modes of thinking in the face of the outwardly unmanageable.  
The bias in foreign policy scholarship towards events that involve violence, explosions, and death, is 
not one that this thesis escapes. Discussions of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and drones hold 
prominence here, but this should not obscure the importance of the Obama administration’s 
engagement in other matters. A longer thesis would rightfully examine the administration’s 
response to the Ebola crisis, its pursuit of energy security, a closer consideration of its pursuit of a 
range of trade agreements, and along with the Paris climate agreement a broader examination of 
the administration’s approach to the climate crisis. Again, as it is, the thesis contends with the 
episodes that it does because they are the policies and actions which demand scrutiny. They 
demand to be problematized due to the degree by which they challenged Obama’s approach to the 
world. In opening up potentials for inconsistencies and failings they lay bare a foreign policy that was 
nuanced, complex, and imperfect.   
The sources consulted for this thesis were simultaneously constrained and boundless. The nature of 
the near-contemporary history at hand provided limitations in the absence of archival materials. Key 
documents pertaining to foreign policy remain classified. The histories based upon such materials 
will follow in the future. In the meantime, this thesis stays true to its form as a work of intellectual 
history. As Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen puts it the “historical sensibility” of intellectual history 
“gladly welcomes any source to use for eavesdropping: legal documents, novels, private letters, 
diaries, photographs, or a painting. No source need be too imposing – like a major tome of 
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theological disputation. And no source is too insignificant – like marginalia in a text of an 
advertisement in a magazine.”52 
The thesis takes this to heart, and examines Obama through the sources that are available to us 
now. Such key sources include his books, his speeches, and other writings by him. Also significant are 
the many journalistic interviews conducted with him, contemporaneous accounts of events as they 
transpired in the administration in book or news article form, and the myriad sources of reflections 
from former members of the administration, be they memoirs, comments and interviews in 
magazine articles, podcasts, or other outlets for such perspectives. The four biographies written on 
Obama are also valuable texts. 
But as a work of intellectual history, this thesis has also relied on sources of philosophy, history, and 
criticism that help to bring context to the world of Obama’s intellectual make-up. As Ratner-
Rosenhagen writes of the breadth of sources “that can awaken us to all the ways” people have 
“constructed their realities and made meaning in their lives,”53 this thesis argues for using such 
sources to awaken us to the ways Obama constructed his approach to foreign policy. 
The author was also able to conduct interviews of three former members of the Obama 
administration - Charles Edel, Edward Fishman, and Michael Kimmage. Each were members of the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, but are also trained historians. Conversations with them 
offered unique insights, drawn from their experiences in government, but also from their placing of 
those experiences in historical context. They were each able to speak to the importance of ideas in 
guiding foreign policy, but also of the immediate imperative of situating those ideas within the 




Barack Obama, junior senator from Illinois, began his 18 March 2008 speech in an almost wistful 
manner. He quoted the opening words of the United States Constitution “We the people, in order to 
perform a more perfect union…” and in doing so bore the weight of history: of the Founders of the 
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republic, the American Dream, and of his unlikely ascendance to front-runner in the Democratic 
primary for President of the United States.54 
He was speaking at the National Constitution Center, an edifice of angular stone and glass, with 
those same words quietly stated inside boldly inscribed on its face. On the other end of the grassy 
Independence Mall in downtown Philadelphia stands the modest yet elegant Independence Hall, 
where the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States were debated and 
signed. Across the street from Independence Hall stands the Liberty Bell, an enduring symbol of 
American nationhood. In this venue so steeped in American history, Obama’s speech laid out a 
complicated vision of the United States in its ongoing wrestle with the imperfections of its past, and 
aspirations for a better future. He grappled with an issue personal to himself, that of race, its 
implications for inequality, and its ever-present place in America’s history.55 He reflected a nuance of 
thought which would come to be a recognisable trait of a politician so enamoured with detail, so 
comfortable in weighing paradoxes against each other.  
In the speech Obama laid out those depths and nuances of his thought in clarion vision. But as a 
candidate for the highest office in the land, his stop in Philadelphia was not one to tip his hat to the 
pantheon of American greatness, to put on a show of patriotism, or indeed a play for the photo 
opportunity. It was with an altogether more sober purpose which Obama stepped to the lectern that 
night. Videos of Obama’s long-time pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, had surfaced in which he 
railed against aspects of American society, even proclaiming in one sermon, “not God bless America. 
God damn America.”56 Such excoriations of the way in which the U.S. government fails Black 
Americans might never have passed beyond the walls of Chicago’s Trinity United Church of Christ, if 
it were not for the status of his most eminent parishioner.  
Obama had met Wright during his days as a community organizer in the South Side of Chicago, and it 
was through encountering Wright at Trinity that he testifies to have found God.57 Reverend Wright 
was a charismatic figure, who built his Trinity United Church of Christ congregation up from 87 in 
1972 to more than 8,000 three decades later.58 Raised in Philadelphia, he was the son of a Baptist 
minister. In 1961, aged 20, he left University in order to enlist in the U.S. Marine Corps. After two 
years of service he moved to the Navy’s corpsman school, becoming a cardiopulmonary technician, 
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even caring for President Lyndon B Johnson after surgery in 1967. He finished his bachelor’s degree 
before then attaining a master’s at Howard University. He completed another master’s at the 
University of Chicago Divinity School, and then a PhD at the United Theological Seminary in Dayton, 
Ohio.59 In short, Jeremiah Wright was an accomplished man who had given a lot to respectable 
American society. Yet, in his sermons he would frequently challenge the conventional norms of the 
polite American Sunday morning. The motto of Trinity was “unashamedly black and unapologetically 
Christian,”60 and taking this to heart Wright used his sermons to tap into the roots of black liberation 
theology, placing emphasis on the church as a vessel for a movement of the advancement of the 
African-American and non-white community, one that was keenly aware of the subjugations of 
America’s history.61 In the heat of an already vicious primary battle against Hillary Clinton, the 
footage of Wright’s sermons caused a media storm, and threatened to derail the Obama campaign. 
For Obama, the issue of race would need to be addressed. Despite the affectation of a ‘post-racial’ 
figure and the ushering in of a society to mirror him, the possible reality of the election of the first 
black man to the office of president was of momentous import.62  
The speech in Philadelphia - entitled “A More Perfect Union” - focused on the scars inflicted by the 
issue of race on America, scars both historic and fresh in the national memory. That someone who 
was so close to Obama and who had played the role of a spiritual leader and mentor not only to 
Obama but also to a section of Chicagoan society, could hold views so violently contrary to 
conventional America, demonstrated the weight of race and its shackles around America’s soul. It 
was thus a speech that interrogated the very heart of America the imperfect, the flawed creation of 
flawed men. Obama invoked the Constitution of the United States as being “ultimately unfinished,” 
“stained” as it was by the nation’s “original sin of slavery.” He offered a repudiation of Reverend 
Wright’s particularly hostile statements, but he noted that the controversy generated by them and 
their relation to his own candidacy for President “reflect the complexities of race” that had, in his 
mind, never been confronted or resolved. As such, for Obama, it was “a part of our union that we 
have not yet made perfect.” Obama argued that Wright made “profound mistakes” in his sermons in 
the way that he “spoke as if our society was static; as if no progress had been made.” Instead, he 
countered this notion by pointing to the very possibility of his own run for office as proof that 
America could change. This reflected “the true genius” of the nation. This ability to gradually 
improve was emphasized by Obama and opens a window onto his thinking, with a simple message of 
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optimism at its heart; he argued in Philadelphia that - rooted in its foundational history - “this union 
may never be perfect, but generation after generation has shown that it can always be perfected.”63 
For Obama, the notion of perfect was not a noun or an adjective - something that is - but instead it 
took on the properties of a verb - something to be done. Perfecting the Union, for Obama, was a 
process which has been carried out since a disparate group of interests, of both the self and of 
divergent communities, declared their truths to be self-evident and declared the independence the 
United States of America.64 This was the very same group that declared “we the people of the United 
States, in order to form a more perfect union.” ‘More perfect’ appears almost as a rhetorical 
oxymoron, but Obama reflected the idea of perfection not as an absolute end goal, but instead as a 
constant effort to continually make things better, even if being tethered by a humility that 
acknowledged the difficulties, and potential futilities of the pursuit of perfect.  
Bart Schultz, in discussing Obama’s use of ‘perfection’ as a verb, argues that such a use is “the means 
by which Obama pragmatizes the American Dream.”65 The struggle of Black Americans discussed 
openly and honestly by both Reverend Wright and Obama is intertwined with an American history 
and the struggle within it for the American Dream. While Obama recognized the anger and 
pessimism of Wright, he offered instead a place “where the perfection begins” as a matter of 
embracing the process of people coming together to work towards a better reality, a process which 
is itself embedded in that American Dream.66 Obama’s idea of perfect and perfection did not 
guarantee things would necessarily be as they should. Nor did it preclude generations of struggle 
and moments of sacrifice. What it did provide however, was the hope and impetus for things to get 
better.67 
The notion of history carrying a direction of travel invokes a teleological perspective that locates 
purpose in that direction. In his book The Teleological Discourse of Barack Obama, Richard Leeman 
argues that Obama has consistently exhibited a “teleological discourse grounded in the American 
ideals of freedom and equality.”68 Teleology captures a notion that “our very goal and purpose in life 
is to actualize – to become – that which our essential nature ‘make’ us.”69 Telos “serves as the 
transcendent ideal which undergirds everything,” it stands as the “essential nature,” of an entity and 
as such it stands not only as a guide for means of acting in the world, but also acting in accordance 
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with it is itself an “instantiation of the telos.”70 In terms of the address in Philadelphia, Leeman 
argues that “telos is not an adornment to the speech; it is the speech.”71 The “more perfect union” 
that Obama strives for carries a telos not only which seeks a union that is more just, equal, and free, 
but Leeman suggests, “Obama also defines the telos as a union that embraces diversity even as it 
affirms its common purpose regarding the pursuit of those qualities.”72  
In his useful work Barack Obama: American Historian Steven Sarson examines Obama’s engagement 
with American history, and the means by which that engagement has shaped him. Through this 
endeavour, Sarson makes the assessment that in the notion that “out of unity comes progress” we 
can locate Obama’s “ultimate historical theme.”73 It is a significant theme. Obama’s vision of 
perfection is rooted in the embrace and achievement of these facets of unity through diversity, in 
overcoming divisions and instead finding common purpose. In enacting the essential nature of the 




The speech in Philadelphia did not discuss matters of foreign policy. But it is nevertheless a valuable 
source for examination. Obama’s speeches often provide a platform, as Axelrod suggested, to 
advance an argument, to draw out complications, and to weigh them against each other; jurist in the 
court of ideology.  
David Milne notes that “few things in history are as important as the life of an idea.”74 In a review of 
his book Worldmaking, Daniel Bessner suggests that Milne “demonstrates that epistemology shaped 
the thought of foreign policy intellectuals.” For Bessner, “this is an incisive observation that 
diplomatic historians, who generally pay the most attention to a thinker’s beliefs and not the means 
by which she or he arrived at these beliefs, should incorporate into future work.”75 Indeed, this 
thesis holds that one cannot conceive of foreign policy without first examining the ideas that lay 
behind it and the context in which they fomented. Ideas seep out of every pore of Obama’s 
engagement with the world around him. It is imperative for us to take them seriously. 
                                                          
70
 Ibid. p. 16 
71
 Ibid. p. 44 
72
 Ibid. p. 45 
73
 S. Sarson, Barack Obama: American Historian (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018). p. 279 
74
 Milne, Worldmaking. p. 20 
75
 D. Bessner, "Thinking About the U.S. In the World," Diplomatic History 41, no. 5 (2017). p. 1020 
25 
 
In her brilliant study of the intellectual history of the United States, The Ideas That Made America, 
Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen extolls the value of an intellectual history approach. “It is,” she 
contends, “an approach to understanding the American past by way of ideas and the people who 
made or were moved by them.” It enables the effort “to understand where certain persistent 
concerns in American thought have come from and why some ideas, which were important in the 
past, have faded from view.”76 With “a careful attention to time and place” it allows for questions 
such as “Why did they come to those conclusions? Why then? Why there?” Ratner-Rosehagen 
contends that for an intellectual historian “the context of the idea is as important as the idea 
itself.”77 
For Christopher McKnight Nichols, “intellectual history matters deeply to the ‘U.S. in the World,’ in 
part because it can illuminate the ideas and mind-sets – as well as the widest range of intellectual 
actors – in terms of what Michael Hunt refers to as the ‘interrelated set of convictions or 
assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible 
terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.’”78 Intellectual history is a means of 
excavating sets of “convictions or assumptions” that help shape pathways of action. 
In a review of a set of post-administration memoirs, political scientist Corey Robin refers to the 
staffers who authored them, somewhat derisively, as “the Obamanauts.”79 In examining the nascent 
Obama legacy as treated in these memoirs and the picture of Obama they paint, he contends that 
“instead of a clear outline of the man, we get the shadow of his enemies.” Robin concedes “that’s 
not fair to Obama,” yet argues that “as he’s the one who chose these people to speak for him while 
he was in office, they are the ones who’ve chosen to speak for him when he’s out. So it will remain, 
until he writes his memoirs.”80 Robin asserts that in the absence of Obama’s own perspective we can 
only get an understanding of what he represented - “what Obamaism, beneath and beyond Obama, 
was all about” - from these figures, and as such, when interrogating the question of “What is 
Obama’s legacy?” Robin suggests that “for better or worse, and at least for now, it’s the 
Obamanauts themselves.”81 
Whilst the specific matter of ‘legacy’ is thorny, this thesis ultimately rejects this notion that the 
absence of Obama’s voice in contemporary evaluation cedes ground to other actors in this search 
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for understanding. Instead, it contends that his voice has always been apparent, and can be found by 
examining his speeches, tying them in to his older writings, drawing him out from interviews, and 
from reading contemporary accounts of his presidency. In short, we can examine the ideas which 
resonated for Obama and the contexts which shaped them. We can understand his mode of 
thinking, and locate the convictions and assumptions which shaped his worldview. We can start 
doing that work of intellectual history now and, in the future, fold future Obama memoirs into that 
understanding. When the time comes, declassified memoranda and other such archival materials 
can add to the well of understanding of how the ideas of the Obama administration shaped the 
pursuit of his foreign policy. 
This is a process that Robin himself actually engages with, even if implicitly. He notes that certain 
efforts to understand Obama and the Obamanauts – assessments that find them making “an error of 
judgment” in their doomed efforts at engaging with intransigent Republicans - fail “to reckon 
with…elements of Obama’s public philosophy that render his refusal to confront the Republicans not 
a failure of tactics or strategy but a faithful reflection of his commitments.” This failure “begins with 
a misunderstanding of Obama’s radical-sounding rhetoric,” with Robin instead suggesting “Obama’s 
radicalism was, from the very beginning, bound up with a narrow notion of what politics was about.” 
“His was,” Robin maintained, “a vision less of power than of process, the culmination of twenty 
years of political theory journals where democracy was deliberation and deliberation was 
democracy.”82 
Robin here seems to accept, and exemplifies how, in attempting to understand Obama’s presidency, 
more can be gleamed through engaging with the very ways in which Obama himself conceptualized 
politics than through a mere examination of the manifestation of those politics themselves. Ratner-
Rosenhagen helpfully reminds us that “the primary responsibility of the intellectual historian is not 
to issue verdicts on moral decision-making of the past but rather to comprehend how those actors 
came to their understanding of their world and their role in it.”83 Keeping this in mind, regarding 
Obama’s foreign policy, this thesis will seek to develop understanding of the means by which his 
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In the case of Barack Obama, a particularly persistent idea emerges time and again, reflected in the 
“More Perfect” speech and beyond. It is a cornerstone output of a teleological worldview: that of 
taking a long view of history.  Former member of Obama’s National Security Council, Derek Chollet, 
has written a glowing assessment of his foreign policy entitled The Long Game in which he lays out 
eight criteria which guided Obama’s long game: balance, sustainability, restraint, precision, patience, 
fallibility, scepticism, and exceptionalism.84 Importantly, he emphasises that “Obama believes that 
playing the Long Game requires a clear North Star to aim toward, with persistent and steady 
progress to get there” and couples this with a comfort with incremental outcomes, “believing that 
some problems can only be managed, while just a few can be immediately solved,” the skill lies in 
distinguishing between them.85 
Ever the writer, Obama is keenly aware of being part of a “long running story” in which he is just 
trying to get his paragraph right.86 He expanded this notion in a series of metaphors. One such 
metaphor has each president as “a relay swimmer in a river full of rapids, and that river is history” 
where “you don’t start with a clean slate, and the things you start may not come to full fruition on 
your timetable. But you can move things forward. And sometimes the things that start small may 
turn out to be fairly significant.”87 He has alternately offered the vision of “tacking like a sailor 
toward a particular direction but [you] have to take into account winds and currents and 
occasionally the lack of any wind, so that you’re just sitting there for a while, and sometimes you’re 
being blown all over the place.”88 Once more on the nautical theme, he told Marc Maron of the 
process of making policy and affecting change in the world is like steering an ocean liner, whereby 
“sometimes the task of government is to make incremental improvements or try to steer the ocean 
liner two degrees north or south so that, ten years from now, suddenly we’re in a very different 
place than we were.”89 He put great emphasis on the slow process of making two-degree turns to 
make steady progress, rather than turning at fifty degrees and tipping over. 90 The theme of slow and 
steady progress, with optimism for victory in the long game, has been a consistent metronome 
keeping time for Obama in his presidency and beyond. 
Whether “perfection” as a moment of action is aimed at addressing the failings of the nation’s 
constitution, at bringing change to society, or at the challenge of foreign policy decision making and 
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steering a course for America in the world, it is reflective of Obama’s sensibility that draws heavily 
on pragmatism and navigating a course between permanent ideals of the absolute and the 
contextualised, of the universal and the particular. It reveals a worldview which is reflective, 
nuanced, and altogether, complicated. For Obama, perfection begins in a moment of disparate 
interests and ideas conversing with each other, working together to build a bridge between them, to 
































In weighing the disappointments of America’s past against hopes for its future, Obama rooted his 
thought in a patient vision of constant perfection. His instincts tended toward the pursuit of progress 
over a broad sweep of time. It was incremental but, in projecting the act of perfection into an 
indeterminate future, it was forward looking. As briefly sketched in the introduction this mode of 
thought spoke to a collection of philosophies and ideas which orbit around the American 
philosophical tradition of pragmatism. It is thus necessary to engage more fully with the ideas and 
history of pragmatism as a philosophy and mode of thinking. In acknowledging the complicated 
interplay between the particular and the universal, the contingent and the permanent, the 
undulating patchwork of paradoxes and paradigms, the opening chapter demonstrated the 
multiplicities at play in any effort to conceptualise the political ideology of Barack Obama. This is the 
context Obama’s pragmatism must be considered within. 
This is a thesis about foreign policy and the ideas that shape it. In understanding the political 
ideology and philosophy of any actor in foreign policy, we must seek to uncover the thinking which 
underwrites their approach to the world. But connecting ideas to policy is challenging. Indeed, it is a 
task that could easily be neglected for the sake of expediency or to evade the mire of complex 
argumentation. To do so in this thesis would lose the context that lies behind later foreign policy 
focused discussion. 
As such, what might feel like an unnecessary detour from matters of foreign policy is instead crucial 
for establishing the ideas which undergird Obama’s thinking on foreign policy matters. The 
interaction of pragmatism with other traditions in political theory forms a vital, albeit complicated, 
prism through which Obama’s political decisions can be examined. A crucial part of this philosophical 
consideration will centre on the tendency of Obama’s thinking to straddle the divide between 
opposing, often conflicting, perspectives. The frequent performance of such mental gymnastics 
provoked staunch criticism of a man who could apparently stand for both everything and nothing all 
at once. An empty vessel to be filled by the flavour de rigueur. But crucially, there exists enough of a 
cache of Obama’s writings and proclamations where the examination thereof can allow us to locate 
consistency in his thought. We can find a coherent philosophical outlook which offers cogency for 
that which had seemed contradictory. 
30 
 
This detour starts in the perhaps unlikely realm of the ‘culture wars.’ Though seemingly far removed 
from the concerns of foreign policy, the culture wars offer a starting point for understanding an 
intellectual climate which promoted and reified opposing conceptualisations of values, morality, and 
their place in time. It is worthwhile establishing how and where Obama takes his place in relation to 
the debates that animate the culture wars. Considering his place in those arguments over the very 
means of belief and epistemology is a crucial endeavour. It encapsulates the competing instincts of 
universalism and particularism that permeate his thought: the constant tension between acceding to 
the contingencies of time and the aspiration to escape it. 
After first examining philosophical pragmatism, the chapter will then consider how Obama 
contended with the division wrought by the culture wars, particularly as it attained a prominent 
place in his reading of the United States Constitution. This will necessitate a discussion on Obama’s 
specific legal grounding, significant in its congruence with his broader philosophical outlook. The 
importance of Abraham Lincoln as a guiding light for Obama and the specific vision of pragmatism he 
encapsulated will then be evaluated as a means of conceptualising Obama’s own complicated 




In 1991, James Davison Hunter defined the ‘culture wars’ as the gradual creep of conflict between 
opposing moral ideals into the everyday of American social and political life. Hunter declared that 
America was “in the midst of a culture war” that put the question of how people ordered their lives 
together at stake.91 He defined this cultural conflict as being representative of a “political and social 
hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding.”92  
Hunter characterised this divide as being of those who held an impulse toward orthodoxy set against 
those with an impulse toward progressivism.93 The former was a commitment to “an external, 
definable, and transcendent authority.” This authority offers the promise of "a consistent, 
unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, what is true, how we should live, and who we 
are.” An authority that assumes a quality “that is sufficient for all time.”94 This perspective is 
countered by cultural progressivism which assumes the notion that “moral authority tends to be 
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defined by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism.” As such, 
progressive moral ideals curate a vision of truth as “a process, as a reality that is ever unfolding.”95 
Under this view, historic faiths are re-symbolized in accordance with the “prevailing assumptions of 
contemporary life.”96  
In Age of Fracture, a superb exploration of this fragmentation of American society through the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, Daniel Rodgers notes that under the rubric of the culture wars “the 
emergent talk of fluidity and choice grew in tandem with contrary desires for centers and certainties, 
each drawing on each other’s energy.”97 It was “a battle over the very foundations of morality: 
between those who thought of ethics as adaptive, progressive, and socially constructed and those 
who thought of morals as fixed, timeless, and non-negotiable.”98 It was a battle which would shape 
the academic and intellectual environs within which Barack Obama would rise.  
Having attended a prestigious private preparatory high school in his home city of Honolulu, he was 
able to leverage a fairly inauspicious academic start into a scholarship to attend Occidental College 
in Los Angeles. After two years he jumped at the opportunity to transfer to Columbia University in 
New York. Though not the most diligent of students in his younger days, Obama showed a 
burgeoning intellectual curiosity. Before attending university, he read the writings of key Black 
intellectuals such as James Baldwin, Ralph Ellison, Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and W.E.B.  Du 
Bois, spurred as he was by the yearning for a sense of identity and belonging within the African-
American community.99 Over the course of his undergraduate years, whilst continuing his search, he 
developed a growing interest in politics, including keen involvement in anti-Apartheid and anti-
nuclear proliferation campaigns.100  Be it a concern for personal matters of race and identity, or 
wider political issues, he was demonstrating a propensity for serious engagement with large ideas. 
At Occidental, Obama took two courses - taught by Roger Boesche - which proved pivotal to his 
intellectual development. In addition to being Obama’s favourite instructor at Occidental, Boesche 
was later credited by the president as fully sparking his interest in politics.101 Boesche’s courses, 
‘American Political Thought’ and ‘Modern Political Thought,’ provided an important basis from which 
Obama would engage seriously with a wide range of political thinkers and texts. It would lead to his 
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reading of The Federalist Papers and key philosophical thinkers such as Nietzsche, Sartre, Marcuse, 
and Habermas, along with Boesche’s subject of specialism, Tocqueville.102 It was to be but a taste of 
Obama’s reading over the course of his years studying in higher education, where he also 
encountered a broad spectrum of important intellectuals including Emerson, Thoreau, Douglass, 
Lincoln, Niebuhr, Machiavelli, Marx, Weber, and Fanon, as well as an array of classical Roman and 
Greek thinkers.103 
At Columbia, Obama confesses to having turned to a somewhat ascetic lifestyle, focusing more and 
more on intellectual pursuits.104 Boesche remarked upon Obama’s later persistence in reading the 
works of Friedrich Nietzsche, that “Nietzsche calls everything into question. You have to call 
everything into question. He says God is dead… So if he kept reading Nietzsche, he went through a 
whole reasoning process in which he re-evaluated all the core beliefs that he had – and then came 
out on the other side.”105 He was developing a sceptical and philosophical mind. 
It was Obama’s third stop on the elite university tour, however, which bought him into direct contact 
with the culture wars. At law schools across the United States, the culture wars had manifested itself 
into a strident debate that left them in turmoil and formed a tense atmosphere of intellectual 
conflict.106 Harvard Law School was not immune to this. It was here Obama breathed in an 
atmosphere alive with debates over opposing visions of society and the means by which the law 
should interact with it. Rodgers reflects on how it was around this time that a gradual turn emerged 
in which conservative intellectuals began to see the culture wars as being less and less a conflict 
between different moral positions, but instead became more “a choice between ‘virtue’ and 
‘nihilism’ – between having morals and having none at all.”107 Rodgers again pithily displays the 
choice on hand, where “to stake one’s claims in certainties was to frame the alternative as an abyss 
of nothingness. Encounter with truth, on the one hand: the quicksands of relativism on the other.”108 
These debates, focused on whether ideas could be tied to the mast of absolute truths, were a crucial 
aspect of the academy as Obama became ensconced within it. Kloppenberg suggests “immersion in 
that intellectual maelstrom not only shaped Obama’s approach to law, it left a permanent imprint on 
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his ideas about American history and politics.”109 It stands to reason that it would have similar 
impact on his ideas about America’s foreign policy. 
It bears repeating from the introductory chapter Kloppenberg’s suggestion that whilst Obama shares 
“the scepticism of those critics who eroded the foundations on which mid-twentieth-century 
universalism stood” he also understands and is “haunted” by “the residual appeal that timeless 
ideals continue to exert.” From this, Kloppenberg asserted of Obama that “as he has been 
throughout his life, as president he remains caught in the force field between universalism and 
particularism.” Each ideas that stand as broadly analogous for Hunter’s orthodoxy and progressivism 
respectively. 
While much of the remainder of this chapter will place emphasis on the importance of pragmatism 
in Obama’s thinking, it is first important to note Bart Schultz’s warning that “the universalizing, 
Platonizing, Christianizing elements of Americanism are the very things pragmatism usually seeks to 
undercut.”110 It is thus a significant point of interest for Obama to be wedded to such ideals, 
anathema as they appear to his broader ideological instincts to be traced below. Herein lays a 
central enigma of Obama’s philosophical outlook, but also the political and foreign policy 
ramifications of it. As such, what follows will also examine the process by which Obama sought 
congruence between two contrasting worldviews. This again is not to suggest Obama’s approach is 
entirely anomalous, or exceptional. It is possible (perhaps probable) for every person in the policy 
making realm to carry conflicting views animated by different sources, constantly at friction with one 
another, competing for prominence. For political figures, decision makers, and foreign policy actors 
such is the demand on their attention of predetermined priorities and fundamental duties, they are 
almost compelled to encompass a broad dichotomy of perspectives from one issue to the next. Yet, 
Obama retained a notable place among such figures given the detail in which his writings and 
speeches have expressed the desire for a means by which contrasting ideas can reasonably be 
brought together to cohere in a functional manner. 
In foreign policy terms this becomes particularly pertinent, given the longstanding presence of 
schools of foreign policy thought which tend towards binaries. These binaries run on a spectrum 
ranging from the more conventional – interest-focused realist opposed to the values-oriented 
idealist, to the more nuanced “exemplarist” versus “vindicationalist,” transactional or 
transformational approach, or the varied intellectual consequences of an “artist” contra “scientist” 
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foreign policy outlook.111 Binaries often form a familiar and comforting lens through which to 
contend with the ever-changing contours of the international realm. In examining Obama’s apparent 
instinct to transgress the confines of such binaries, and his emphasis on speaking to multiple 
perspectives and viewpoints, we can establish a framework through which such a mindset and 
outlook can be applied to matters of foreign policy. In doing so, we can provide context for a 
president who overtly expressed that he was “comfortable with complexity,” and truly grapple with 
the implications of that, and the depth of the intellectual well from which he drew.112 Doing so will 
enable us to develop a more rounded perspective on Obama’s curation of a foreign policy than 





In June of 2006, Jim Wallis and his Christian association Sojourners held a conference in Washington 
D.C. Obama, Senator for Illinois, was invited to give the keynote speech at the event and he used the 
opportunity to address a cornerstone piece of the culture wars divide: that of religion and its 
relationship with politics. In so doing, his determination to navigate between intractable societal 
divides were prominently displayed. 
Sojourners is an organisation dedicated to applying articles of faith to issues of social justice, seeking 
to fuel discussion that places the Christian faith into context with political and social issues of the 
day.113 With this in mind the 2006 conference was entitled ‘Building a Covenant for a New America.’  
Obama’s speech was an ‘address on faith and politics,’ and he began by praising the conference and 
its other speakers’ ideas about the pressing concerns of poverty and justice in the United States. He 
in turn celebrated the impetus provided by the idealised ‘Covenant.’ But he noted that the ideas 
held within could not be impactful unless “the mutual suspicion that sometimes exists between 
religious America and secular America” was tackled head-on. He therefore wanted to use the 
platform to talk about “the connection between religion and politics” and in doing so to offer 
                                                          
111
 H. W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).;  Jr. Nye, J. S., Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era 
(Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013).; Milne, Worldmaking. 
112
 Remnick, "Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama". 
113
 Sojourners, "Our History,"  https://sojo.net/about-us/our-history. 
35 
 
thoughts on how to “sort through some of the often bitter arguments that we've been seeing over 
the last several years.”114  
He discussed a gap that had built up in American society between those who attended church 
regularly and those who did not. In doing so, he noted nevertheless that on the part of liberals 
(among whom he counted himself) it was to err in failing “to acknowledge the power of faith in 
people’s lives – in the lives of the American people.” As a result, it was time to “join a serious 
debate” about how faith could be reconciled with a modern, pluralistic democracy. He was hopeful 
“that we can bridge the gaps that exist and overcome the prejudices each of us bring to this debate.” 
This could later be recognized as signature Obama: advocating an implicit underlying notion that by 
bringing perspectives together to a more workable shared ideal, society could – and would - do 
better. We will later see how this extended in significant ways to the foreign policy realm. 
Wittingly or not, in his Sojourners speech, Obama was evoking thinking that had been put forth a 
century before, when William James sought to bridge his own time’s intractable philosophical divide. 
In a series of lectures given late in 1906 at the Lowell Institute, James began his efforts to establish 
pragmatism as a field of enquiry. He proffered to his audience that philosophy was divided into two 
conflicting modes of thinking. He saw a schism between rationalists and empiricists; the former 
committed to a worldview led by the heart and by emotions, the latter encountering the world on a 
basis of factual discovery, concerned only with what was empirically proven to be true.115 
James deemed this unsatisfactory polarization to be the most pressing dilemma in philosophy of the 
day. It was thus his ambition to present pragmatism as a middle course that could correct for the 
failings of each perspective and instead foment a more fruitful mode of enquiry. He too was seeking 
to speak across divides, to find a functioning path of action between two opposing ways of thinking. 
Drawing from the insights of his contemporary Charles Sanders Peirce, James forged a new 
philosophy (albeit one he termed as being ‘a new name for an old way of thinking’). He defined the 
pragmatic method as being one primarily of “settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be 
interminable.”116 He offered examples of disputes he deemed unending; “is the world one or many? 
– fated or free? – material or spiritual?” As a response, he argued: 
The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing 
its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make 
to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical 
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difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the 
same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be 
able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the 
other's being right.117 
The influence of Peirce’s earlier overtures was clear. In an essay first published in the January 1878 
issue of Popular Science Monthly, the logician had laid the foundations for what would become 
America’s novel contribution to philosophy. He wrote of his desire “to point out how impossible it is 
that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of 
things. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects.” From this, he curated his definitive 
maxim: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.”118  
For James, pragmatism was to stand as a radical perspective on notions of truth.  To assume the 
pragmatist method is to turn “away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from 
bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins,” 
and to turn instead “towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and 
towards power.”119 As a method, pragmatism means “the open air and possibilities of nature, as 
against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth.”120  
Literary scholar Morris Dickstein argues that James developed pragmatism “as a critique of 
abstractions and absolutes and as a philosophy oriented toward practice and action.”121 In rejecting 
the rationalist emphasis on eternal truths, James established pragmatism as an effort at finding truth 
centred upon a premise of provisionality and experimentalism. As such, “it stands for no particular 
results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method.”122 For James, an idea “makes itself 
true, gets itself classed as true, by the way it works.” Indeed, “truth is made…in the course of 
experience.”123 Truth cannot be conceived of separately from the actual practice of living, of asking 
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what it would mean for one idea to be true over another.124 Truth is found in the assimilation, 
validation, corroboration, and verification of ideas.125 
In engendering this “attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed 
necessities” pragmatism turns to a process of “looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, 
facts.”126 It is concerned with the practical outcomes of experience and practise. This focus on ‘last 
things’ necessitates a crucial consequentialism that once again rejects the notion that you can fully 
conceive the truth of something separate of an engagement and contextual experience of it. In a 
2011 New Yorker article on Obama’s response to the Arab Spring, Ryan Lizza noted that an aide had 
referred to Obama as “consequentialist.” They perceived him as “an anti-ideological politician 
interested only in what actually works.”127 Here, we already see the language of pragmatism seeping 
into discussion of Obama’s thought, and the implications that might carry for foreign policy. It bears 
remembering, from the introduction, Becker and Shane’s assertion of Obama’s instincts of 
“pragmatism over ideology.” At its core, pragmatism in foreign policy appears, in the first instance, 
as the notion of rejecting ideological considerations as a predicate for taking action on the world 
stage. It instead takes its cues from reacting to the realities and constraints of the moment.  
Dickstein argues that pragmatists see “the quest for certainty” as a “futile and misguided remnant of 
an outworn metaphysics, and they take the new, contingent, human-centred world as a source of 
opportunity and possibility. For the pragmatists, truth is provisional, grounded in history and 
experience, not fixed in the nature of things.”128 Prior to its migration into the mainstream of social 
argumentation, James and his contemporaries were making early moves in the intellectual 
unwinding which would rupture into the culture wars. By beginning to question the very foundations 
of truth, they were beginning to muddy the waters of whether such truths could ever be fixed in 
place. They threatened the certainty which had assured moral order. 
In his book The Metaphysical Club Louis Menand traces the intellectual and emotional milieu which 
gave rise to the pragmatist thinking of James, Peirce, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and John Dewey.129 
For Menand the key spark that set the movement aflame was the devastation of the American Civil 
War. The brutal four year conflict left those who witnessed its horrors in a state of disbelief at what 
fellow Americans – fellow humans – would do to each other in pursuit of an absolute idea. It 
                                                          
124




 Ibid. p. 29 
127
 R. Lizza, "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy,"  The New Yorker 
May 2 Issue (2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist. 
128
 Dickstein, "Introduction: Pragmatism Then and Now." p. 5 
129
 L. Menand, The Metaphysical Club (London: Flamingo, 2002). 
38 
 
spawned a horror at the inhibitions broken down by the devotion to an unyielding dogma.  Horror 
that translated to a distrust of the ideas, beliefs, and assumptions of the preceding era.130  
As the following chapter will discuss, Obama carried a similar suspicion of abstraction in foreign 
policy that was rooted largely in a reaction to the Bush administration’s approach to the Iraq War. 
For the early pragmatists, this suspicion of abstraction was to result in a changed perception about 
ideas. They came to believe that ideas are not “out there” waiting to be discovered, but are “tools… 
that people devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves.”131 Formed not 
individually, but socially, and not developed according to an inner logic of their own, but instead 
dependent “like germs, on their human carriers and the environment.”132 The pragmatists believed 
“that since ideas are provisional responses to particular and unreproducible circumstances, their 
survival depends not on their immutability but on their adaptability.”133 For the purposes of this 
thesis, it is important to recognize the implications of this pragmatist perspective in confronting the 
notion that directions in American foreign policy could ever be pure distillations of abstract truths 
plucked down from on high - manna from heaven. Instead they have always been made a certain 
way for specific purposes, through specific contexts. Drafters of foreign policy, nevertheless, have 
continued to claim the mantle of abstract ideals in driving their decisions. 
Menand argues that the key value animating these pragmatists was that of tolerance. It necessitated 
a means of social organisation that would allow for difference, for the room for adaptability, and the 
constant potential for better ideas to replace old ideas.134 Beliefs for these pragmatists “are just bets 
on the future” and that while people “may believe unreservedly in a certain set of truths, there is 
always the possibility that some other set of truths might be the case.” Ultimately, it is a sense that 
“we have to act on what we believe; we cannot wait for confirmation from the rest of the 
universe.”135 The tolerance of different perspectives and alternative conceptions of the world 
provides a moral justification for actions that are taken. The warning at the heart of pragmatism is 
that the alternative to toleration is force. As a result, Menand contends that “pragmatism was 
designed to make it harder for people to be driven to violence by their beliefs.” He elaborates: 
This sounds unexceptionable, and in many ways it is. But it is important to see 
that the idea is a compromise. Holmes, James, Peirce, and Dewey wished to bring 
ideas and principles and beliefs down to a human level because they wished to 
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avoid the violence they saw hidden in abstractions. This was one of the lessons 
the Civil War had taught them. The political system their philosophy was designed 
to support was democracy. And democracy, as they understood it, isn’t just about 
letting the right people have their say; it’s also about letting the wrong people 
have their say. It is about giving space to minority and dissenting views so that, at 
the end of the day, the interests of the majority may prevail.136 
Despite its fledgling success at the beginning of the century, pragmatism began to splutter as the 
weight of events-to-come ground it to a halt. The aftermath of World War II and the emergence of 
the Cold War world offered little incubation for the anti-essentialist worldview provoked by 
pragmatist thought. An approach which emphasized the contingency of history and the slippery 
nature of truth found short shrift in a world of rigid moral distinctions. This would become the world 
of the free and liberal west against the tyrannical Soviet east. The defeat of Nazism and the coming 
of the Cold War necessitated a certain moral clarity and thus instilled this virtue and its assumptions 
unquestioned and unfettered.  Absolutes became the currency of the day. 
By the end of the Cold War, however, a change in thought had occurred. There had been, under the 
surface, a growing dissatisfaction in the philosophical world with these moral absolutes and the 
restrictive analytic thinking that accompanied their formulation. It was a dissatisfaction with the 
foundationalism that had become so dominant in Western thought. With the end of the Cold War, 
old certainties were breaking down, trusted delineations buckling at the edges, and people were 
beginning to look around for new modes of understanding the ensuing malaise. This would prove to 
not only be a crucial backdrop to Obama’s education but it would also form the context of a struggle 
in U.S. foreign policy circles to understand this post-Cold War world. It would be a struggle that 
would last through to Obama’s own presidency. 
Primary among those who had been tirelessly laying the groundwork for this coming uncertainty was 
philosopher Richard Rorty whose work sought to build on what the earlier pragmatists had achieved. 
Beginning in 1980 with his iconoclastic Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he worked to question 
the very foundations of philosophy as it had come to be established.137 He questioned the very 
notion of truth itself and even the very possibility of philosophical inquiry finding answers it sought. 
For Rorty, many of the ideas animating pragmatism stood in firm contrast to what he argued to be a 
‘positivist’ account of truth. Under positivism, he argued, there is a “hope to leave behind [for all 
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future generations] true propositions, propositions which have been shown to be true once and for 
all.”138 
He emphasized how the positivist search for universal criterion for agreement are buttressed by the 
pragmatist conception of these same criterion as “temporary resting-places constructed for specific 
utilitarian ends.”139 The positivism of Platonist philosophy and its search for truth reflected an “urge 
to escape the vocabulary and practises of one’s own time and find something ahistorical and 
necessary to cling to.”140 In response to such a notion, Rorty pulled on the thread that he argued tied 
Nietzsche, James, Dewey, and Michel Foucault together, and warned that “there is nothing deep 
down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that we have not created in 
the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, 
no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions.”141 Indeed, as James put it 
over half a century earlier, “the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything.”142 
Rorty was not ploughing a lone furrow – contemporaries such as Richard Bernstein and Hilary 
Putnam were contending with similar questions, ideas, and conclusions about truth and the 
underpinnings of absolutist thought. These American philosophers were joined, among others, by 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, anthropologist Clifford Geertz, and scientist and intellectual 
historian Thomas Kuhn, in fomenting an intellectual moment which sought once more to unwind the 
foundational conceptions which had propped up understandings of the world and society for 
generations. 
Running parallel to, and frequently intersecting with, this reimagined pragmatism was another 
intellectual movement which found similar discomfort with truth as it had been dominantly 
portrayed. Prominent philosophers such as Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze were 
pursuing similarly anti-foundationalist modes of enquiry. This group of thinkers, which would 
broadly constitute the post-structuralist and post-modernist movements, sought to deconstruct all 
meaning and in doing so highlight the root power at play behind all thought and ideology.  
There are difficulties that come with a rejection of fixed truths. Bernstein argues that “much of the 
pathos of what is called “postmodernism” results from the claim that there are no firm fixed 
foundations for any of our beliefs.” Falling into the absolutism-relativism binary poses its own 
problems, whereby “if there are no firm foundations, then presumably there is no escape from an 
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“anything goes” relativism.” Indeed, with its relentless criticism of absolutism, foundationalism, and 
fundamentalism, Bernstein notes that pragmatism opens itself up to the critique that it stands for a 
version of Nietzschean relativism that stands for nothing at all.143 But he pushes back against this, 
arguing that pragmatists have rejected this relativism and “extreme scepticism,” and instead they 
have “advanced an ideal of ‘concrete reasonableness,’” a perspective that holds the belief that “we 
can distinguish better or worse options, and we should try to support our convictions with the best 
available evidence and reasons.”144 While it is important that pragmatists embrace the idea that “we 
never escape from contingency, uncertainty, and ambiguity,” pragmatism itself offers insight into 
how this malaise can be avoided.  Bernstein posits that “the response to contingency and 
uncertainty should not be despair, wild relativism, or the flight to new absolutes.” Instead “our task 
– and it is a difficult never-ending task – is to learn to live with this contingency, to respond as 
intelligently as we can to the new conflicts and crises that arise in our everyday lives.”145 For 
Bernstein, pragmatism allows for thought that is flexible and constantly open to scrutiny and 
adaptation. He maintains “the pragmatists believed that we can learn to think and act without 
relying on rigid banisters.”146  In this vision of pragmatism we can find much that animated Obama’s 
thinking. This is a connection we can draw even in the infancy of this study, given the themes 
expressed in the ‘More Perfect’ speech, that speaks to this advocacy of carefully and intelligently 
responding to the changing contingencies embedded in America’s evolution. To see this carried forth 
into foreign policy, we might expect to see an approach that was based more on an adjustment to 
the contingencies of the world than one which claimed to hold certain knowledge of how the world 
could be shaped acceding to an ideological image. 
Chris Hayes, Bart Schultz, Trygve Throntveit, David Milne, Cass Sunstein, and others have written in 
depth on drawing out such instances of pragmatism as a significant guiding force on Obama’s 
thought.147 Kloppenberg is also prominent among this group. He emphasises that his own work is 
not a matter of “trying to establish a necessary connection between philosophical pragmatism and 
Obama’s politics,” as “the former does not entail the latter.”  But instead he is arguing “from 
Obama’s writings back to the philosophy of pragmatism in order to show the congruence between 
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antifoundationalism, historicism, experimentalism, and democracy in his way of thinking.”148 If we 
can not necessarily pin Obama to a specific pragmatist thinker and their specific vision of 
pragmatism - though Kloppenberg nominates Bernstein as a workable approximation - we can at 
least place him in the nexus of pragmatist thought.149 Inhabiting, as he did, a way of thinking notable 
in its cacophony of ideas that compete, play off against one another, and complement one another 
to form a patchwork vision of a complex intellectual framework.  
In Obama’s speech at the Sojourners conference, we can draw out elements of ideas that swirl in 
this nexus of pragmatism, antifoundationalism, historicism, experimentalism, and democratic 
theory. As he addressed the divide between the religious and the secular he emphasized the 
valuable role that religion plays in society and the spur it can provide for social change. He 
contended that such movements offered the potential to make secular progressives strange 
bedfellows of the religious. Progressives “might recognize some overlapping values that both 
religious and secular people share when it comes to the moral and material direction of our 
country.”150  For Obama, “overlapping values brings to mind an idea of shared understandings, and 
consensus.”151 He argued that thinking in a collective rather than individual sense offered the 
possibility to engage groups from religious and secular backgrounds to work together “in the larger 
project of American renewal.” Obama’s emphasis on a communal and shared effort to solve issues 
speaks to a larger tradition that encompasses notions of pluralism, civic engagement, and the 
overarching movements of civic republicanism, communitarianism, and deliberative democracy.  
In celebrating pluralist democracy, civic virtue, and political participation as overtly as he does, 
Obama primed his compass towards a North Star of civic republicanism. Kloppenberg defines the 
civic republican tradition of public interest as “a conception of a shared, common good, emerging 
through the process of lively debate between champions of competing points of view.”152 Early on in 
The Audacity of Hope, Obama’s second book, he invokes “a tradition that stretched from the days of 
the country’s founding to the glory of the civil rights movement, a tradition based on the simple idea 
that we have a stake in one another, and that what binds us together is greater than what drives us 
apart, and that if enough people believe in the truth of that proposition and act on it, then we might 
not solve every problem, but we can get something meaningful done.”153 For Kloppenberg, Obama 
embraces a mode of thinking that holds the United States as being “designed from the start to be a 
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democracy in which the people would deliberate together to discover the meaning of justice and 
advance the common good.”154  This is a vision of American history that found compelling roots in 
Gordon Wood’s The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, an exploration of the thought 
which surrounded the writing of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Emphasising 
how “the sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of 
republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic goal of their Revolution,” Wood 
places the Founding Fathers in a tradition based upon interests of the collective as opposed to those 
purely of the individual anomic self. 155  
Kloppenberg emphasises how these ideas of the republican synthesis were ones which Obama was 
introduced to in Roger Boesche’s political theory class, and he contends that this is “among the most 
striking facts about Obama’s intellectual formation.” He argues that “whereas members of an earlier 
generation of Americans had been taught versions of the nation’s history that stressed the 
importance of individual rights in the founding, Obama from the beginning learned the importance 
of community, the centrality of obligations, and the shaping influence of civic virtue in American 
democracy.”156 It is thus significant that Obama’s conception of American history is one premised on 
a positive vision of human interaction. It is a conception which he brings forward into his own 
optimistic visions for how the nation can continue to strive for a future that he believes is entirely in 
keeping with its founding spirit.  
In key respects, Obama’s is a vision of American history which reifies aspects of what a critical eye 
might view instead as the mythos of the founding, a vision which on its face elides crucial 
uncomfortable realities of the Founders as slaveholders, self-interested businessmen, and 
propertied elites. Where Kloppenberg finds Obama’s immersion in such a history as indicative of a 
notable variance from previous generations, we might also observe a mythologized over-inflation of 
civic virtue as an animating factor in the nation’s founding. It is an important aspect of Obama’s 
thought to bear in mind. To the jaded, such credulity could seem misguided. Indeed, given the 
persistent unwillingness of the Republican Party and its Senate leader Mitch McConnell to engage in 
reciprocal civic republicanism, we might consign Obama’s immersion in that history as a naïve 
mistake in the present of American politics.157 But nevertheless, his continued insistence on this 
worldview in the face of such opposition is significant. And it might also indicate a willingness on the 
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international stage to continue with such a hope, even when confronted with foes more violently 
opposed to Obama’s America than the Republican Party. 
As discussed above, Louis Menand emphasized how the notion of toleration underpinned 
pragmatism. As a conscious effort to preclude the violence of abstraction, pragmatism was a mode 
of thinking designed to facilitate this precious human interaction. Democracy is the system of social 
organisation which allows for the malleable process of experimentation and re-evaluation of ideas in 
order to reach an understanding of what is best for society. It also enables the adaptability to solve 
new problems and disagreements as they arise. 
James, in his original writings, emphasized the importance of pluralism to the pragmatic method of 
inquiry, arguing that “pragmatism…must obviously range herself upon the pluralistic side.”158 
Pragmatism naturally coheres with a pluralist view which allows for a multiplicity of perspective. This 
places pragmatism in a firm lock-step with the reification of democracy so central to the American 
project. Bernstein contends that “an adequate theory of democracy should incorporate the principle 
of fallibility, the openness of all inquiry and interpretation, the need for the cultivation of critical 
habits of deliberation,” thus making it clear that the traits and goals of pragmatism and democracy 
form a symbiotic relationship.159  
Bernstein considers the thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Habermas, and Rorty, and 
teases out “a current that keeps drawing us to the central themes of dialogue, conversation, 
undistorted communication, communal judgment, and the type of rational wooing that can take 
place when individuals confront each other as equals and participants.”160 He emphasises a 
pragmatism embedded in this pluralist democratic process. The embrace of ideas “draw us toward 
the goal of cultivating the types of dialogical communities in which phronesis [“practical wisdom”], 
judgment, and practical discourse become concretely embodied in our everyday practices.”161 For 
Bernstein the embrace of such pragmatism “is not antithetical to an appreciation of the depth and 
pervasiveness of conflict…which characterizes our theoretical and practical lives,” but crucially, he 
maintains that:  
On the contrary, this vision is a response to the irreducibility of conflict grounded 
in human plurality. But plurality does not mean that we are limited to being 
separate individuals with irreducible subjective interests. Rather it means that we 
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seek to discover some common ground to reconcile differences through debate, 
conversation, and dialogue.162 
A running theme in Obama’s intellectual output is an emphasis on the importance of seeking 
common ground within plurality. Bernstein’s argument is an important statement concerning 
pragmatism’s mode of operation and its goals. It is also a crucial representation of how Obama 
conceived of the American political project. But vitally, for the purposes of this thesis, it also found a 
home in his foreign policy. 
Efforts at reaching a level of reconciliation of difference and common ground became a large part of 
Obama’s foreign policy in its determined focus on diplomacy. This began right from the opening 
moments of his presidency. “To the Muslim world” Obama proclaimed in his inaugural address, “we 
seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” He noted more generally 
“to those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent,” that they 
should “know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are 
willing to unclench your fist.”163 
He followed this overture with a trip to Cairo to give a speech heralded as “a new beginning” which 
he sought between the United States and Muslims worldwide, a beginning “based on mutual 
interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive 
and need not be in competition.” Instead, he argued “they overlap, and share common principles -- 
principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.” To achieve 
progress in this regard, he maintained, “there must be a sustained effort to listen to each other; to 
learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common ground.”164  
The common ground Bernstein expressed as a vital part of pragmatism in its effort “to reconcile 
differences through debate, conversation, and dialogue” was adopted by Obama not only in his 
visions of domestic American democracy, but vitally, it was also deemed a constituent part of a 
foreign policy aimed at overcoming adversarial relationships. Obama spoke in general terms in his 
inaugural address and in Cairo, but it would be realized in concrete policy through the Iranian 
nuclear deal, and the “opening” to Cuba, two countries notable in their historical enmity with the 
United States. Susan Rice, who served as Obama’s Ambassador to the UN in the first term writes in 
her memoir that “in President Obama’s view, my job and that of my team was to bridge old divides, 
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find common ground where possible, stand tough when necessary, and forge collective solutions 
that would help us confront the most intractable global challenges.”165 The pursuit of common 
ground would prove a pivotal part of how Obama perceived the most effective ways of pursuing U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Bringing these ideas to bear on the notion of the role of religion in democratic life, Obama argued at 
the Sojourners conference that, in the search for this common ground: 
Democracy demands that the religiously motivated translate their concerns into 
universal, rather than religion-specific, values. It requires that their proposals be 
subject to argument, and amenable to reason. I may be opposed to abortion for 
religious reasons, but if I seek to pass a law banning the practice, I cannot simply 
point to the teachings of my church or evoke God's will. I have to explain why 
abortion violates some principle that is accessible to people of all faiths, including 
those with no faith at all.166  
Here Obama reflects ideas reminiscent of one of the thinkers Bernstein contended with in his 
aforementioned work: Jürgen Habermas.  
Habermas sought to advance the notion of “universal pragmatics” in the realm of human 
communication, the goal of which “is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible 
understanding.”167 He argued this aim of reaching an understanding to be fundamental, and as such, 
he starts from an assumption that “other forms of social action – for example, conflict, competition, 
strategic action in general – are derivatives of action oriented to reaching understanding.”168 
Habermas holds that “the goal of coming to an understanding is to bring about an agreement that 
terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual 
trust, and accord with one another.”169 Bernstein characterizes Habermas’ project as seeking “a way 
of redeeming, reconstructing, and rationally defending the emancipatory aspirations of the 
Enlightenment – emancipatory aspirations that call for autonomy and concrete freedom embracing 
all of humanity.”170 Contra to the philosophy of Rorty (and much to the American’s chagrin), there is 
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a universalizing element to Habermas’ thought which conceives of rationalizations that underlie 
‘communicative action’ as providing a telos and a guiding principle for practice.171 Bernstein argues 
Habermas’ key insight is that under pluralism, with different perspectives rooted in “unique 
traditions,” there is a claim to reason which can provoke mutual dialogue and discourse.172 He 
argues “the interpretations that Habermas develops in these interrelated contexts are animated by a 
unifying ‘moral-political intention’ the desire to show that there is a telos immanent in our 
communicative action that is oriented to mutual understanding.”173 There is an indelible societal 
interaction which is aimed at common understanding.174  
The introduction considered the notion that Obama himself carries a sense of telos in his treatment 
of America and its capacity for perfection. In part, this was characterized by a determination towards 
diverse interests coming together as one. Obama was exposed to the ideas of Habermas in 
Boesche’s class. While it might not be possible to ascribe direct influence of Habermas on Obama, 
the presence of certain key ideas expressed in Obama’s writings suggests that the broad intellectual 
tenor which surrounded Habermas’ project has permeated, at the very least, into surface level 
aspects of Obama’s thinking. 
In his prioritising of a democratic means of creating society, Obama also draws heavily – again, 
consciously or not - on the ideas of John Dewey, one of America’s foremost philosophers, one of the 
leading pragmatists, and a key figure in theories of social reform and education. In the latter 
capacity, he was the founder of the University of Chicago’s famed Lab School, which Obama’s own 
daughters attended. In his impressive intellectual biography of Dewey, Alan Ryan highlights that 
Habermas also shared a significant relationship of thought with Dewey, writing “there are many 
connections between Habermas’s ideas about emancipatory forms of social theory and Dewey’s 
conception of philosophy as social criticism” and draws parallels between each thinker’s attachment 
of human communication to democracy.175 Ryan argues that they share an idea that “only when 
people can communicate on free and equal terms can they achieve the deep self-understanding that 
we have hankered after since the Enlightenment. If freedom and equality are absent, what can be 
said and thus what can be thought will be limited.”176  
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It is in this sense that Obama can himself be placed firmly in the realm of Deweyan thought.177 He 
subscribes to the lionization of democracy as a guiding principle for American society. As the very 
key to unlock the liberty promised by its foundation. Indeed, we can even see how Obama held a 
belief that the world would benefit from a democratic turn. The degree to which he did not actively 
pursue democratization as a matter of course his for foreign policy was a significant departure from 
his two predecessors. But he nevertheless did hold fast to the continual emphasis - through rhetoric 
at least - of the promises of democracy for every country of the world, and for its place in 
conceptions of a better world.178 
The particular significance of Dewey’s emphasis on democracy lies in the sense by which it was not 
to be seen purely as a means to an end – a way of achieving a specific society – but instead it was 
the end in itself. In The Public and its Problems Dewey emphasized that engagement with 
community and participation with civic association and family life is enriching for “a good citizen” as 
the “pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord.”179 He 
proclaimed that “regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of 
associated life. It is the idea of community life itself.”180 It encompasses all the interactions, 
associations, and commitments held between various interests shared and otherwise. Simply, for 
Dewey, “the clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of 
democracy.”181 Under a Deweyan conception, Bart Schultz argues that the very purpose of American 
democracy “is not to aggregate consumer preferences on the political side, but to create a forum for 
deliberation and participation, for listening to one another, talking to one another, and taking action 
together.”182 
The resonance with Habermas’ and Obama’s thought is made clear in Dewey’s assertion that 
“democracy will come into its own for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching 
communion.” And vitally, it would reach its fruition “when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded 
to the art of full and moving communication.”183 This ideal of employing communication between 
dissected interests is a central aspect of Habermas’ communicative action and of Obama’s notion of 
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putting ideas up for argumentation in a deliberative manner. It was the exact argument behind his 
speech at the Sojourners conference, and would underline overtures such as those made in his 
inaugural address, in Cairo, Yangon, and to Cuba and Iran. 
Ryan places Dewey as falling within what would become the communitarian tradition. A movement 
with which Obama carries clear connections. Communitarian thinking is animated by the notion that 
people learn how to live “the moral life” in a community, based on that community’s established 
moral precepts. It holds that our ideals are learned, shaped, and developed by such a common 
life.184 What Ryan termed as Dewey’s “revolt against Kant and utilitarianism” was matched, he 
argued, by a similar revolt in the latter part of the twentieth century.185 Communitarianism emerged 
into the mainstream of political thought primarily through its contention with the thought of John 
Rawls.  Rawls himself had proved a vital influence for liberal politics since his essential A Theory of 
Justice was published.186 He sought to develop a means for organising society based upon the 
thought experiment of ‘the original position,’ where a social contract would be drawn up behind ‘the 
veil of ignorance’ whereby no individual would know their place in society once it was created. Rawls 
argued that under such conditions, people would reason to establish the fairest society possible, so 
as to preserve their self-interest. Justice conceived under such conditions was to be a fair 
agreement, and thus Rawls termed his theory “justice as fairness.”187 Ryan notes that “this is an 
individualistic device in many ways; it assumes that our concern for ourselves is more basic and 
more natural than our concern for others, it represents public life as a system of mutual bargaining, 
and it adopts a view of rational behaviour modelled on the one we find in classical economics.”188  
The communitarian critique, led initially by Charles Taylor and later Michael Sandel, argued that 
Rawls failed to account for the commitments to others which constitute so much of human life. He 
disregarded religious and ethical considerations, cultural and national traditions – communal 
enterprises - which are so central to a person’s sense of self.189 In time, Rawls would amend his 
thinking and historicize his project. As Kloppenberg eruditely puts it, “he brought A Theory of Justice 
down from the ‘Archimedean point’ of universality, from the imagined exchanges among 
disembodied rational actors operating behind the veil of ignorance, and placed him in the particular 
context of modern American culture. Justice could no longer be conceived in terms of unchanging 
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principles.”190 Instead, Rawls embraced and emphasized the pluralism underwriting justice produced 
by “an overlapping consensus.”191 This concept resonated with Deweyan, Habermasian, and what 
would later be Obamian thought.  
Kloppenberg effectively traces the synthesis which began to develop between Rawlsian liberalism 
and communitarianism and notes the influence of such ideas on Obama. In defining Obama as a civic 
republican, Kloppenberg argues that he is “committed to a revised version of Rawls’s principles of 
justice as applied to law and politics by many of those with whom he studied, and whose work he 




Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone thesis catapulted concerns over how community life was declining in 
the United States into popular discourse. It argued that bonds of community were breaking, and 
people were becoming more atomized, lonely in their separation from surrounding networks of 
support and companionship.193 Obama internalized these ideas and expressed them in multiple 
forums. At the Sojourners conference, he noted how each day people were going about their daily 
business and were “coming to the realization that something is missing.” 
They want a sense of purpose, a narrative arc to their lives. They're looking to 
relieve a chronic loneliness, a feeling supported by a recent study that shows 
Americans have fewer close friends and confidants than ever before. And so they 
need an assurance that somebody out there cares about them, is listening to 
them - that they are not just destined to travel down that long highway towards 
nothingness.194 
It was a search for belonging and connection that Obama himself had sought, not only in the 
religious sense. In contending with his own identity, he wrote in Dreams From My Father that his 
growing understanding of himself as a black American “remained unanchored to place.” He yearned 
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for a community that would “cut deeper than the common despair that black friends and I shared 
when reading the latest crime statistics, or the high fives I might exchange on a basketball court. A 
place where I could put down stakes and test my commitments.”195 
Obama began to learn lessons centring around the importance of community and human 
connectivity in another hallowed (if informal) institution of education - that of the streets. A short 
while after graduating from Columbia, he assumed the role of a community organizer in the South 
Side of Chicago. The thrust of community organising, as expressed by its architect Saul Alinsky – a 
radical reformer and a native Chicagoan attuned to the city’s rough and tumble machine-politics - is 
to “give [people] a way to participate in the democratic process, a way to exercise their rights as 
citizens and strike back at the establishment that oppresses them, instead of giving in to apathy.”196 
Writing in a 1988 edition of Illinois Issues (a periodical covering government and public policy in 
Illinois), Obama gave a precis of the aims and ideas that lay behind community organising. He argued 
that, “in theory,” it “provides a way to merge various strategies for neighborhood 
empowerment.”197 It is aimed at addressing the lack of power communities have to solve problems 
they face. He suggested that “the only way for communities to build long-term power is by 
organizing people and money around a common vision,” and emphasized the necessity of a “broadly 
based indigenous leadership” to “knit together the diverse interests of their local institutions.”198 It is 
a movement based upon bringing people together to realize shared interests. It is far beyond Rawls’ 
rational individual identifying solely what will benefit them. Instead “it enables people to break their 
crippling isolation from each other, to reshape their mutual values and expectations and rediscover 
the possibilities of acting collaboratively” which itself Obama termed “the prerequisites of any 
successful self-help initiative.”199 The seeds of pluralism in Obama’s thinking were planted deep, 
their roots intertwining with those of communitarianism and democratic representation. 
The principles that animate community organising were of utmost import to Obama. He made the 
twin pillars of democracy and community abundantly clear in two speeches which bookended a key 
dividing line in his life; his farewell address as President, and his first public engagement as a former 
president. In his farewell address, he expressed the intention of his speech to focus on the state of 
American democracy. In order to preserve and protect American democracy, he warned that “all of 
us, regardless of party, should be throwing ourselves into the task of rebuilding our democratic 
institutions” an act which he argued depends on “accepting the responsibility of citizenship, 
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regardless of which way the pendulum of power happens to be swinging.” He argued that it is the 
people who give the Constitution power and meaning “with our participation, and with the choices 
that we make and the alliances that we forge.”200 These ideas deemed by Obama to be the crucial 
last message he needed to give the people before leaving office are ideas so inherent to the 
Deweyan vision. It was a message of democracy and democratic processes as the all-encompassing 
philosophic virtue to be pursued for the betterment of society. For the curation of communities who 
understand their interests in a shared sphere of argumentation and deliberation. The rhetorical 
flourish of urging those who believe something in society needs fixing to “lace up [their] shoes and 
do some organizing” was a final nod to his past, but also to the potential it offered for the future.201  
He would reach into this past again in his first appearance post-presidency. It was at an event at the 
University of Chicago where Obama chaired a panel with six students from the local area. He gave an 
opening soliloquy in which he discussed his time as an organizer in the area: 
This community gave me a lot more than I was able to give in return, because this 
community taught me that ordinary people, when working together, can do 
extraordinary things. This community taught me that everybody has a story to 
tell. That is important. This experience taught me that beneath the surface 
differences of people that there were common hopes and common dreams and 
common aspirations. Common values. That stitched us together as Americans. 
And so even though I, after three years, left for law school, the lessons that had 
been taught to me here as an organizer are ones that stayed with me. And 
effectively gave me the foundation for my subsequent political career and the 
themes that I would talk about as a state legislator and as a U.S. Senator and 
ultimately as president of the United States.202 
He emphasized the importance of seeking a “common reality” which he argued had gone by the 
wayside in public discourse. Its renewal would allow for the people “to have a healthy debate and 
then try to find common ground and actually move solutions forward.”203 
This notion of engaging in public participation, argumentation, deliberation, and the search for 
agreement of shared interests are a thread that has run consistently through the thought of Barack 
Obama. He expressed this in his Sojourners conference speech with regards to religious belief and its 
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relation to pluralism. He noted the difficulties posed by the attempts to bring those who believe in 
the inerrancy of the Bible in to such a deliberative process, but he affirmed that “in a pluralistic 
democracy, we have no choice.” Vitally, for Obama “politics depends on our ability to persuade each 
other of common aims based on a common reality. It involves the compromise, the art of what's 
possible.” He reflected here an essentially pragmatic screed, both in the language of “the art of 
what’s possible” but also in valorising the coming together of a cross-section of perspectives to 
arrive at a solution that is attainable. He conceded an important point, however, that “at some 
fundamental level, religion does not allow for compromise” and as such “embodies the notion of an 
absolute truth, an infallible truth that is free of context.”204 It becomes Hunter’s vision of orthodoxy, 
certain of the fixed moral veracity of an established truth. 
Obama himself has reached into the past, to the very founding of the United States to talk about 
those ideas cohering around the ‘culture wars’ divide. In doing so he staked an argument predicated 
on a specific reading of the Constitution. As Obama taught for twelve years at the University of 
Chicago, specialising in constitutional law, we can take his perspective on the matter as being serious 
and rigorously drawn from a depth of study. It is thus valuable to acknowledge his exposition of the 
fundamental divide in the legal world that is built around competing conceptions of how the 
Constitution is to be read, understood, and acted upon. In this divide we can see the legal 
foundations for cultural conflicts as they are contested today in mainstream American society. 
In The Audacity of Hope, Obama offered a clear rendering of this divide. He wrote that American 
society is “arguing about how to argue – the means, in a big, crowded, noisy democracy, of settling 
our disputes peacefully. We want to get our way, but most of us also recognize the need for 
consistency, predictability, and coherence. We want the rules governing our democracy to be 
fair.”205 And thus, when getting into arguments, debate, and disagreements about weighty moral 
issues, people “appeal to a higher authority – the Founding Fathers and the Constitution’s ratifiers” 
to give more direction.206 Obama held up the late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia as an 
example of the approach to the Constitution which concludes that “the original understanding must 
be followed and that if we strictly obey this rule, then democracy is respected.”207 He contrasted 
Scalia’s position to that of Justice Stephen Breyer, who does not dispute that “the original meaning 
of constitutional provisions matters” but he and others who follow his conception “insist that 
sometimes the original understanding can take you only so far – that on the truly hard cases, the 
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truly big arguments, we have to take context, history, and the practical outcomes of a decision into 
account.”208 Obama put this notion forward as taking the view that “the Founding Fathers and the 
original ratifiers have told us how to think but are no longer around to tell us what to think” and as 
such “we are on our own, and have only our own reason and judgment to rely on.”209  Obama 
conceded that he saw the appeal of Scalia’s perspective, given his own reverence for the 
accomplishment of the Founding Fathers, indeed he argued that “as we read these documents, they 
seem so incredibly right that it’s easy to believe they are the result of natural law if not divine 
inspiration.”210 The very material of a fixed understanding of the way the world should be. Ultimately 
though, Obama sided with Breyer’s view of the Constitution, arguing that “it is not a static but rather 
a living document, and must be read in the context of an ever-changing world.”211 It is the language 
of the culture wars transplanted into the very core of how American society should be organized 
upon legal principles. 
That Obama internalized these debates and ideas was a natural by-product of his time at Harvard 
Law School. In a sign of Obama’s enmeshment within the ideas that percolated around Cambridge at 
the time, he served as a research assistant for the legal scholar Laurence Tribe on his paper ‘The 
Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics,’ which argued 
that legal practitioners should be mindful of the impact that interpreting the law has upon society. 
Indeed, “like all human activity, the law is inevitably embroiled in the dialectical process whereby 
society is constantly recreating itself.”212 Perhaps more significantly, Tribe and Michael Dorf (another 
scholar in the department), noted in the acknowledgments of their book On Reading the 
Constitution that “Robert Fisher and Barack Obama have influenced our thinking on virtually every 
subject discussed in these pages.”213 The book expressed the value of approaching the Constitution 
through a process of interpretation. They argued that “fundamentally, the Constitution is, rather, a 
text to be interpreted and reinterpreted in an unending search for understanding.”214 For Tribe and 
Dorf, “reading the Constitution does not require an overarching theory of constitutional 
interpretation.”215 They contended that: 
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 Although we cannot give a completely consistent theory of constitutional 
interpretation, we can at least sketch some acceptable approaches to the 
enterprise. If the task we have set for ourselves sounds halting and tentative, it is 
because the questions to which constitutional interpretation are addressed are so 
basic and so difficult. More often than not, we have no answers, and those we 
offer are almost never held with certitude. We do not attempt to offer the last 
word on the Constitution’s meaning; when a last word is possible the Constitution 
will have lost its relevance to an ever-changing society. Less ambitiously, but 
perhaps more realistically, we hope to contribute to a useful dialogue on reading 
the Constitution, “a constitutional conversation.”216 
They provide a footnote for this last notion, which states “we are grateful to Robert Fisher and 
Barack Obama for the metaphor of constitutional interpretation as conversation.”217 Obama later 
put forth these arguments in The Audacity of Hope as a crucial part of his vision of the Constitution. 
Obama termed it a “shift in metaphors”:  
That sees our democracy not as a house to be built, but as a conversation to be 
had. According to this conception, the genius of Madison’s design is not that it 
provides us a fixed blueprint for action, the way a draftsman plots a building’s 
construction. It provides us with a framework and with rules, but fidelity to these 
rules will not guarantee a just society or assure agreement on what’s right. It 
won’t tell us whether abortion is good or bad, a decision for a woman to make or 
a decision for a legislature. Nor will it tell us whether school prayer is better than 
no prayer at all.218 
For Obama, the Constitution offers a means by which American society can argue about its future.219 
Indeed “all of its elaborate machinery – its separation of powers and checks and balances and 
federalist principles and Bill of Rights – are designed to force us into a conversation, a ‘deliberative 
democracy’ in which all citizens are required to engage in a process of testing their ideas against an 
external reality, persuading others of their point of view, and building shifting alliances of 
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consent.”220 The notion of testing ideas against external realities is an essential aspect of pragmatism 
which, in its Jamesian notion of experimentalism, Obama expressed with aplomb. 
Crucially for Obama, this conception of the Constitution again emphasises the importance, from the 
very founding of the nation, of curating a process of deliberation and persuasion. At the Sojourners 
conference Obama referred to the fundamental notion of religious belief not allowing for 
compromise. As such, he termed it the “art of the impossible” whereby followers are expected to 
live by God’s word and edicts without regards to the consequences. For Obama, “to base one’s life 
on such uncompromising commitments may be sublime, but to base our policy making on such 
commitments would be a dangerous thing.”221 Here is an explicit rejection from Obama of the notion 
of absolute truth as a driver for decision making. And this is a rejection which again he based in his 
reading and understanding of the Founding Fathers and their formulation of the Constitution. He 
argued that it was “not just absolute power that the Founders sought to prevent. Implicit in its 
structure, in the very idea of ordered liberty, was a rejection of absolute truth, the infallibility of any 
idea or ideology or theology or “ism,” any tyrannical consistency that might lock future generations 
into a single, unalterable course, or drive both majorities and minorities into the cruelties of the 
Inquisition, the pogrom, the gulag, or the jihad.”222 Instead, drawing out yet another pragmatic 
flavour from the pantry of William James, Obama argued that the Founders were “suspicious of 
abstraction and liked asking questions, which is why at every turn in our early history theory yielded 
to fact and necessity.”223 It is telling that this is the reading which Obama gleamed from the 
Founding Fathers. He saw the rejection of absolutes as being woven into the fabric of the nation. 
Woven in to the very means by which it is appropriate to create society absent abstractions. Set 
entirely on the premise that to reject absolute truth, and to deny the infallibility of any ideology, is 
to enable a flexibility and openness to change that, in his view, had enabled the American project to 
thrive. 
Obama recognised a ‘fundamental humility’ in this particular reading of the Constitution and the 
American democratic process. He conceded “the rejection of absolutism implicit in our 
constitutional structure may sometimes make our politics seem unprincipled” – and such a 
conception “seems to champion compromise, modesty, and muddling through.” But he contended it 
is a mistake to assume “that democratic deliberation requires abandonment of our highest ideals, or 
of a commitment to the common good.”224 Instead, it is a system that “has encouraged the very 
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process of information gathering, analysis, and argument that allows us to make better, if not 
perfect, choices, not only about the means to our ends but also about the ends themselves.”225 For 
shapers of foreign policy, this notion of matching means to ends might resonate in respect to the 
goals of formulating grand strategy.226 Obama showed himself as being open to a pragmatist mode 
of thought that carried implications for how he would approach matters of determining the direction 
of America’s foreign policy infrastructure. This is a quintessential notion of pragmatic 
experimentation that once again James would recognise. It also points to Obama carrying a reading 
of the Constitution that embodies a pragmatic mode of thought. His version of America is one where 
it seeks to use a process of experimentation and inquiry in order to achieve better results, in order 
to constantly pursue the process of perfection. Obama argued that “whether we are for or against 
affirmative action, for or against prayer in schools, we must test out our ideals, vision, and values 
against the realities of a common life, so that over time they may be refined, discarded, or replaced 




Emphasising the importance of democracy in fostering shared understandings, Bernstein wrote that 
“the strength of the pragmatists is the recognition that both individual liberty and active communal 
life are essential for a democratic polity.”228 Again, consciously or not, Obama echoed this mode of 
pragmatist thinking. The “realities of a common life” are guided by the Constitution which, he 
summated “envisions a road map by which we marry passion to reason, the ideal of individual 
freedom to the demands of community.”229 
In a 2007 interview, Obama told Ryan Lizza that he was constantly trying to “balance a hard head 
with a soft heart.”230 This ongoing tightrope walk was central to Obama’s worldview. The measured 
search for a mediation of conflicting ideas permeates so much of his writing and speeches. This 
chapter has repeatedly emphasized how this process of marrying passion to reason - of balancing a 
hard head with a soft heart - weighs heavily on Obama, and it is here that we begin to see the outer 
limits of that struggle, and arrive at the ideological implications of a specific breaking point. 
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In a significant passage in The Audacity of Hope, Obama wrestled with the stain of slavery and its 
inherent place within the founding of the nation. He argued that he was “too invested in what this 
country has become, too committed to its institutions, its beauty, and even its ugliness, to focus 
entirely on the circumstances of its birth” but he maintained that “neither can I brush aside the 
magnitude of the injustice done, or erase the ghosts of generations past, or ignore the open wound, 
the aching spirit, that ails this country still.”231 And it is here that he realized those aspirations to 
escape contingency, to leave history in his wake. It is where he broke from the sceptical anti-
foundational spirit which grounded so much of his thought, and leapt most visibly into the realm of 
the absolute. In a fascinating passage, he ruminated: 
The best I can do in the face of our history is remind myself that it has not always 
been the pragmatist, the voice of reason, or the force of compromise, that has 
created the conditions for liberty. The hard, cold facts remind me that it was 
unbending idealists like William Lloyd Garrison who first sounded the clarion call 
for justice; that it was slaves and former slaves, men like Denmark Vesey and 
Frederick Douglass and women like Harriet Tubman, who recognized power 
would concede nothing without a fight. It was the wild-eyed prophecies of John 
Brown, his willingness to spill blood and not just words on behalf of his visions, 
that helped force the issue of a nation half slave and half free. I’m reminded that 
deliberation and the constitutional order may sometimes be the luxury of the 
powerful, and that it has sometimes been the cranks, the zealots, the prophets, 
the agitators, and the unreasonable – in other words, the absolutists – that have 
fought for a new order. Knowing this, I can’t summarily dismiss those possessed 
of similar certainty today – the antiabortion activist who pickets my town hall 
meeting, or the animal rights activist who raids a laboratory – no matter how 
deeply I disagree with their views. I am robbed even of the certainty of 
uncertainty – for sometimes absolute truths may well be absolute.232 
This last sentence offers perhaps the most telling insight into the complexity and ongoing dialectical 
nature of his thought. It demonstrates a keen awareness that even the self-conscious wisdom of 
uncertainty that abounds with fealty to pragmatic deliberative thinking can offer no recourse to the 
sometimes urgent hope and moral clarity that ascends with absolutism.  
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In this moment of confusion, Obama turned to a true titan of American history for guidance. He 
wrote “I’m left then with Lincoln, who like no man before or since understood both the deliberative 
function of our democracy and the limits of such deliberation.”233 He traced the virtue for which 
Americans remember him, “the firmness and depth of his convictions – his unyielding opposition to 
slavery and his determination that a house divided could not stand.” But Obama saw past this to 
note that Lincoln’s was a presidency “guided by a practicality that would distress us today.” He 
chronicled Lincoln’s Civil War efforts in bargaining with the Confederacy to uphold the Union 
without war, changing generals and strategies throughout the war, and a willingness to “stretch the 
Constitution to the breaking point in order to see the war through to a successful conclusion.” It is 
the image of a President – and a national icon - guided not by stringency of ideals, but instead solely 
by practical considerations. Obama, however, rebuffed this conception, arguing instead his belief 
that “for Lincoln, it was never a matter of abandoning conviction for the sake of expediency. Rather, 
it was a matter of maintaining within himself the balance between two contradictory ideas – that we 
must talk and reach for common understandings, precisely because all of us are imperfect and can 
never act with the certainty that God is on our side; and yet at times we must act nonetheless, as if 
we are certain, protected from error only by providence.”234 For observers of U.S. foreign policy, 
they will recognize this dilemma as forming the core of the nation’s efforts in world affairs. The 
competing impulses between doing more and doing less, imposing its will and standing back 
disinterested. Obama’s pragmatism in foreign policy will be seen throughout the remainder of this 
thesis as existing within this dilemma, seeking to manage - just as with William James’ original 
intention for pragmatism - the ‘interminable’ disputes concerning America’s role in the world. 
Obama’s is a prescient rendering of an idea which literary scholar John Burt has encapsulated in his 
term “tragic pragmatism.” In his ambitious book, Lincoln’s Tragic Pragmatism, Burt offers a detailed 
insight into the means by which Lincoln navigated the stark political and moral challenges of his 
time.235 For Burt, “the exigencies of history unfold new demands” out of concepts to which one is 
committed (in Lincoln’s case, the promises of the Founding Fathers). While “these demands are 
imperative and absolute,” Burt argues for the notion of a “tragic pragmatism” in the idea that “we 
are also required to practice the art of the possible in realizing them, always wagering that our 
compromises will not somehow compromise them.”236  
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For Burt’s Lincoln there is a deep sense of tragedy in the recognition of human frailty, in recognizing 
the limitations which can render human decisions as moral failures. Burt notes that “the irony of 
history is that it turns on moral wagers whose wisdom cannot be clear when they are made, moral 
wagers that risk not only one’s outcome but also one’s moral standing.”237 Indeed he argues that this 
mind-set allowed Lincoln to view his: 
Most important moral acts as a kind of wager, a kind of leap of faith taken in the 
face of the absurd. Crucial moral acts like emancipation are made in the face of 
what might be crippling doubt, in the face of a sense that one’s act might be 
impure as to motives, as to means, and to ends, and might leave one in a world as 
fallen as the one in which one is already entangled. One does the right as one 
sees it, knowing that there will be unanticipated consequences, and that one will 
still have to face those down, and knowing also that that act will leave one still as 
human, still as fallen, as one ever was.238 
It is a philosophy of doubt carried while still being cautiously open to the hopeful promises of 
certainty. Contained within “tragic pragmatism,” is the notion of allowing for compromise to achieve 
specific ends while never compromising the ends themselves. Tragedy lies in the uncertainty with 
which one can perceive one’s actions as serving those ends.     
Obama found great value in Lincoln’s example. He contended: 
That self-awareness, that humility, led Lincoln to advance his principles through 
the framework of our democracy, through speeches and debate, through the 
reasoned arguments that might appeal to the better angels of our nature. It was 
this same humility that allowed him, once the conversation between North and 
South broke down and war became inevitable, to resist the temptation to 
demonize the fathers and sons who did battle on the other side, or to diminish the 
horror of war, no matter how just it might be.239  
In Obama’s telling, Lincoln was a figure who embraced and embodied the ideals laid forth by the 
institutional structures of the American project. By keeping true to those ideals, he was able to 
maintain the deliberative imperative ingrained in the founding documents. It also demonstrated the 
act of maintaining the ambitions to such an imperative while accepting its limitations.  
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Obama conceded that “the blood of slaves reminds us that our pragmatism can sometimes be moral 
cowardice.” There is always a cost for any ideological perspective. For Obama, “Lincoln, and those 
buried at Gettysburg, remind us that we should pursue our own absolute truths only if we 
acknowledge that there may be a terrible price to pay.”240 An acknowledgment that the outcome 
from an action may differ from that which is desired. It can never be pre-ordained. But it does not 
stop – sometimes, must not stop – one from pursuing such a course. 
In The Long Game, Derek Chollet, who served in Obama’s administration as Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, argues that “the test of leadership is choosing the right 
time to push more chips on the table.” Under this rubric he sees Obama not as a bluffer, but instead 
as “a calculating gambler willing to make big bets.”241 This speaks to the notion expressed by Burt of 
tragic pragmatism’s relationship to making “moral wagers,” - that “leap of faith taken in the face of 
the absurd.” Menand used similar nomenclature, in arguing that pragmatism holds beliefs to be “just 
bets on the future.”242 The tragic pragmatism passed down from Lincoln to Obama decrees that bets 
on the future must be made only in tandem with the readiness to accept their failure. 
Obama’s reverence for Lincoln is storied. The points of comparison between them are legion: two 
lawyers, going from Illinois state politics to the White House. Ascending from underprivileged 
backgrounds in the obscurity of the hinterlands, to the very zenith of power. Obama announced his 
candidacy for President, just as Lincoln had, in the shadow of the Illinois Old State Capitol.243 And it 
was in emulation of his hero’s train ride from Springfield to Washington D.C. that Obama made the 
same journey 148 years later prior to his inauguration. The front of later editions of Doris Kearns 
Goodwin’s titanic Team of Rivals is adorned with a declaration that it is “the book that inspired 
Barack Obama,” and quotes him in reviewing it as “a remarkable study in leadership.”244 Sales ploy 
or not, his appreciation for the tome is clear. After reading the book Obama, then a Senator, rang 
Goodwin and requested a meeting with her to discuss Lincoln.245 In an interview with Goodwin at 
the end of his time as president he reflected on his fondness for Lincoln, proclaiming that “there’s no 
one who I believe has ever captured the soul of America more profoundly than Abraham Lincoln 
has.”246 
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At the opening of the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum in April 2005, Obama posed 
the question, how is it, that “a man given to depression and wracked with self-doubt, might come to 
represent so much of who we are as a people, and so much of what we aspire to be?” He argued for 
Lincoln as being a vision of self-creation, both of the individual self and of the American nation, 
representing a “fundamental element of the American character,” representing a belief that “we can 
constantly remake ourselves to fit our larger dreams.” But for Obama, it was something altogether 
different that separates Lincoln from the other giants of American history. He highlighted his 
character, as being “not a perfect man, nor a perfect president.” Indeed “he wasn’t immune to 
political considerations; his temperament could be indecisive and morose” but importantly, Obama 
argued that: 
Despite these imperfections, despite his fallibility...indeed, perhaps because of a 
painful self-awareness of his own failings, etched in every crease of his face and 
reflected in those haunted eyes...because of this essential humanity of his, when 
it came time to confront the greatest moral challenge this nation has ever faced, 
Lincoln did not flinch. He did not equivocate or duck or pass the challenge on to 
future generations. He did not demonize the fathers and sons who did battle on 
the other side, nor seek to diminish the terrible costs of his war. In the midst of 
slavery's dark storm and the complexities of governing a house divided, he kept 
his moral compass pointed firm and true.”247 
For Obama, this aspect of Lincoln’s character - “which makes tough choices, and speaks the truth 
when least convenient, and acts while still admitting doubt” – is something the American character 
should embrace. Obama and Burt are in concert on this idea, the latter arguing that Lincoln “offers 
an example of moral depth and subtlety that is hard to find elsewhere in American politics.” 248 
Indeed, in his ability to “balance a prophetic sense of ethical mission with a tragic sense of the 
ironies of politics and history” Lincoln “provides a model for moral agency in a complex world in 
which one must make one’s way among various half-understood alternatives, none of which leaves 
one’s hands very clean.”249 Here we can make sense of Obama feeling as though he is “left with 
Lincoln.” The sixteenth president was Obama’s last recourse for an American moral heroism, 
founded in complexity and depth he deemed unparalleled in the history of the republic.  
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Significantly, for the purposes of this thesis, Bart Schultz argues that for Obama “whatever his 
fondness for admiration of Gandhi and King, it is the rhetoric of Lincoln that matters most, and 
moreover the rhetoric of Lincoln is the rhetoric of pragmatism.”250 Philosopher Hilary Putnam notes 
“that one can be both fallibilistic and antiskeptical is perhaps the basic insight of American 
pragmatism.”251 In Lincoln’s words, Obama finds the means of understanding how one can act with 
the humility that accepts doubt, yet which is willing to take action aimed at advancing what one 
believes to be right. When one must take a wager on a moral absolute, it cannot be shied away 
from. Yet, it is this recognition of the importance of humility and doubt which ties Obama’s thinking 
so profoundly to pragmatism’s distrust of absolutism.  
It is this Lincolnian tragic pragmatism that we will find most pertinent in foreign policy terms. The 
pragmatism focused on forging common ground, on deliberation, and on experimentalism remains 
important, and will be present. But it is the imperative of balancing that “sense of ethical mission” 
with the “tragic sense of the ironies of politics and history” – in contending with the violence and 
cruelty of war in foreign policy that tragic pragmatism emerges into prominence. Obama discovered 
that making “one’s way among various half-understood alternatives, none of which leaves one’s 




At the close of his address to the Sojourners conference, Obama reflected on a letter he had 
received from a member of his electorate. A doctor from Illinois had taken issue with the language 
on Obama’s campaign website. He felt the language impugned those who held anti-abortion beliefs 
as being ideologues “driven by perverse desires to inflict suffering on women,” a notion which the 
doctor protested was not fair-minded. Obama quoted the doctor as writing: “You know that we 
enter times that are fraught with possibilities for good and for harm, times when we are struggling 
to make sense of a common polity in the context of plurality, when we are unsure of what grounds 
we have for making any claims that involve others ... I do not ask at this point that you oppose 
abortion, only that you speak about this issue in fair-minded words."252 Obama lingered on the 
phrase “fair-minded words.” He suggested that it is people such as the doctor who are “looking for a 
deeper, fuller conversation about religion in this country” who “may not change their positions,” but 
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crucially, “they are willing to listen and learn from those who are willing to speak in fair-minded 
words.”253 They thus offer the potential for the deliberation and search for consensus that Obama 
craves so much. “Fair-minded words” is reflective of the notion that, even where there is 
disagreement, a debate can be had that prioritises discourse starting at the point of acceptance of 
differing perspectives. From here you might be able to reach a point where you can find common 
ground. Fair-minded words emphasise the value of dialogue, of creating a space where competing 
ideas can come together. It is a notion that encompasses Habermas’ search for communicative 
action. It reaches for Rawls’ “overlapping consensus.” It shares in the communitarian’s curation of 
shared values, the community organizer’s drive for shared commitments. Above all, it breathes in 
Dewey’s democratic ideal. Envisaging a society primed toward the navigation of multiplicity, the 
ends of which are tied up with that very pursuit itself. 
The importance of pragmatism in Obama’s thought is evident within all of this. It takes the shape of 
fomenting a way of thinking which never presumes to have the one correct answer, one correct 
vision for the world. Vitally for the purposes of this thesis, even if this notion of “fair-minded words” 
or indeed of coming together for deliberation and consensus is not necessarily an obvious means by 
which to conduct many aspects of foreign policy, it is still a mindset that provokes an awareness that 
other possibilities exist and should not be closed off. There remains emphasis on a constant process 
to change how things are, a constant awareness of the contingency of choices, and openness to 
deeply held convictions being challenged.   
Crucially, in the case of Obama, this does not preclude the aspiration towards certainties, or rather, 
the belief in a fundamental universality in justice and progress. But instead, it helps guide this belief 
and this hope, in a fallibilistic, humble manner. It is in fact the process of turning this strong belief 
over to process itself. Morris Dickstein helpfully notes that in the milieu of competing philosophical 
factions, pragmatism “has come to be seen as an American alternative, an escape from the 
abstraction of theory and the abyss of nihilism. We might describe it as constructive scepticism. If 
liberal politicians and intellectuals share one thing at the moment, it is the loss of old certainties. 
Pragmatism today is less an attack on the foundations of knowledge, as it was portrayed by its early 
critics, than a search for a method when the foundations have already crumbled.”254 
It starts from a place that confronts the absence of certainties, but rather than following the trail of 
deconstruction down to meaningless solipsism, it embraces the possibilities offered to construct 
something new. The emphasis on the method of pragmatism is crucial for Obama’s search for a 
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place to stand between the sandy shores of doubt and the hard rocks of certainty. Pragmatists 
know, all is transitory, all is contingent. All is open to the wind of change, the waves of new realities. 
But crucially, all the while this also necessitates the acknowledgement that while rocks can erode 
and be weathered down, sand and grit can also be shaped and compressed over time. They can be 
formed into something more solid.    
This chapter has sought to develop an understanding of pragmatism not as an ideology which 
dictates the drive to specific outcomes, but instead it is an intellectual framework which shapes its 
holder’s approach to knowledge, truth, and ideology itself. It has become apparent that the means 
by which Obama understands politics, philosophy, American history, and democracy coheres with 
pragmatisms of James, Dewey, Rorty, Bernstein and others. But significantly, the profound influence 
of Lincoln on his thinking looms large. Through Burt’s conception especially, it serves as an 
addendum to his pragmatism. It is a particularly poignant reminder of the ‘tragic’ element which 
recognises the very limits even of pragmatism itself. It allows for the cautious acceptance that 
sometimes the pursuit of an absolute is necessary, but tempers this pursuit with the pragmatist 
sensibilities of scepticism, fallibility, and contingency. 
It is a complicating factor, but his thinking was no less coherent for this consciousness. Instead it 
serves to reinforce the fitting - albeit imperfect - conception of Obama the pragmatist. This 
Lincolnian pragmatism ultimately allowed Obama to convey any desire for universals in a pragmatist 
framework. Pragmatism is thus viewed as a handbrake on the wheels of ideology. This is thus an 
important indicator of how we should treat the influence of pragmatism on Obama’s thought. It is 
the way of thinking, not the thought itself. This might appear obvious, but it is an important 
distinction to make. 
The remainder of this thesis will examine Obama’s approach to specific foreign policy events 
throughout his presidency. It will focus more readily on key questions of what it means to pursue a 
foreign policy which embraces a rejection of the absolute, and which accepts contingency despite 
aspirations for the universal. What does it mean to recognise the need to make difficult choices, and 
yet to acknowledge the frailties exposed in making such choices? Will pragmatism and foreign policy 
correspond in the manner suggested throughout this chapter? All these elements reflect 
foundational aspects of Obama’s complex intellectual make-up, and thus to analyse his foreign 
policy record must consider the presence of such an intellectual architecture in playing at least a 
nominal role in its formation. In asking these questions, we are implicitly seeking a means by which 
we can recognise such a diverse stream of ideas as forming any sense of coherency. For now, 
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pragmatism presents itself - as James initially established it to be all those years ago - as a means of 


































Not on reason but on passion 
 
In the early hours of 18 December 2011, the last remaining U.S. forces left Iraq. In a convoy of about 
110 vehicles they crossed over the border into Kuwait, leaving behind nine years of war, the death of 
nearly 4500 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, all at a cost of close to $1 trillion.255 
There would be no triumphant ceremony greeting their departure, no banner declaring ‘mission 
accomplished.’ They slipped out quietly into the dead of the night, in the vain hope that they were 
also leaving peace behind. 
While the exit had been nominally agreed by his predecessor in tandem with his Iraqi counterpart, 
its full-scale implementation was the fulfillment of a campaign promise made by Obama.256  It was 
the realization of his deeply held conviction of the importance of removing the U.S. from its failed 
war in Iraq. Obama had been bequeathed the opportunity for an exit he sorely wanted, and he took 
it with few doubts. Exiting Iraq could allow for the desired redirection of attention elsewhere, and in 





On October 2nd 2002, Illinois State Senator Barack Obama, as a last minute stand-in, addressed an 
anti-war rally in Chicago’s Federal Plaza.257  The Bush administration had identified Saddam Hussein 
and his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme as an existential threat to world order. He 
thus exemplified the kind of threat that must be pre-emptively confronted in the post-9/11 world. In 
his speech, Obama decried the nation’s apparent headlong rush into war in Iraq. Seven years later, 
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Hussein was gone but the U.S. remained in Iraq, and Obama was now Commander-in-Chief charged 
with presiding over a war he had virulently opposed. But he was also charged with presiding over the 
war which he had argued Iraq detracted from. The 2001 offensive in Afghanistan was itself the direct 
response to the events of 9/11. The ruling Taliban regime had offered sanctuary to Osama bin 
Laden’s al Qaeda as it planned its attack, and Operation Enduring Freedom was deemed the 
appropriate recourse to eliminate the conditions for such a plot to be hatched again.258 
For his part, from that 2002 address onwards, Obama continually expressed a belief in the war in 
Afghanistan as being important for the cause of American security. It was a war of necessity. The war 
in Iraq, on the other hand, was based on a flight of fancy, bearing no relation to the interests of 
America. This was a war of choice. This distinction between wars finding a basis in either choice or 
necessity was most prominently articulated by Richard Haass, but it was a notion that found its way 
into the lexicon of discussions concerning the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.259 
This chapter will examine this dynamic in Obama’s conceptualization of the wars. In tracing these 
alternate visions we can establish how Obama conceived of American power itself and what its role 
in the world should be. In considering the ways in which Obama differentiated between the wars, 
we can trace an ideological architecture which delineates between the abstract and the material in 
making foreign policy choices.  
The chapter begins by tracing the mindset in U.S. foreign policy which led to the Iraq war, and which 
ultimately enabled Obama’s ascendance. There will then be an examination of perhaps Obama’s 
most telling - though frequently overlooked - statement on foreign policy, a chapter from The 
Audacity of Hope, which offers insights into his broad perspectives on foreign policy held prior to his 
election. His approach to the Afghanistan policy review process will then be discussed. The attempts 
he made to chart a course between two opposing policy options will be evaluated alongside the 
question of how he ultimately made a choice which appeared to be against his instincts pertaining to 
American overseas engagement. The chapter will emphasise the importance of Obama’s purposeful 
delineation of necessity and choice in employing American power. Obama’s determining of 
necessary shaped his approach to the world and his perspective on war, peace, and America in the 
world. 
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Obama’s 2002 speech outlined his opposition to the Iraq war in nuanced and defined terms.                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Although speaking at an anti-war rally, he went to great lengths to emphasize that he himself was no 
pacifist. He maintained that he was “not opposed to all wars” but instead, he was opposed to a 
“dumb war,” a “rash war.” He termed this particular war sought by the Bush administration as “a 
war based not on reason but on passion, not on principle but on politics.”260 He later wrote in The 
Audacity of Hope that “the administration’s rationales for war were flimsy and ideologically 
driven.”261 This statement and his general opposition to the Iraq War portrayed a crucial aspect of 
Obama’s thinking on foreign policy, war, and peace. While recognizing the abhorrent nature of 
Hussein’s regime, this for him was not itself enough to necessitate action. Instead, Obama 
emphasized how “Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States or to his 
neighbours, that the Iraqi military is a fraction of its former strength, and that in concert with the 
international community he can be contained until, in the way of all petty dictators, he falls away 
into the dustbin of history.”262 
In his speech Obama offered a far-sighted warning of the potential disasters war in Iraq could 
unleash.263 That Obama proved prescient was a tragedy for Iraq, the wider Middle East, and the 
United States. Yet it would prove beneficial for Obama as he positioned himself, against Hillary 
Clinton and John Edwards in the 2008 Democratic Party presidential primary; a dissenting voice 
against the foreign policy failings of a generation of political figures. Obama rode the wave of 
opposition in painting Senator Clinton’s vote for the war as a sign of poor judgment.  264  
The push to war was, Obama argued, “the cynical attempt by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and 
other armchair, weekend warriors in this administration to shove their own ideological agendas 
down our throats, irrespective of the costs in lives lost and hardships borne.”265 Obama’s focus on 
Perle and Wolfowitz is significant. It reflected a broad frustration at members of the Bush team, but 
also betrayed a deeper conviction against the philosophy which animated their calls for war. Much 
has been written on the role of neoconservatism in the younger Bush’s foreign policy output. That 
ground does not require covering here in close detail, but it is useful to recognize the degree to 
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which Obama’s enmity for the ideological assumptions of neoconservatism illuminate important 
aspects of his own worldview. 
Neoconservatism is broadly an ideological movement with roots in an anti-Soviet left which 
transitioned rightward as it began to emphasize a strong sense of duty to advance a core of universal 
morals.  The Iraq War has taken its place at the zenith of the neoconservative movement given the 
rhetoric of regime change and fostering of liberal democracy which drove it. Yet, it was a 
culmination of a process which had taken place over the course of a turbulent decade in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. The post-Cold War world became a landscape ripe for those determined 
to shape it under their terms of what America’s role and place in the world should be.  
The uncertainty led to varied attempts at defining what the new order would look like. Columnist 
Charles Krauthammer identified a ‘Unipolar moment,’ whereby America now stood alone as a 
superpower with the world laid out before it – to be shaped in ways previously untold.266 Robert 
Kaplan wrote of “the coming anarchy,” a world torn asunder by overpopulation.267 Samuel 
Huntington famously wrote of “the clash of civilizations” where the core assumptions across 
societies would rupture based on civilizational differences.268 Huntington however was writing in 
response to perhaps the most significant of these post-Cold War hypotheses. Francis Fukuyama’s 
‘End of History’ hypothesis advanced a scintillating antidote to the uncertainty of the era.269 Finding 
roots in the dialectical philosophy of Hegel, and a particular reading thereof by French-Russian 
philosopher Alexandre Kojève, Fukuyama embraced the notion that actualization of the principles of 
the French Revolution had heralded the achievement of an idealized end state, where the 
contradictions of society had been resolved.270  An achievement of absolute self-consciousness 
would be an end of history.271 As such, Fukuyama advanced a notion that liberal democracy was the 
ultimate and triumphant form of human societal organisation, and the conclusion of the Cold War in 
favour of the United States served to highlight this.272 
Fukuyama was part of the neoconservative movement which found particular cause in stepping into 
the breach and advancing these new certainties. The development of neoconservatism fits neatly in 
to the same philosophical tectonics underscoring that intellectual maelstrom behind the culture 
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wars, and which pitted opposing conceptions of truth, meaning, and certainty against one 
another.273 Varied in its traditions, historian Justin Vaïsse suggests that Neoconservatism resembles 
more a “tendency” or “persuasion” that forms part of an intellectual outlook, or school of 
thought.274 He suggests the movement developed through three distinct ages, culminating its 1990s 
manifestation – the “neocons” - that broadly remains intact today.275 This latest age of 
neoconservatives would codify their ideology into specific foreign policy prescriptions. Vaïsse details 
that: 
 They attached great importance to military superiority and to the democratic 
principle: America must be strong and ready to act in order to shape the world 
according to its political and security interests, which sometimes include help in 
spreading democracy. In their view, multinational organizations such as the 
United Nations possess neither moral nor democratic legitimacy, nor do they have 
the strength necessary to ensure world order and defend freedom. Only America 
can and must meet these challenges.276 
The prime mover in this respect was think tank the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) 
whose statement of principles, published in June 1997, outlined its aims, among other things, to 
increase defense spending, to challenge regimes hostile to U.S. interests and values, to “promote the 
cause of political and economic freedom abroad,” and crucially, to “accept responsibility for 
America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our 
prosperity, and our principles.” They termed this “a Reaganite policy of military strength of moral 
clarity” and declared it “necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past 
century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.”277 Signatories to the statement of 
principles was not restricted to intellectuals such as Fukuyama, but it also boasted key figures of 
what became the Bush administration, and ultimately, key architects of the Iraq War such as Eliot 
Cohen, Scooter Libby, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and the focus of Obama’s criticism, Paul 
Wolfowitz.278 It was their vision of neoconservatism that Obama set himself so firmly against. 
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Vaïsse suggests that “one can see neoconservatism as an avatar of American messianism, as the 
expression of an underlying nationalism that has been present since the country was born, a 
reincarnation of Wilsonianism in a new, more martial form.”279 Neoconservatism, he contends “is 
fundamentally a manifestation of patriotism or even nationalism.”280 In the sense that - even as a 
fragmented and varied movement – neoconservatism found at its core an unyielding sense of 
American nationalism, it fit squarely in to the orthodox aspect of James Davison Hunter’s culture 
wars dichotomy. It continually reinvented itself as a means of re-affirming the need to defend and 
maintain orthodoxies: the moral character, the values of humanity, and the sense of national 
greatness that it found in America.281 It is important to recognize this as the ideological worldview it 
was. It was primed on a “blind faith” in the truth of its convictions.282 
Obama’s opposition to the ideological nature of the Iraq War is important. Undergirding his 
consternation at “a war based not on reason but on passion” lay a web of philosophical influences 
sketched in the preceding chapter. Philosophical pragmatism and its related impulses reflected an 
animosity to abstractions, an aversion to basing decisions upon an imposition of ideas into reality 
with which they do not fit.  
Russell Burgos traces the means by which neoconservatives and regime change hawks worked 
through the 1990s to change conventional thinking with regards to policy in Iraq.283 Burgos argues 
that “the neoconservative’s real power derived from their ability to redefine what Iraq meant for 
U.S. security.”284 He places his argument in the context of the concept of “Ideapolitik,” defined as 
“political competition to define the substantive meaning of events and those policy responses 
appropriate for dealing with them.”285 He discusses a notion that policy making is a “struggle over 
alternate realities” in which “rival policy entrepreneurs compete to define the policy narrative – to 
impart social meaning to facts.”286 This comports significantly with William James’ perceptions of 
truth and how it is constructed. Burgos notes that the epistemic communities which seek to impart 
this social meaning comprised, in the case of Iraq, “a loosely allied group of defense intellectuals in 
Washington D.C., think tanks, and hawkish journalists at national newspapers.”287 Crucially 
“producing new policy ideas is relatively easy” for groups such as these, as “they do not face the 
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same constraints that politicians do and so risk little by floating proposals that may fail. Successful 
ideas, however, can prove highly influential when they reshape elites’ understandings of what a 
problem means and how it can be solved.”288 In other words, theirs are ideas which are not tested by 
reality, their ideas remain ideological in the sense that they are not curated to respond to the 
demands of real-world necessity. 
Those in favour of ousting Saddam Hussein ultimately succeeded in changing the discourse which 
surrounded the issue of regime change in Iraq. They sought to degrade the notion that the 
“containment” policy as pursued by President Bill Clinton was a viable approach to Hussein. Burgos 
argues that: 
Given that regime change was the default understanding of appropriate U.S. 
strategy for Iraq, that it had supporters across the political spectrum, and that 
Saddam Hussein was presumed to have an active unconventional weapons 
program, it is unsurprising that the Bush administration undertook action to 
topple the Ba’athist regime. Saddam Hussein’s ouster was, after all, a given in 
elite foreign policy discourse by 2001.289 
This moment was, in essence, the embodiment of a D.C. Beltway establishment reinforcing its own 
wisdom by steadily converging on a stream of ever-narrowing perspectives. Obama and his 
administration later developed consternation at this self-reinforcing echo-chamber. They perceived 
a foreign policy establishment relieved from its senses of reality when making policy. Burgos 
contends that “the new strategic narrative” - as pushed by the likes Perle, Wolfowitz, and PNAC - 
“blended a rejection of realism with an uncritical promotion of American exceptionalism and an 
abiding faith in the utility of military force, leading inexorably to the conclusion that America was 
ordained to liberate Iraq.”290 
In his book Daydream Believers journalist Fred Kaplan also traces the development of a foreign 
policy mindset which assumed a supreme confidence in U.S. capabilities to effect change around the 
world and to live up to its post-Cold War role as sole superpower, possessing the ability to do “pretty 
much as they pleased” and an “inclination to devise policies based on the premise of 
omnipotence.”291 This confidence was accompanied by developments in weapons capabilities and 
strategies – the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) – which promised enhanced missile precision, 
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and the ability for rapid deployment of force which would render opposition minimal and the 
potential for America to defeat enemies and shape the world in its favour, limitless.292 
Burgos notes that “the comparative ease with which the Taliban regime was toppled likely validated 
the idea that the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and military preeminence meant that the 
use of force was less costly than it had been in the past.”293 This was a belief he argues that “would 
be consistent with neoconservatives’ strategic vision,” that which was clearly outlined in PNAC’s 
‘Statement of Principles.’ 294 Significantly, Stephen Wertheim, writing more specifically on the rise of 
liberal interventionism through the 1990s, demonstrates how that emerging movement worked in 
tandem with those attitudes “consistent with neoconservatives’ strategic vision,” to further shape 
attitudes to American power in Washington: 
Humanitarian interventionism nevertheless facilitated the war, mainly through 
the assumptions it primed politicians and the public to hold. Since the 1990s, 
humanitarian interventionists assumed U.S. military force could reliably 
transform societies in those societies’ own interests. The world they depicted was 
riddled with enemies of humanity; it needed more U.S. intervention, not less; and 
interventions would succeed if willed, postconflict conditions posing no obstacle 
to a mission’s fulfilment or its morality. It is impossible to know how far these 
assumptions permitted the Iraq War to go forward, but they may have hollowed 
out what strong dissent would have otherwise existed. Through their prism, the 
Iraq War looked, if not virtuous, then at least not worth protesting strenuously.295 
This mindset reveled in its certainty of American greatness and the timeless nature of its absolute 
conception of morality. It carried hostility to contingency. It held truth to be permanent and 
crucially, to have been revealed to, or discovered untouched, by those shapers of U.S. foreign policy.  
Obama was in many respects pushing against the tide at this point in U.S. history. His calls to 
“contain” Hussein in his 2002 speech were already predated by the passage of the Iraq Liberation 
Act, which formally declared U.S. policy in Iraq to be premised upon the goal of regime change.296 
Neoconservatism, liberal internationalism, and U.S. military pre-eminence had become a dominant 
part of the assumptions which underwrote the foreign policy landscape. 
                                                          
292
 Ibid. pp 1-50 
293




 S. Wertheim, "A Solution from Hell: The United States and the Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991-
2003," Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 3-4 (2010). p. 165 
296
 Burgos, "Origins of Regime Change: "Ideapolitik" on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993-2000." p. 251 
75 
 
The decision to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein, with the benefit of hindsight, was unwise – 
to put it lightly. But Burgos ably demonstrates how the ideas which fueled the Iraq War had become 
so ingrained in conventional Washington thinking, that it appeared an almost logical step to make. It 
became a reasonable course of action. In the Senate, the vote to authorize the use of military force 
passed 77 to 23, with high profile Democratic Party figures such as Max Baucus, Joe Biden, Hillary 
Clinton, Tom Daschle, John Edwards, and John Kerry voting in favour.297 This ultimately allowed 
Obama’s clear-headed disavowal of the Iraq War – an otherwise ordinary rejection of sub-optimal 
policy – to appear both wise and brave. The bar was set extremely low, but Obama was among the 
few who cleared it. The rejection of this myopia over the U.S.’s use of force would instead speak to a 
key element of his foreign policy outlook. 
The prospect of being able to advance universalized conceptions of the good in Iraq had proven 
tantalizing to the architects of the war. The expected results, however, remained out of reach. 
Wertheim writes that “over the past decade the norm of humanitarian intervention briefly guided by 
dreams of U.S. military invulnerability, advanced beyond the ability to undertake the action it 
prescribed.”298 Kaplan emphasized this point too in quoting the Bush Administration’s 2006 NSS as 
declaring “we seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better 
instead of being at their mercy.”299 But Kaplan scathingly responded: 
To a degree this statement was a truism, a defining feature of a global power. But 
pressed too far, as Bush and his top aides tended to do, it verged on not merely 
hubris but fantasy, a mistaken notion that the end of the Cold War left America in 
control of the world – when, in fact, it left much of the world beyond anyone’s 
control. And when America’s leaders acted as if things were otherwise, as they 
often did in the first years of the twenty-first century, they only trumpeted their 
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On the campaign trail in 2007, Obama declared “I am running to do more than end a war in Iraq – I 
am running to change the mindset that got us into war.”301 This was the mindset traced by Burgos, 
Wertheim, and Kaplan, which Obama believed had taken the country off-course in foreign policy. It 
was, under his conception, “a conventional way of thinking about foreign policy that values time 
spent in Washington over timely judgments; posturing over pragmatism; and fear of looking weak 
over the conviction to get things right.”302 At its core, it was a mindset that gave license for the U.S. 
to make war for reasons aside from national security interest. It is in this context that Obama’s 
repeated emphasis on drawing a line for action that denoted “national security interest” becomes 
noteworthy.  
The violence in abstractions painted by Menand as a touchpaper for pragmatism came to be a core 
unconscious tenet of the ‘conventional’ thinking of Washington that Obama railed against.303 This 
was the conventional thinking which carried a vision of imposing a fixed notion of truth and reality 
on to the world as it was, and of imposing pre-conceived ideals rather than shaping the ideal from 
the reality on the ground. 
In positioning himself against the Iraq War, Obama was disavowing a set of assumptions which 
underwrote U.S. foreign policy. In 2016 Ben Rhodes - Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for 
Strategic Communications - ruffled feathers when he referred to the D.C. foreign policy community 
as “the blob,” as an entity which would uncritically parrot a tired set of perspectives bound firmly 
within a limited perimeter.304 Rhodes is an important figure in the study of Obama. He has become 
notorious both inside and outside the foreign policy spheres, both in admiration and derision of his 
possession of a so-called “mind-meld” with Obama: an apparent ability to portray, with uncanny 
accuracy, the thought process of his boss.305 He was a lightning rod for criticism both from 
Republican opposition but also from those in the so-called “blob.” He was dismissed in these circles 
as a naïf and a know-nothing, lacking the requisite expertise and experience to critique them as he 
did.306 But what makes Rhodes crucial as it pertains to Obama’s thinking, was the foreign policy 
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experience that he did bring with him to the White House. Though he lacked academic expertise or 
governmental experience, prior to joining the Obama campaign in 2007 he worked as a special 
assistant for Lee Hamilton, former congressman from Indiana, as he co-chaired the Iraq Study 
Group.307 This followed on from a similar role for the 9/11 commission. In both instances he helped 
draft the findings of the studies into a report.308 Rhodes’ experience – meagre though it might 
appear to foreign policy heavyweights – was primed at understanding how it was that the U.S. had 
made its biggest foreign policy mistake of a generation. 
This helped shape a worldview which was fiercely opposed to modes of thinking which offered the 
risk of replicating the mistakes of Iraq. It also fostered in Rhodes a general perspective of regret at 
the apparent hubris of U.S. foreign policy. Late in his presidency Obama gave a revealing interview 
with Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic which – as though with the gloves off after years of careful 
niceties – focused heavily on rejecting establishment thinking.309 
Obama meditated on what was perceived to be the ‘controversial’ nature of his foreign policy. 
“Where am I controversial? When it comes to the use of military power. That is the source of 
controversy.” He proceeded to discuss his perspective on conventional U.S. foreign policy wisdom: 
There’s a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It’s a 
playbook that comes out of the foreign-policy establishment. And the playbook 
prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be 
militarized responses. Where America is directly threatened, the playbook works. 
But the playbook can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions.310 
Obama, continuing on the theme of a ‘playbook,’ opined that “in the midst of an international 
challenge like Syria, you get judged harshly if you don’t follow the playbook, even if there are good 
reasons why it does not apply.”311 The playbook contains a set of pre-prescribed options for action, 
ready to be rolled out as a solution to foreign policy issues as they arise. It is a sense of having all the 
correct answers before a question has been posed.  
Kloppenberg emphasises how pragmatism “challenges the claims of absolutists – whether their 
dogmas are rooted in science or religion – and instead embraces uncertainty, provisionality, and the 
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continuous testing of hypotheses through experimentalism.”312 With Obama demonstrating an 
approximation of this mode of thought - for instance in his treatment of the Constitution as offering 
a framework for citizens to “engage in the process of testing their ideas against an external reality” - 
we can see the roots of thinking which precludes absolutism and the uncritical mindset which 
established the infallibility of a set of ideas.313  For Obama’s warnings in The Audacity of Hope of 
“any tyrannical consistency that might lock future generations into a single unalterable course” read: 
the playbook, neoconservatism, liberal interventionism, and their collective march to war in Iraq. 314 
In carrying this disdain for the U.S. foreign policy establishment Obama went some distance - at least 
in his own mind - to exemplify James’s looking away from “first things, principles, ‘categories,’ 
supposed necessities” as prescribed by that establishment and to turn indeed towards “last things, 
fruits, consequences, and facts.”315 Obama’s foreign policy was thus in many senses aimed at a 
recalibration of American power, and an effort to focus it to what he deemed its appropriate level 
and direction. Ben Rhodes noted in 2011 that in terms of Obama’s foreign policy outlook to that 
point “if you were to boil it all down to a bumper sticker” it would say “wind down these two wars, 
re-establish American standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities, 
from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear-nonproliferation regime.”316 
This logic animated Obama in important ways long before his presidency. His speech in 2002 offered 
an early glimpse of his specific conceptualization of America’s role in the world. He expressed it not 
merely through his opposition to the Iraq War but crucially also in his framing of it as a war of 
choice. He also went to great lengths to establish its counterpart: a war of necessity in 
Afghanistan.317 
For Obama it was clear. There existed a set of scenarios which enabled a strong case for war. For 
him, the necessity of Afghanistan lay in both its nature as a response to a direct attack on U.S. soil, 
but also crucially as a measure to protect national security – the prevention of such an attack 
happening again.318 He spelled this logic out time and again both prior to and throughout his 
presidency. 
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An important and foundational statement on foreign policy from Obama can be found in The 
Audacity of Hope. Obama offered a glimpse of the foreign policy president to come in the chapter 
entitled ‘The World Beyond Our Borders.’ He wrote a potted history of U.S. foreign policy, heralding, 
in particular, the post-war order constructed by President Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, George 
Marshall, and George Kennan. Significantly, his is a reading of an architecture that pursued neither a 
unilateralist nor accommodationist (to the Soviet Union) path but was instead one that “married 
Wilson’s idealism to hardheaded realism, an acceptance of America’s powers with a humility 
regarding America’s ability to control events around the world.”319  
While one can question this characterization of humility in America’s post-war outlook, it is 
worthwhile noting the traits which Obama identified as positive aspects of U.S. foreign policy 
history. His interpretation of America assuming a balanced role in world affairs is indicative of a 
means by which he translated his instinct to favour conciliation and consensus between multiple 
perspectives into his reading of American foreign policy history. 
He saw the establishment of the liberal international order and its eventual triumph after the Cold 
War as a “remarkable achievement.” In the following sentence though, he noted that “like any 
system built by man, it had its flaws and contradictions,” indeed it could “fall victim to the 
distortions of politics, the sins of hubris, the corrupting effects of fear.” 320 He thus argued that the 
U.S. foreign policy apparatus itself came to view too much of the world and its problems through the 
Cold War lens, which not only led America away from core interests, but also led to the distortion of 
America’s “professed commitment to freedom and democracy.”321 This was an era of foreign policy 
which Obama argued would also bring the increasing prominence of a military lens when viewing 
problems around the world, displacing efforts at curating a diplomatic one.322 For Obama “the 
postwar system over time suffered from too much politics and not enough deliberation and 
domestic consensus building.” This undermined an expectation for officials tasked with formulating 
policy to do so “based on facts and sound judgment, not ideology or electioneering.”323  
Obama argued that this was a consensus that had extended to the public at large, with the 
cultivation of public trust in the government and reciprocal faith that the American people “could be 
trusted with the facts that went into decisions that spent their tax dollars or sent their sons to 
war.”324 This allowed the government to execute large programmes such as the Marshall Plan, which 
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underwrote the U.S. dominance of the international system. But furthermore, it was a mode of 
making policy that built and retained consensus and support commensurate with creating 
sustainability in efforts abroad. 
He broadly painted a vision of foreign policy that drips with Deweyan democracy, Rawlsian 
consensus, and Jamesian fact-based decision making. He may have opined for a bygone golden era 
that never actually existed, but that his interpretation of U.S. foreign policy history was in keeping 
with his intellectual moorings, is worthy of note, and it further underlines the strength of his 
reaction to the Iraq War. Having set the Cold War up as an ideological folly, he emphasized parallels 
with the Vietnam War. “Perhaps the biggest casualty [of the war in Vietnam] was the bond of trust 
between the American people and their government – and between Americans themselves.”325 It 
became a millstone around the neck of a tired and war-weary nation, and as the human costs 
became ever more apparent, Obama noted that “Americans began to realize that the best and the 
brightest didn’t always know what they were doing – and didn’t always tell the truth.”326 It is 
through this notion of a breach of trust and ideas gone astray that Obama treated the Iraq War.  
He wrote that, in the aftermath of 9/11, “I waited with anticipation for what I assumed would 
follow: the enunciation of a U.S. foreign policy for the twenty-first century, one that would not only 
adapt our military planning, intelligence operations, and homeland defenses to the threat of 
terrorist networks but build a new international consensus around the challenges of transnational 
threats.”327 But in the Bush administration’s response to perceived provocation from Iraq he noted 
that “what I sensed…was that the threat Saddam posed was not imminent, the administration’s 
rationales for war were flimsy and ideologically driven, and the war in Afghanistan was far from 
complete. And I was certain that by choosing precipitous, unilateral military action over the hard 
slog of diplomacy, coercive inspections, and smart sanctions, America was missing an opportunity to 
build a broad base of support for its policies.”328 With this critique he tarred the Iraq War decision 
and its accompanying thinking with the broad brush of being representative of that which corroded 
his hallowed post-war order. 
In The Audacity of Hope, however, Obama emphasized another significant element of his foreign 
policy outlook. He wrote: 
 It might be preferable to have the support of our allies in…military campaigns, 
but our immediate safety can’t be held hostage to the desire for international 
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consensus; if we have to go it alone, then the American people stand ready to pay 
any price and bear any burden to protect our country.329 
Obama appeared to ring-fence ideas of national security and self-defence, whereby under threat to 
the U.S. the rules are different and his role as Commander-in-Chief supersedes any idealist 
commitment. There is nothing surprising in this notion. Could we expect any world leader to act 
differently? But that Obama time and again re-iterated it as a concept is notable. Its significance 
speaks to a broader perspective he carried throughout his presidency; of the necessity for the 
recalibration of American power, and the reconfiguration of U.S. foreign policy away from 
distractions which carried no bearing for U.S. interests. Attention would instead be moved towards 
those which did. Under this guise, necessity lay in directing U.S. attention to those parts of the 
world, and aspects of world affairs which would be of benefit to a nation confronting emerging 
challenges and shifting rivalries and alliances. It was a concept which Marc Lynch helpfully termed 
“rightsizing.”330 For Obama, this meant a recalibration of assessing how to intervene militarily and 
for what purpose, ultimately renewing the focus of foreign policy to the more modest aims of 
maintaining U.S. security. This is a notion tied up in Obama’s more holistic skepticism towards 
ideology as a basis for decision-making. The correction of U.S. goals in accordance with the 
assessment of risk is something Obama came to emphasize in a more nuanced manner in the 
National Security Strategy of 2015. He stated in his introduction that on all issues in international 
affairs. “America leads from a position of strength” but he was swift to qualify: 
This does not mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all 
unfolding events around the world. As powerful as we are and will remain, our 
resources and influence are not infinite. And in a complex world, many of the 
security problems we face do not lend themselves to quick and easy fixes. The 
United States will always defend our interests and uphold our commitments to 
allies and partners. But, we have to make hard choices among many competing 
priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we make 
decisions based upon fear.”331  
The contrast with NSS 2006 could not be starker. This emphasis on interests and competing priorities 
lends credence to the notion that Obama’s foreign policy can be ably characterised as being realist in 
nature. The case has been made by numerous scholars and observers of foreign policy, such as Fred 
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Kaplan, Zaki Laïdi, and arch-realist Stephen Walt, who was even prompted at one point to ask “is 
Barack Obama more of a realist than I am?” 332 
Further kindling for that particular fire is provided by the fact that Obama himself consistently spoke 
so glowingly of the foreign policy of G.H.W. Bush and his national security advisor Brent 
Scowcroft.333 There are clear and distinct parallels to be drawn, with the strong non-ideological 
current that runs through realism finding a similar home in Obama’s thought. He used that same 
non-ideological current to shield himself from the designation of any theoretical standpoint. Ryan 
Lizza suggested in a 2011 article that “despite the realist tilt, Obama has argued from the start that 
he was anti-ideological, that he defied traditional categories and ideologies.”334 
In terms of ascribing ideological perspective, it is important to recognize that Obama himself steadily 
worked to distance himself from such a signifier, indeed in part through questioning the very utility 
of such signifiers in the first instance. He spoke pointedly of a need to move beyond the realism-
idealism binary which pervades much foreign policy thinking.335 That Obama himself chose to avoid 
the label of a realist provides some insight into his perspective on its utility in describing his thinking. 
Lizza noted that “Obama’s aides often insist that he is an anti-ideological politician interested only in 
what actually works.” It was one of those aides who spoke of Obama the “consequentialist.”336 
In many respects Obama distinguished himself through his evaluation of what constituted a distinct 
threat to the security and interests of the United States. This was the “controversy” he addressed in 
the Goldberg interview. It was this logic which resulted in much ire on the part of foreign policy 
commentators. He was frequently chastised as being feckless and unwilling to take the necessary 
actions to preserve American dominance in the international sphere.  For such critics, Obama’s 
reaction (or lack thereof) to crises in Syria and Crimea, apparent Russian intransigence, increasing 
Chinese revanchism in the South China Sea, North Korean missile tests, and the chaos inflicted by 
ISIS in Iraq, betrayed an abdication of U.S. responsibility on the world stage.337 
                                                          
332
 F. Kaplan, "The Realist: Barack Obama's a Cold Warrior Indeed.,"  Politico Magazine March/April (2014), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/barack-obama-realist-foreign-policy-
103861#.UxU1gONdWvh.; Z. Laïdi, Limited Achievements: Obama's Foreign Policy, trans. C. Avery, Series in 
International Relations and Political Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). p. 60; S. Walt, M, "Is 
Barack Obama More of a Realist Than I Am?,"  Foreign Policy (2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/19/is-
barack-obama-more-of-a-realist-than-i-am/. 
333
 Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine".; J. Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House to Redefine 
American Power (London: Penguin, 2012). 
334
 Lizza, "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy". 
335
 Vox, "Obama: The Vox Conversation - Part Two: Foreign Policy,"  https://www.vox.com/a/barack-obama-
interview-vox-conversation/obama-foreign-policy-transcript.; Brooks, "Obama, Gospel and Verse". 
336
 Lizza, "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy". 
337
 Stephens, America in Retreat. p. 228 
83 
 
Robert Kagan impugned Obama’s approach and a changing mood in U.S. perspectives on world 
affairs as a “search for normalcy.” But he warned that “superpowers don’t get to retire.”338 Robert 
Singh emphasized a change in foreign affairs approach, contrasting Obama’s limited horizons with 
those of his presidential predecessors since Franklin Roosevelt, where the United States “followed 
foreign policies of global scope whose core feature was the ability and willingness to employ force to 
defend vital national interests.”339 Instead, emphasizing Obama’s inadequacy in projecting U.S. 
power, he argued the administration’s “core national security impetus became manifest: an 
unwillingness to employ America’s military might where, when and how it really mattered.”340 
More than this, Singh characterized Obama’s as an approach defined by limits whereby he had been 
unwilling to “impose discipline” upon international relations. He argues, “in a defeatist fashion, 
Obama’s defining down of U.S. foreign policy through negatives has been audacious.” Singh argues 
Obama abandoned the ambition which underwrote U.S. grand strategy, and instead “made clear 
everything America will not do.” This meant that under Obama, “overwhelmed by limits, both self-
imposed and real,” America appeared “unconscious of possibilities” and damningly, it equivocated 
as to what it stood for, turning instead to retrenchment, retreat, and accommodation abroad.341 
Singh effectively captured the broad strains of criticism levelled at Obama’s foreign policy, in 
highlighting the means by which his approach “defined down” expectations for an American 
presence in world affairs.  Unwillingness to project American power in necessary places and 
necessary fights served only to undermine both the world order and American interests within it. 
Taken together, these criticisms of Obama’s foreign policy reflect an interpretation of a foreign 
policy that tempers America’s role as the world leader.  
But in important respects, the definition of “necessary” acts as something of an ink-blot test for how 
observers might react to Obama’s foreign policy. Where Singh talks of Obama’s “defining down of 
U.S. foreign policy through negatives” as being “audacious,” from Obama’s perspective, this was the 
only recourse available to initiate the needed recalibration of U.S. forces to a level which more 
appropriately served the interests of the nation. He declared in 2014 that “ultimately, global 
leadership requires us to see the world as it is, with all its danger and uncertainty.  We have to be 
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prepared for the worst, prepared for every contingency.”342 This sentiment clearly resonated. It 
would be echoed in the title of Ben Rhodes’ memoir of his time in the White House.343 
The forces agreement signed by Bush in the dying embers of his presidency allowed Obama to keep 
his campaign promise of leaving Iraq. The early-hour border crossing in December 2011 was thus the 
end to the war of choice. Afghanistan, the war of necessity however, would consume more energy 




In the early days of the administration Obama ordered a policy review process, to be led by former 
CIA operative Bruce Riedel, in order to establish an appropriate course of action in Afghanistan.344 
The resulting report advocated dedicating more attention to Pakistan and the safe havens within its 
borders where al Qaeda figures hid. The Riedel report established the goal “to disrupt, dismantle, 
and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” and resulted in Obama ordering 4000 more 
troops to the country to train Afghan security forces.345 This was on the heels of approving 
deployment of a further 17,000 from a request held over from the Bush administration.346 By 
increasing American troop presence in Afghanistan from 38,000 to 59,000 in a short time period 
after assuming the presidency, he was demonstrating in practice what he had preached about re-
allocating resources to Afghanistan. The Riedel report, however, ultimately failed in setting a 
satisfactory course for the supposedly necessary war. 347 
In staking the need for a second, more in depth strategy review, Obama suggested that recently 
appointed commander Stanley McChrystal’s assessment of the war “clarified a gap in what had 
come out of the Riedel report.”348 There was a need to address ambiguities, chief among them being 
what was to be done with the Taliban. Was the goal to defeat or merely disrupt? McChrystal’s 
assessment offered a stark warning that without more forces, the war would “likely end in failure” in 
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the next twelve months.349 It was a direct challenge to the Commander-in-Chief who had 
campaigned on the necessity of the war to do what was needed to avoid an ignominious defeat. 
Obama for his part, while being dismayed and angered at the feeling of being ‘boxed in’ by the 
military, initiated the new process of strategic review.350 Obama was keen on establishing what the 
purpose of any U.S. presence in Afghanistan was, and he wanted a policy the whole government 
could rally around. He told journalist Bob Woodward “what became clear to me was, we’ve got to 
get everybody in a room and make sure that everybody is singing from the same hymnal.”351 
Obama’s reification of consensus it seemed would extend unabated into Afghanistan decision-
making. 
Woodward’s Obama’s Wars offers a widely sourced insider account of the Afghanistan review 
process, and it notes how Obama opened the first meeting by proclaiming “We need to come to this 
with a spirit of challenging our assumptions. I’m a big believer in continually updating our analysis 
and relying on a constant feedback loop.”352 His approach to the strategic review meetings was one 
that sought out a range of perspectives before then summarizing participant’s positions and finding 
areas of overlap. Seeking to establish where everyone stood.353 This was a mode of operating which 
reflected the deliberative approach which observers have noted characterized Obama through 
multiple avenues in his life. Accounts from students he taught from his time as a teacher of 
constitutional law at the University of Chicago paint a picture of Obama conducting his classes in a 
manner which would provoke and challenge assumptions, but also importantly, they recall that “he 
did not belittle students; instead he drew them out, restating and polishing halting answers.”354 He 
displayed a constant visage of evenhandedness, facilitating students to tease out arguments and 
debates from the subjects at hand. 
Prior to this, his ascension to become the first black president of the esteemed Harvard Law Review 
was ascribed, in part - by those who participated in the election - to have been founded upon his 
ability to listen to people from different perspectives.355 For his part, a 28 year old Obama, upon 
being elected, said he would “concentrate on making the review a ‘forum for debate,’ bringing in 
new writers and pushing for livelier, more accessible writing.”356 He later emphasized “if I'm talking 
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to a white conservative who wants to dismantle the welfare state, he has the respect to listen to me 
and I to him. That's the biggest value of the Harvard Law Review. Ideas get fleshed out and there is 
no party line to follow."357 Obama the Commander-in-Chief carried a resemblance to the professorial 
Obama leading a seminar, prodding and poking at arguments, and to Obama the law journal editor, 
seeking to expand the range of the arguments being put forward. 
The core of the debate at hand rested on competing notions of what America was seeking to achieve 
in Afghanistan, and as such how many more troops it ought to commit in order to achieve whatever 
ends were established as desirable. A key element of this was the notion of whether a U.S. presence 
in Afghanistan ought to be aimed at reshaping its society or whether it should have more limited 
goals. It thus hinged on the extent to which the goal should be defeating or merely disrupting the 
insurgent Taliban, and whether the defeat of al Qaeda could be detached from a similar defeat of 
the Taliban.358 To defeat the Taliban would be to establish a goal of reshaping Afghan society and 
polity in an all-encompassing manner. It would constitute a nation-building enterprise. 
The debate circled around the utility of counterinsurgency as a strategy which could bring stability to 
the country and to help bring about political change. This debate would shed important light into 
how Obama wrestled with the implications of either adopting or rejecting such a strategy, and 
whether he would accede to the notion that the U.S. could reshape a foreign land. 
Counterinsurgency acted as something of a stand-in for how America perceives its role in the world. 
Could the U.S. maintain an involvement in the internal affairs of problem spots the world over? 
Counterinsurgency (abbreviated to COIN) is a strategy which, as its name implies, focuses on 
countering insurgent fighting forces, but does so through prioritizing relations with the population of 
the country at war. As Fred Kaplan notes, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan meant taking on the 
assumption that “the best way to keep al Qaeda at bay is to dry up its support by earning the trust of 
the civilian population, building roads, creating jobs, and striking power-sharing deals with tribal 
elders.”359 
By embedding U.S. forces in communities and adapting to its cultural habits, the theory goes that 
the U.S. can win over hearts and minds, and thus degrade the opportunities for insurgent forces to 
recruit, hide within, and gain support from local populations.360 Skeptics argue it to be a troop, 
resource, and time intensive approach which is extremely difficult to execute effectively. In 
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Afghanistan, the case for COIN was further weakened by the cultural, political, and governmental 
difficulties of a complex country which had resolutely resisted outside interference in its affairs for 
centuries.361 The case was made however, to have any chance of defeating the Taliban and 
effectively reforming Afghan society, full-scale counterinsurgency would be required.362 
Counterinsurgency is a military strategy which carries with it many ideological assumptions. It taps 
into some of the same assumptions which led to the Iraq War, in embracing notions of America’s 
ability to shape world affairs, militarism, and a mindset which universalized western liberalism.363 It 
was a vision of ideology dictating modes of foreign intervention and, as such, to fully embrace COIN 
would be to signal a continuation of this way of thinking. But furthermore, under Haass’s 
conception, taking steps to extend the war effort into modes of transforming Afghani society, would 
signal a shift from fighting the war of necessity Obama sought to paint it as, towards a war of choice 
he nominally decried.364 
For Afghanistan the strategy had high-profile advocates in the form of much of the military brass, 
and crucially among them were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, 
McChrystal, and the architect of the concept as it existed in its modern form, CENTCOM (United 
States Central Command) commander General David Petraeus.365 The military parlayed its belief in 
COIN as a strategy in Afghanistan into high number troop requests. Full-scale COIN would require 
80,000 troops and a commitment of ten years or more. In the strategic review, though, they argued 
for 40,000 as the number of troops which “provided the best opportunity to protect the 
population.”366 The key opponent of the pursuit of such a course was Vice President Joe Biden, who 
viewed the governmental and cultural challenges posed by Afghanistan as prohibitive. He favoured 
instead a strategy of ‘Counterterrorism Plus,’ an approach that did not increase troop levels, but 
accelerated counterterrorism offensives, focusing attention solely on taking out al Qaeda 
operatives.367 Biden was joined notably in this perspective by counterterrorism chief John 
Brennan.368 
The review process led to a broad recognition of the infeasibility and undesirability of carrying a goal 
of defeating the Taliban. Yet crucially, Obama stated “I’m not of the view that we can simply leave. 
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To the extent that we define counterinsurgency as population security as opposed to a high Taliban 
body count, that I can embrace and I think it’s sound. We need to determine how broad or narrow 
the scope of that objective is though.”369 He seemed to be grappling with defining counterinsurgency 
in a more particular manner, one which moved away from the military defeat of the Taliban. Yet he 
also posed questions about the sustainability of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan – a presence 
perpetuated by any COIN policy – questioning “we can clear, hold and build, but how can we 
transfer?...We’ve put a lot of lives and money in Afghanistan, I don’t want to be going to [U.S. 
military hospitals] Walter Reed and Bethesda eight years from now.”370  In terms of the military’s 
preferred options, 40,000 troops and its cost for ten years of $889 billion – Obama proclaimed “this 
is not what I’m looking for. I’m not doing 10 years. I’m not doing a long-term nation-building effort. 
I’m not spending a trillion dollars. I’ve been pressing you guys on this.”371 Simply put, such an 
approach was “not in the national interest.”372 For Obama, the cost of doing what was needed to 
achieve the beginnings of a desirable and functional Afghan political system was too high.  
He stated that “actually, in 18 to 24 months, we need to think about how we can begin thinning out 
our presence and reducing our troops. This cannot be an open-ended commitment.”373 He wanted 
something akin to Bush’s surge in Iraq. He emphasized the point by arguing “I’m not going to make a 
commitment that leaves my successor with more troops than I inherited in Afghanistan.”374 The goal 
of extricating the U.S. from Afghanistan sooner rather than later was made abundantly clear. But 
there remained a sense that Obama held the imperative of taking action to alter the situation in 
Afghanistan, belying the impulse to remove American troops from harm’s way. Obama was wrestling 
with an issue on which he had held a consistent position of opposing the Iraq War through the prism 
of supporting the war in Afghanistan. Now he held the reins, he had to navigate to a strategy which 
fulfilled the demands of necessity, but also fulfilled an overriding intention to extricate the U.S. from 
an ever lengthening war. This was a contradiction which ultimately Obama could never solve 
satisfactorily. 
At one point in the policy review meetings, Obama explicitly noted his desire to mediate between 
Biden and Petraeus’ opposing perspectives, stating “let’s see if we can reconcile Joe’s concerns with 
Dave’s concerns.”375 It was a useful window into Obama’s review process – a concerted effort to 
bring opposing perspectives together in debate. He was trying to find a middle ground between two 
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intractable positions. We return once more to James’ original founding of pragmatism where under 
“the present dilemma in philosophy,” he argued “the world is indubitably one way if you look at it in 
one way, but as indubitably is it many, if you look at it another.” 376 As a solution, James offered “the 
oddly named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand.”377 The 
question remained for Obama, how could you mediate between doing more and doing less? 
Ultimately Obama approved a plan which committed 30,000 new troops into Afghanistan. It was to 
be a surge of forces, but crucially would be announced alongside an announcement of a withdrawal 
to begin after 18 months.378 Journalist James Mann argues “Obama had rendered a lawyerly 
solution, a compromise that gave McChrystal and the Pentagon most of the additional troops they 
sought, but seemingly for a limited time period.”379 Mann notes that “as envisioned by the Obama 
administration… the war in Afghanistan was to be limited in scope and duration. These new ideas 
were in some tension with the military doctrine of counterinsurgency, which required time, patience 
and lots of troops.”380  There was a fundamental disconnect, where Obama had over time, in Mann’s 
reckoning “began to back away from the full implications of a counterinsurgency strategy.”381  
Rhodes recalls in his memoir “we would announce it as a temporary surge – in eighteen months, the 
troops would start to draw down.”382 It was a strategy seeking to “secure Afghanistan’s major 
population centers, then shift to training and counterterrorism – essentially endorsing the Petraeus-
McChrystal approach for two years, and then shifting to the Biden-Brennan approach sooner than 
the military wanted.”383 It is hard to tell if this was intended to be a transitional approach at the 
time, or if Rhodes is retro-fitting a rationalization on to the policy. But it is an indication of policy 
which seeks to straddle a divide, and go between two opposing approaches. 
COIN had been consistently pushed by the military, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates, but Deputy National Security Advisor (later National Security Advisor) Tom 
Donilon reiterated that the cost of this approach was not in the national interest.384 He believed “the 
key difference between what had been proposed and what the strategy would ultimately be…was 
that it would not be a full-scale counterinsurgency.”385 There was an apparent cognizance that COIN 
had been a thorny presence in the debates, but ultimately for Obama, the strategy could never be 
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full-scale COIN. That was an ideological commitment that was beyond the pale and beyond the 
necessary. Indeed, at one point in the review process, Obama asserted “we’re not trying to achieve a 
perfect nation-state here. We don’t have the resources to do that.”386  
In the speech announcing the policy review decision, Obama went to lengths to emphasize exactly 
why the U.S. was in Afghanistan in the first place. “We did not ask for this fight,” but 9/11 had 
compelled the U.S. and its allies to take action. There was an imperative that necessitated a 
presence in Afghanistan. Even in this venue of announcing Afghanistan policy, he would return once 
more to the notion of Iraq detracting from efforts in Afghanistan, noting that as the situation had 
deteriorated, all the while “troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in 
Iraq.”387 
He emphasized once more the significance of the war in Afghanistan. “I see firsthand the terrible 
wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American 
people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home 
tomorrow.” But “I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from 
here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I 
speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat.”388 
In justifying the pre-emptive timeline for exit, he rejected a course that would commit the U.S. to “a 
nation-building project of up to a decade” that “sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at 
a reasonable cost, and what we need to secure our interests.” He emphasized:  
As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or 
our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don’t 
have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I’m mindful of the words of 
President Eisenhower, who – in discussing our national security – said, “Each 
proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to 
maintain balance in and among national programs.”389 
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Woodward reflected on Obama’s thinking that “he had to get himself and the country out of the 
box. War could not suck the oxygen out of everything else.” Obama had campaigned as something of 
an anti-Bush, but Donilon thought at the time of the Afghanistan policy decision “that Obama had 
perhaps underestimated the extent to which he had inherited George W Bush’s presidency – the 
apparatus, personnel and mind-set of war making.”390 The war footing remained on course in ways 
that disappointed Obama’s supporters. Even some of those involved in the process were surprised 
by the outcome. Doug Lute, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan said “I 
don’t think the review adds up to the decision,” and suggested that Obama had treated the military 
as another political constituency that had to be accommodated.391 
The review process had, as far as Lute and other observers were concerned, seemed to be moving 
away from a large-scale military solution, as Obama emphasized time and again the need to avoid 
costly commitments of indeterminate duration. Obama’s decision however still involved a significant 
deployment of troops. The question of whether Obama ever got “out of the box” in Afghanistan is 
thus a pertinent one. Whether the strategy curated out of the review process would be satisfying to 
Obama was a lingering question. Rhodes writes of Obama: 
 I’d seen him try to slow the momentum that was leading inexorably to more 
troops, more war; I’d watched as that process became, essentially, a negotiation 
between the far-reaching recommendations of his advisors and his own sense of 
realism. At the same time, the economy was teetering on a ledge between 
depression and slow recovery, and an overhaul of American healthcare was 
creeping through Congress. The American public was exhausted by nearly a 
decade of war. In a way, we’d failed him by making him spend so much time on 
this review. He’d reshaped what had come to him and turned it into something 
that he felt was necessary, something worthy of sacrifice, something with limits. 
But I could still sense the unease at sending young people to die.392 
Despite arriving at 30,000 troops, Obama reflected on how he would politically have been better off 
rejecting that request and telling the military “the American people are sick of this war, and we’re 
going to put in 10,000 trainers because that’s how we’re going to get out of there.”393 In making the 
decision there appeared to be an amount of wistfulness on the part of the president, as though he 
was fighting an instinct that preferred the quicker, easier exit. This raises urgent questions as to how 
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Obama could commit so many lives to danger if he was so unsure and unconvinced of the merits of 
the plan. How did he convince himself to go against his instincts?  
The paramount importance of deliberation to his approach to foreign policy was a vital part of this. It 
made blurry the lines between clear visions of action. That was by design. Obama’s thoroughgoing 
process was not to the tastes of all observers. Through undertaking a systematic review that sought 
out perspectives from all sides, it was also not a process of expedience. Former UN Ambassador John 
Bolton argued that in undertaking such a process Obama was “dithering,” and, whatever the 
decision he would reach on Afghanistan, “his credibility and leadership” were “badly wounded by his 
continuing public display of indecisiveness.”394 Former Vice President Dick Cheney, meanwhile, 
suggested that "the White House must stop dithering while America's armed forces are in danger” 
instead it was time for Obama “to do what it takes to win a war he has repeatedly and rightly called 
a war of necessity."395 Obama’s affirmation of the necessity of the war might have entailed a more 
efficient process. But deliberation was a pivotal part of his process. What, to his critics, was 
“dithering” as a means of avoiding responsibility, was under Obama’s conception an act of 
thoroughness, to ensure all angles of the policy were considered. Yet in this instance it was also a 
crucial factor in leading him away from his instincts, towards a solution that he thought could 
appease and marry opposing perspectives.  
Despite a stated antipathy to blind travel down the path of war, despite a rejection of ideological 
commitments of war, despite a rejection of COIN for those reasons, despite options for a more 
restrained counterterrorist initiative on the table, Obama still reached the commitment of 30,000 
more troops and a surge which resembled significant elements of COIN. How did he end up doing 
something he was nominally so set against?  How could he justify taking a decision which would put 
lives on the line, and yet is one which he was not one hundred per cent behind? No matter how his 
instincts shied away from drawing the U.S. further in to conflict, his continued assertion of the 
necessity of the war in Afghanistan would serve only to hook him in. 
We are returned once more to the crucial sense of the necessary war, differentiated from the war in 
Iraq. In his 2002 speech he noted that “after September 11, after witnessing the carnage and 
destruction, the dust and the tears, I supported this administration’s pledge to hunt down and root 
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out those who would slaughter innocents in the name of intolerance, and I would willingly take up 
arms myself to prevent such tragedy from happening again.”396 
While this taking up of arms was now vicarious by dint of being the Commander-in-Chief, Obama’s 
approach to Afghanistan continued to recognise the need for such sacrifice. In 2002 he talked, in 
contrast to Iraq, of battles which were worthy of fighting. He said “the consequences of war are dire, 
the sacrifices immeasurable. We may have occasion in our lifetime to once again rise up in defense 
of our freedom, and pay the wages of war. But we ought not – we will not – travel down that hellish 
path blindly. Nor should we allow those who would march off and pay the ultimate sacrifice, who 
would prove the full measure of devotion with their blood, to make such an awful sacrifice in 
vain.”397 
It is important to acknowledge again the debt Obama owes to Abraham Lincoln. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, where he is left dismayed by the contradictions in his own thought, he turns to 
Lincoln whose lessons remind him “that we should pursue our own absolute truths only if we 
acknowledge that there may be a terrible price to pay.”398  For Obama, to fight a war, you must be 
fully conscious of what you are asking people to sacrifice and what that sacrifice is for.  
Trevor McCrisken argues that the rhetoric of sacrifice was a major component of Obama’s public 
discussion of the war in Afghanistan. He notes that Obama “built a sustained campaign to emphasize 
the need for sacrifice in the face of what continue to be perceived as grave threats to U.S. 
security.”399 Indeed “Obama understands that the U.S. public would not accept continued sacrifice in 
pursuit of building a sustainable and strong Afghan society, but they would continue to give 
fundamental support to an effort that reinforced U.S. security and therefore served U.S. 
interests.”400 Privately, Obama argued that if he was not convinced the action was necessary: 
“another night in Dover [Delaware]” to observe the war-dead being repatriated “would be enough 
for me just so say to hell with this, and let’s get out of there.”401 His deep conviction of the necessity 
of the war remained evidently steadfast, but he was vividly aware of the costs of this particular 
endeavor.  
In the drawing of comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam, McCrisken notes that 9/11 
provided a moral imperative that Vietnam lacked. There remained an urge to take the fight to al 
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Qaeda and its leadership, and there remained a desire to exact justice upon Osama bin Laden.402 
These were far removed from the abstract aims of Iraqi liberation and from the increasingly distant 
Cold War logic that underwrote Vietnam. This notion also not only mirrors Obama’s rhetoric of 
gladly taking up arms for the worthy cause of defending America, but also reaches back to deeper 
roots in Obama’s thinking, roots which held a particular and unbent determination to place 
appropriate perception of threat, risk, and national interests not in the abstraction of ideology, but 
instead in a fact-based evaluation of reality. 
Whilst being sympathetic in his interpretation of Obama’s philosophical and intellectual savvy, in 
Reading Obama James Kloppenberg questioned whether Obama’s decision to send additional troops 
into a failing war offered a representation of the pragmatist thinker he had so thoroughly laid out. 
He noted “Obama seems convinced that the United States can control the threat of terrorism only 
by transforming a nation that for centuries  has consisted of a loose confederations of largely 
autonomous and often cantankerous clans into a united, stable, law-abiding constitutional 
democracy. He has not always been so sure of America’s power to perform such alchemy.”403 For 
Kloppenberg, the temptations for pursuance of such an ambitious nation-building course offered a 
test of “whether Obama’s stated commitment to the critical assessment of results – and the 
resolution to change course when necessary rather than follow dogma blindly – extends from the 
domain of domestic politics to that of foreign affairs.”404 
Kloppenberg’s concerns might have been assuaged by Woodward’s report of Obama professing that 
“I’m not signing on to a failure. If what I proposed is not working, I’m not going to be like these other 
presidents and stick to it based upon my ego or my politics – my political security.”405 This is a crucial 
statement of - at least in Obama’s mind - a willingness to change course based on results. Placing 
results above all other concerns speaks once more to the experimentalism which is so at home in 
Jamesian pragmatism.  
Interestingly, Obama doubled down on the timeline he had projected – “in 2011 we will not be 
having a conversation of how to do more.”406 It was as though he was giving himself one opportunity 
to get it right in Afghanistan, but if it did not come off he would not set about chasing favourable 
results. A one-time thing. This attitude speaks to the notion of not trying the same thing time and 
again; instead being comfortable with failure, and willing to alter course in the event of failure. 
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In Goldberg’s lengthy piece on Obama’s foreign policy he refers to Derek Chollet’s notion of Obama 
as a gambler. As the previous chapter noted, gambling nomenclature is prevalent not only in such 
discussions of Obama, but also in conceptualizations of pragmatism. The tragic pragmatism passed 
down from Lincoln to Obama holds that bets on the future must be made only in tandem with the 
readiness to accept their failure. The metaphor and rhetoric of ‘gambling,’ if applied to Obama 
attains a pertinence that offers fascinating analytical value. And importantly, it offers intriguing 
possibilities in offering explanation for how he was able to justify his apparently dissonant approach 
to Afghanistan policy. 
The metaphor offers a route directly in to the ideas that animate pragmatism and how they can lead 
in to foreign policy decision-making. The very act of ‘gambling’ relies on a sense of understanding 
that there is an element of chance to the decision being made. By its very nature it lacks certainty. It 
is an act which relies on a series of contingencies to alter the results as they arise. The notion of 
gambling in foreign policy does not mean that you take a decision completely at random. Bets are 
still informed by a level of understanding of the factors which are likely to influence an outcome 
either way. But they are still made with the knowledge – and vitally - the acceptance, that there will 
be a level of variance in the outcome that means you can never be assured of a specific result. 
Taking calculated bets on the future, with the hope that your decisions are weighted towards 
favourable outcomes, but nevertheless being cognizant that the very nature of gambling precludes 
those favourable outcomes from being guaranteed. This was a key essence of Obama’s foreign 
policy. 
In Afghanistan, Obama appeared to reflect this approach of taking a “moral wager.” The logic of 
necessity was indisputably a crucial driver. It was the necessary cause which justified the sacrifice of 
war. Yet, that he harboured doubts and an instinct to reduce U.S. commitment was also apparent. 
This is what pushed him to chart an unlikely course between the overwhelming commitment he 
resisted and the escape he craved. Just as Obama turned to Lincoln when explaining the 
intractability of some of his firm beliefs, and the realities of compromise, we can do the same with 
his decision-making in Afghanistan.407 
The tragic pragmatism of Lincoln in many respects undergirded Obama’s conflicted decision making. 
If we are looking for an explanation of why or how Obama was accepting of the logic of the surge, 
we can draw a line to his perspective that highlighted the necessity of the war – a perspective which 
views foreign policy itself through a prism of what does and does not constitute a core national 
security threat. Locating the necessity in that security interest allowed him to justify the ‘moral 
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wager,’ to push forward with an approach which ran counter to much of what he believed in, and 
yet which offered the chance to provide a solution to a cause he firmly did believe in. In speeches 
given about the war in Afghanistan, he repeatedly referred to “the wages of war.”408  He was, again, 
keenly aware of the costs of his choice, his ‘moral wager’ would state that those wages of war were 





In a June 2011 speech announcing the beginning of the process of drawing down forces in 
Afghanistan, Obama argued that such a drawdown was starting “from a position of strength,” that al 
Qaeda was “under more pressure than at any time since 9/11,” and he emphasized U.S. success in 
killing Osama bin Laden – “a victory for all who have served since 9/11.”409 While recognizing that al 
Qaeda remained dangerous, he maintained that the U.S. had put it “on the path to defeat.” The 
Taliban, meanwhile, had suffered “serious losses,” and “along with our surge, our allies also 
increased their commitments, which helped stabilize more of the country.  Afghan security forces 
have grown by over 100,000 troops, and in some provinces and municipalities we’ve already begun 
to transition responsibility for security to the Afghan people.”410  
Whatever financial cost was carried in sustaining the Afghan security force, it was not 
acknowledged. The only costs Obama openly discussed were those of the lives of U.S. service 
personnel already lost.411 They were sacrifices the American people could accept to an extent. But 
the exhaustion after a decade of war was real, and as such, he emphasized that America could “take 
comfort in knowing that the tide of war is receding.”412 This meant that “fewer of our sons and 
daughters are serving in harm’s way.” 413  
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Obama’s overall picture in his address painted some semblance of success, and thus apparently 
provided the suitable conditions to precipitate the desired exit. Yet, the degree to which such 
success was achieved can be readily disputed. In December 2015, the Taliban held more territory 
than in any year since 2001, al Qaeda meanwhile remained undefeated. Even without its leader, it 
metastasized into various groups in an increasing number of locations worldwide.414 Aaron O’Connell 
- who served in Afghanistan as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps reserve and later as 
director of defense policy and strategy on Obama’s NSC - writes in his edited volume of essays Our 
Latest Longest War that despite Obama’s revision of his predecessor’s goals downward, his vow to 
defeat al Qaeda and effect a “responsible transition” in order for Afghans to secure and govern the 
country had not been achieved by December 2015. “Therefore” he argues “any reasoned analysis of 
Operation Enduring Freedom must conclude that, thus far, America’s longest war has been an 
extremely costly half success at best, or at worst, a failure.”415 He argues that “at the outset, 
American leaders suffered not from ignorance but from informed hubris.”416  The intentions which 
undergirded the war effort in Afghanistan were always primed upon assumptions which did not 
match the reality on the ground. As such “the war has been less than fully successful, and an inability 
to turn lofty ideals into practical outcomes is a principal reason why.”417  
The “informed hubris” was such that it embraced that very same worldview which relied upon 
universalist values and moral clarity of an enlightenment west.418 O’Connell notes that “this 
enlightenment vision drove tactics, operations, and strategy in the Afghanistan War under both 
Democratic and Republican administrations.” And as such “it justified end states that would have 
been ambitious under any circumstances, but that became entirely untenable when the Bush 
administration refused to commit the necessary resources and then began a costly and unnecessary 
war in Iraq.”419 Crucially, he maintains that Obama “partially abandoned his predecessor’s 
transformative vision, but by then, the same progressive assumptions were already baked into the 
military’s counterinsurgency doctrine.”420 He could not get out of the box. Indeed, it was ultimately 
Obama who must hold accountability for bringing the shift to counterinsurgency.421 
O’Connell argues furthermore:  
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The United States neither forgot Vietnam nor refought it nor ignored it. The 
United States just never escaped the prison of its culture or quit the habits of 
mind that have been operative in American society long before either war began. 
The United States was committed to American exceptionalism and to a 
benevolent vision of how Afghans would understand its presence in their lands. It 
took culture’s stories – narratives that link freedom with elections and dignity to 
prosperity – to be nonnegotiable and universally accepted. September 11 brought 
the U.S. military into Afghanistan, but the power of these narratives kept it there, 
turning the hunt for al Qaeda into a grand strategy of transformation that 
overpromised and underdelivered.422 
O’Connell’s portrayal of the U.S. foreign policy mindset finds symmetry with the universalist 
assumptions of Hunter’s orthodoxy.  
We are confronted with the pressing question of whether, in seeking a policy review process which 
mediated between opposing perspectives, Obama came to put too much stock in the existing 
infrastructure of war. It allowed for a process which meant always having to move down from a 
permanent war footing. Obama became trapped by the war of necessity, and by his overt willingness 
to guide a policy review process which was informed by, and accepting of, military logic. This was a 
logic which persisted from the particular brand of post-Cold War exceptionalist America which had 
become the dominant force in the U.S. foreign policy machinery. The blob which Obama had sought 
to confront and to reign in appeared, at least in the case of Afghanistan, to have worn him down.  
Though he carried a clear sense that the war in Afghanistan retained necessity, by his own logic of 
searching for success in a one-time effort at turning the tide, it seems viable to argue that given the 
continued difficulty encountered in Afghanistan and the perennial sense of “the forever war,” his 




In 2014, Obama spoke at the West Point commencement ceremony, in what was heralded as a 
marquee speech, primed at laying out a bold vision of U.S. foreign policy for the remainder of his 
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term. He sketched out why “the United Sates is and remains the one indispensable nation.423 That 
has been true for the century passed and it will be true for the century to come.” But he noted that 
the world was changing, and even where U.S. interests lay in “a world of greater freedom and 
tolerance,” “to say that we have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders is 
not to say that every problem has a military solution.” Indeed “since World War II, some of our most 
costly mistakes came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military 
adventures without thinking through the consequences – without building international support and 
legitimacy for our action; without leveling with the American people about the sacrifices 
required.”424 
He emphasized again how U.S. security “demanded those deployments” he ordered in the 
Afghanistan policy review, but maintained “I am haunted by those deaths [that ensued from the 
deployment].  I am haunted by those wounds.  And I would betray my duty to you and to the 
country we love if I ever sent you into harm’s way simply because I saw a problem somewhere in the 
world that needed to be fixed, or because I was worried about critics who think military intervention 
is the only way for America to avoid looking weak.”425 
He emphasized his bottom line that “America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no 
one else will.” The military is the backbone of that leadership he maintained, but crucially, he argued 
that “U.S. military action cannot be the only -- or even primary -- component of our leadership in 
every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a 
nail.”426 
In terms of America’s role in the world, this meant returning to a principle he put forward at the 
outset of his presidency “the United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our 
core interests demand it -- when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when 
the security of our allies is in danger.  In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions 
about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just.  International opinion matters, 
but America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life.”427 
And here came the flip side of the coin which he had continually touted right from his 2002 anti-Iraq 
war speech: 
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 On the other hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a direct threat to 
the United States, when such issues are at stake -- when crises arise that stir our 
conscience or push the world in a more dangerous direction but do not directly 
threaten us -- then the threshold for military action must be higher.428 
This articulation of the very concept of a threshold speaks once more to what he believed to be the 
crux of controversy such as it pertained to his foreign policy. The mere notion of placing a cap on 
what should and could necessitate U.S. intervention in the world struck some observers as being 
declinist. In his reporting of the West Point speech, Fred Kaplan dryly notes, “again, all this should 
seem obvious. The problem is, it isn’t to everybody.”429 
In concluding his book America’s Rasputin David Milne draws a parallel between the modes of 
thinking which led to the wars in Vietnam and in Iraq.430 The book’s focus is former developmental 
economist and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, who advocated for escalated bombing 
campaigns in order to accelerate the achievement of his idealized vision for Vietnamese society. 
Milne suggests that early millennium neoconservatives took up Rostow’s “internationalist, crusading 
mantle” and have ran with it “to potent effect.”431 He points a finger squarely at Paul Wolfowitz who 
he deems “identifiably Rostovian with respect to his reading of international relations: it is beholden 
upon the United States, as the world’s preeminent nation, to democratize and do “good” – at the 
bayonet’s point if necessary.”432  
Obama cast the same aspersion in his 2002 speech in Chicago. He wrapped his opposition to the 
second Iraq war up in an aversion to ideology, the ideology which stretched back from 
neoconservatives, like Wolfowitz and Perle, who Milne argues “believe in the redemptive powers of 
liberal capitalism in the same way as evangelical Christians believe in God – they act as if their value 
system is divinely authored and view deviations from the righteous path as heresy.”433 For his part, 
Milne argues that Rostow “believed that he was in possession of a fundamental truth that was 
impervious to contingency and counterargument.”434 This is a mindset which allows for the removal 
of thresholds. When one is in possession of a fundamental truth, why equivocate? Why take a 
middle course? Why be limited by the boundaries of necessity? When you are in possession of a 
fundamental truth, which is impervious to contingency and counterargument, the only thing which 
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remains necessary is to enact that truth. But Milne offers up a stark warning: “all ideologies can do 
awful things when they are pursued with unyielding determination.”435  
In his embrace of ideas which are averse to ideology, in an embrace of what this thesis has traced as 
a pragmatist foundation of fallibilism, experimentalism, consequentialism, and contingency, Obama 
stands at a starting point which is nominally less inclined toward adventurism in war. His approach 
rejects the pursuit of ideology with unyielding determination, and instead constructs limitations of 
clearly drawn thresholds of necessity. 
There remains debate, however, about where those thresholds lie. And, as with the Afghanistan 
policy review, there remains debate on the extent to which Obama ultimately bought in to the 
ideological trappings of the American war machine. His policy decision gave some level of succor to 
the universalist assumptions of counterinsurgency, the belief in an ability to reshape a society in 
America’s image. Obama’s own process of deliberation and consensus had led him down a path 
which would - despite attempted caveats - accede to ideology. In Afghanistan, we can argue that 
Obama’s approach to decision making, the search for consensus, for a middle ground, allowed his 
own instincts to be crowded out. That he could be moderately satisfied with a solution that seemed 
so out of kilter with his worldview has been demonstrated as being contingent, in part, on that very 
worldview. Obama stated in an interview with The New Yorker’s David Remnick that he is 
“comfortable with complexity,” and this is borne out in his sometimes contradictory foreign policy 
approach. 436 Chollet’s notion of Obama the gambler is useful in offering some explanation for this. 
The thought-process attached to gambling is one that embraces uncertainty, but calculates that 
where wagers can be taken for the advancement of a goal, they must be done so with the 
acknowledgement of that uncertainty. Where Obama takes these wagers, he does so using the 
language of necessity. Crucially, in Obama’s conception of the world, that which is necessary often 
demands the costs of uncertainty in outcome. 
Regrettably from Obama’s carefully curated perspective, the very nature of America’s broad 
engagement with the world – its role as “the one indispensable nation” which “must always lead on 
the world stage” - only serves to expand the parameters of ‘necessity.’  This apparent contradiction 
between competing conceptions of America’s role in the world which Obama laid bare in his 2014 
West Point speech must remain at the core of any attempt to examine Obama’s approach to foreign 
policy. The following chapter will thus examine this in further depth. That expansion of the 
parameters of necessity finds vivid illustrations in the cases of the conflicts which emerged in Libya 
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and Syria. Examining Obama’s response to those crises, and the means of ideation through which he 
confronted them can help to give greater clarity to the means by which – when confronted with 
questions of where he could possibly draw that line of necessity for U.S. action – he could square the 



























Those of us with the best intentions 
 
On 9 October 2009, Obama was awoken in the middle of the night to be made aware of the 
surprising news that he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.437 Not yet a full year into his 
tenure, with little ‘peace’ to show for it, Obama and his team were dismayed. Despite reservations, 
declining the award was not an option. Obama thus turned his attention to the rhetorical 
possibilities open to him in crafting an acceptance speech for a global audience. The speech would 
serve as a meditation on the United States’ role in the world and the manner in which Obama as 
Commander-in-Chief had to face competing imperatives on how the U.S. should respond to 
international affairs. He told speechwriters Ben Rhodes and Jon Favreau that he wanted to use the 
speech to make the case for war.438 Rhodes later wrote in his memoir that Obama “turned the entire 
speech into an effort to deal with the tension of getting the award right after he had decided to send 
thirty thousand troops to fight in a war.”439 The Afghanistan review process had just been 
completed, Obama’s moral wager placed on committing more troops to that war. Ultimately, Obama 
said he did not want the prize to be “a vindication of inaction.”440 Writing in Vanity Fair, Michael 
Lewis suggested that Obama “wanted to reconcile the nonviolent doctrines of two of his heroes, 
King and Gandhi, with his new role in the violent world.” Obama told him “it wasn’t just that I 
needed to make a new argument…It was that I wanted to make an argument that didn’t allow either 
side to feel too comfortable.” He felt he had to “describe a notion of a just war. But also 
acknowledge that the very notion of a just war can lead you into some dark places. And so you can’t 
be complacent in labelling something just. You need to constantly ask yourself questions.”441 The 
contrast Obama sought between the instincts of peace that Gandhi and King typified and the more 
sober perspectives of Reinhold Niebuhr formed the heart of a tour-de-force examining the balance 
of justifying war and violence against the imperative that yearns for peace.  
 
This chapter will focus on how Obama located America’s response to international crises in context 
of debates about the nation’s broader ‘role’ in world affairs. These debates captured the core 
dichotomy of war and peace he addressed in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech. Over the course of 
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his presidency, this became a matter of how he negotiated the process of recalibrating U.S. power to 
a manner that reflected his own distinct vision. 
This is an idea which bears particular examination given the seismic events of the Arab Spring which 
upturned the political order in a string of Middle Eastern and North African countries. Obama’s 
response would directly engage him in the question of situating the American foreign policy machine 
in its appropriate role. Its unique capabilities and status as historic guarantor of the international 
order prompted particular questions about the imperative to act in the face of security and moral 
disasters. 
The chapter will also consider the attention Obama gave Niebuhrian thought in projecting a humble 
worldview with limited expectations, but will crucially acknowledge a competing perspective, which 
trafficked in the hope of shared universals. Ultimately, the balancing of these two perspectives, and 
his ensuing response to the crises in Libya and Syria, will be placed in the context of Obama’s stated 
preference for multilateralism as a means of confronting problems, and in shaping an Obamian 




Obama began his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2009 at Oslo City Hall by 
emphasizing the scale of the problems of war in the new security age, “a decade into a new century, 
this old architecture is buckling under the weight of new threats.”442 He maintained that he did not 
take with him to Oslo “a definitive solution to the problems of war.” He instead suggested that 
“meeting these challenges will require the same vision, hard work, and persistence of those men 
and women who acted so boldly decades ago in shaping the world order.  And it will require us to 
think in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.” In accepting 
the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama stated “we must begin by acknowledging the hard truth:   We will 
not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes.  There will be times when nations - acting 
individually or in concert - will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.”443 To 
emphasize the point, he argued that “a non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's 
armies.  Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms.  To say that force 
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may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism -- it is a recognition of history; the 
imperfections of man and the limits of reason.”444 
Turning to that paradox which he had sought to portray in writing the speech, he reiterated “the 
instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace.” Yet he coupled this with the 
suggestion that “this truth must coexist with another -- that no matter how justified, war promises 
human tragedy” for “war itself is never glorious.” Obama argued that “part of our challenge is 
reconciling these two seemingly inreconcilable truths - that war is sometimes necessary, and war 
at some level is an expression of human folly.” For Obama, the effort to not allow “either side to 
feel comfortable” meant acknowledging the tragedy which befalls those seeking to find peace in a 
violent world. 
Obama found inspiration in the words of President John F. Kennedy, who called for an 
international focus “on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution 
in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions.” Obama dwelled on this notion 
of evolution in human institutions, and posed the questions of what this would look like, and what 
practical steps would be required to attain it. He emphasized the importance of all nations 
adhering to standards which govern the use of force, reiterating the value of these institutional 
norms in the context of multilateralism. Emphasizing that “the world rallied around America after 
the 9/11 attacks, and continues to support our efforts in Afghanistan” doing so “because of the 
horror of those senseless attacks and the recognized principle of self-defense.” The world also 
“recognized the need to confront Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait - a consensus that 
sent a clear message to all about the cost of aggression.” Obama argued that the legitimacy of 
interventions around the world depends on following these “rules of the road”  and as such it is 
imperative that the U.S. live up to those standards alongside all other nations.445  
Writing in The Audacity of Hope, he reflected a similar message that “once we get beyond matters 
of self-defense… I’m convinced that it will almost always be in our strategic interest to act 
multilaterally rather than unilaterally when we use force around the world.”446 For Obama, “acting 
multilaterally means doing what George H.W. Bush and his team did in the first Gulf War – engaging 
in the hard diplomatic work of obtaining most of the world’s support for our actions, and making 
sure our actions serve to further recognize international norms.”447 The use of the example of 
George H.W. Bush presaged the same deployment in the Nobel address. Obama expressed in The 











Audacity of Hope a belief that there are practical benefits to draw from leaning in to institutional 
practices: “Obtaining global buy-in…allows the United States to carry a lighter load when military 
action is required and enhances the chances for success.” Ultimately, he argued, “legitimacy is a 
‘force multiplier.’”448 
Prophetically, in the Nobel address, Obama stated “more and more, we all confront difficult 
questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a 
civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.” In the instance of such 
tragedies arising, he reached back to his earlier testament that force can be used to stop evil, and 
maintained that “I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the 
Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war.” For, “inaction tears at our conscience 
and can lead to more costly intervention later.” And that, Obama explained, is why “all responsible 
nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.”449 
This thesis has sought to locate Obama’s foreign policy within an intellectual framework that 
draws distinctly on his own ideological development. It embraces the notion that we should take 
philosophical groundings and epistemology seriously in understanding history.450 Through this 
lens, the importance of philosophical pragmatism has been manifold. But it is also a necessary task 
to interrogate the means by which it interacts and shapes other intellectual influences. In 
examining why Obama places such an emphasis on multilateralism as an ultimate form of 
international action we can trace elements of that same philosophical pragmatism. 
The Audacity of Hope demonstrates the premium Obama placed on multilateralism. In it he 
reflected on how “the painstaking process of building coalitions forces us to listen to other points of 
view and therefore look before we leap.”451 It allows for that same process of deliberation, and 
consensus building which is so foundational to Obama’s understanding of politics, and in a practical 
sense it allows for engagement “in some hardheaded analysis of the costs and benefits of the use of 
force compared to the other tools of influence at our disposal.”452 
Obama extolled the virtue of appealing to a wider consensus, suggesting “if we hope to win the 
broader battle of ideas, then world opinion must enter into this calculus.”453 In hearing out dissent 
and opposition to the American perspective, he argued that “it’s just possible that beneath all the 
rhetoric are perspectives that can illuminate the situation and help us make better strategic 
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decisions.”454 He painted a picture of using a process of deliberation to sort through the good and 
bad choices. It is the very same process he reified in the Constitution, which promotes “the very 
process of information gathering, analysis, and argument that allows us to make better, if not 
perfect, choices, not only about the means to our ends but also about the ends themselves.”455 He 
mapped that same necessity of testing “ideals, vision, and values against the realities of a common 
life, so that over time they may be refined, discarded, or replaced by new ideals, sharper visions, 
deeper values” that he read in the Constitution on to the international sphere.456 It is a significant 
indication of how Obama viewed the idealized possibilities of a multilateral response to crises and 
institution building. 
In his revealing interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic near the end of his presidency, he 
emphasized once more the indispensability of multilateralism. He explained “one of the reasons I am 
so focused on taking action multilaterally where our direct interests are not at stake is that 
multilateralism regulates hubris.”457 Multilateralism allowed for a very different conceptualization of 
American power and its presence in the world.  
The Nobel Prize speech attested to this vision. It was of a foreign policy that could be bounded by 
context, a notion of war and peace which could be adjudicated by the unique necessity demanded 
by each situation. Yet, nevertheless, the speech also held a competing narrative, one which sought 
to locate perspectives on war and peace in a universalized conception of the good.  
A great deal of Obama’s philosophy was centred on notions that multiple ideas can be valued at the 
same time. The Nobel speech reflected this in abundance. It reflected how competing visions of war 
and peace must be held alongside one another in a complex world. It was part of the logic that saw 
Obama feeding into different philosophical traditions, synthesizing the assumptions of a 
conventional liberal internationalism with another lens of pragmatism.  
This dialectic runs through the heart of Obama’s philosophy. James Kloppenberg discusses it as the 
interplay of universalism’s immutable truths remaining true across time with the denial of those 
universal principles. This particularism holds that “human cultures are human constructions; 
different people exhibit different forms of behavior because they cherish different values.”458 
Kloppenberg argues that “American social thought since the middle of the twentieth century has 
                                                          
454
 Ibid. p. 310-311 
455
 Ibid. p. 94 
456
 Ibid. p. 94-95 
457
 Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine". 
458
 Kloppenberg, Reading Obama. p. 79 
108 
 
been marked by a struggle between champions of foundationalism and universalism.” He maintains 
that: 
 Obama’s sensibility is a product of that conflict. He understands the reasons why 
the ideas of foundationalism and universalism proved useful: such ideas inspired 
the generation of his maternal grandparents and that of his parents. He also 
understands the reasons why such ideals proved vulnerable to a series of 
challenges: those who embraced those ideals aspired to more than any theory 
could provide. Even though Obama shares the skepticism of those critics who 
eroded the foundations on which mid-twentieth-century universalism stood, he 
nevertheless understands – and is “haunted” by – the residual appeal that 
timeless ideals continue to exert. As he has been throughout his life, as president 
he remains caught in the force field between universalism and particularism.459 
This ‘force field’ forms a central aspect of the means by which Obama set forth arguments 
concerning the use of American force. The terms universalism and particularism capture a sense of 
competing assumptions about that question of American involvement in the world. Their 
assumptions stand in for a broader divide between the humility of much of Obama’s perspective on 
American power in war and peace (particularism), and a confidence in the prospects of a sense of 
progress encapsulated by an international order that can reach for universal values in pursuit of war 
and peace (universalism). 
A significant part of this dichotomy was the importance of humility in Obama’s thought. In the Nobel 
Prize speech there is a particular connection which can be drawn between Obama’s rhetoric and the 
thought of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. But this is an intellectual connection that runs deeper. In a 
2007 New York Times interview with David Brooks, when Brooks questioned him on his familiarity 
with Niebuhr, Obama responded by saying “I love him,” declaring him to be one of his favourite 
philosophers.460 This need not necessitate an overwrought reading into Obama’s philosophical 
predilections, he is a well-read man who no doubt has many “favourite philosophers,” none of which 
can necessarily carry a causal link to his overall philosophical outlook. Nevertheless, cause for inquiry 
is further stirred by Obama’s own reading of Niebuhr.  
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Niebuhr was a theologian who ministered in Detroit in the early part of the twentieth century, 
before later teaching at Union Theological Seminary in New York City.461 His time in Detroit was 
significant. Being embedded in a community so entangled in labour movement concerns for 
automotive workers rights, alongside matters of migration and growing racial and ethnic tensions, 
provoked a keen sense of social engagement in Niebuhr. He became a prominent exponent of a 
socially conscious Christianity, at times even advocating for socialism.462 It is perhaps no surprise that 
his writings on politics and international affairs were laced with a perspective which stood cognizant 
of the failings of the United States. 
Niebuhr as a theologian addressed concerns that would later transpose to the philosophical domain. 
He was wrestling with the same concerns which fractured the intellectual spheres of a multitude of 
disciplines. He was bridging the gap between James, Dewey, and Peirce, the early pragmatists, and 
Rorty, Putnam, and Bernstein, their later echoes. Crucially, Niebuhr’s writings offer an intriguing 
vision of Obama’s own distillation of philosophical pragmatism in foreign policy.  
Obama elaborated to Brooks that from reading Niebuhr, he took away: 
The compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. 
And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate these things. 
But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction.463  
This is a reading which transposes neatly into Obama’s Nobel speech warning that “evil does exist in 
the world” and which comports in significant ways with the ideas of one of Niebuhr’s seminal texts 
The Irony of American History. Indeed, it offers a particularly profound treatment of the ideas linking 
the intellectual maelstrom which pragmatism participates in, and links them to foreign policy.  While 
Obama may have carried an imperfect reading and understanding of Niebuhr, in tracing some of 
those ideas into his Nobel address and broader ideas he held on foreign policy, we may, 
nevertheless, see where a Niebuhrian influence lay. In the case of the Nobel Prize address, the 
Niebuhrian thread was by design. When undertaking the writing process, Obama had requested that 
the speechwriters Favreau and Rhodes put together a binder of selected works on war and peace: 
Niebuhr was among them.464 
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In The Irony of American History – first published in 1952 - Niebuhr examined the antagonisms of the 
Cold War through a lens of tragedy in the “human situation.”465 His focus was on the limits of 
humankind in the face of history. In the vortex of ideological conflict that comprised the Cold War, 
Niebuhr identified a certain folly in human activity. He argued: 
Perhaps the real difficulty in both the communist and the liberal dreams of a 
“rationally ordered” historic process is that the modern man lacks the humility to 
accept the fact that the whole drama of history is enacted in a frame of meaning 
too large for human comprehension or management.466 
For Niebuhr, it was important to remember that “the course of history cannot be coerced from a 
particular point in history and in accordance with a particular conception of its end.”467 He 
emphasized a viewpoint that will be familiar to us in our examination of Obama, a perspective that 
argues against abstraction and against imposing ideology onto understandings of historical context. 
Niebuhr capped off his pragmatist credentials in extolling “the triumph of experience over dogma,” 
echoing the thought of James in his seminal lectures and Dewey in his writings on democracy.468 
The emphasis on limitations retains the most telling message from Niebuhr’s work. He framed the 
difficulties of America’s place in the world and the tragedy of America seeking to use its power to 
make a better world. In seeking solutions to problems, America could have the tendency to 
overstate its ability to take righteous action. As such, he warned of the perils of trusting too 
confidently or complacently in “virtues,” lest they turn to “vices.”469 
Here he offered up a remedy to such a problem: 
The ironic elements in American history can be overcome, in short, only if 
American idealism comes to terms with the limits of all human striving, the 
fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic 
configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all human virtue.470 
                                                          
465
 Niebuhr, The Irony of American History: With a New Introduction by Andrew J. Bacevich. 
466
 Ibid. p. 88 
467
 Ibid. p. 79 
468
 Ibid. pp. 89-108  
469





In foreign affairs terms, a state is “doubly tempted to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities, if 
it is informed by an idealism which does not understand the limits of man’s wisdom and volition in 
history.”471 
Here we can most explicitly observe Obama’s engagement and interpretation of Niebuhr. The 
theologian stated: 
The recognition of historical limits must not, however, lead to a betrayal of 
cherished values and historical attainments. Historical pragmatism exists on the 
edge of opportunism, but cannot afford to fall into the abyss. The difficulty of 
sustaining the values of a free world must not prompt us, for instance, to come to 
terms with tyranny. Nor must the perplexities confronting the task of achieving 
global community betray us into a complacent acceptance of national loyalty as 
the final moral possibility of history.472 
It is a nuanced acceptance of a need to act in the face of uncertainty. And it is what Obama – in his 
conversation with David Brooks - professed to have taken away from reading Niebuhr, in being 
“humble and modest” in the belief that evil, hardship, and pain can be eliminated.  
Obama’s reading of Niebuhr comports in crucial ways with instincts within the tradition of 
philosophical pragmatism, and his reverence for the thought of Lincoln. The importance of humility 
in Niebuhr’s writing is demonstrated time and again in his emphasis on the importance of 
humankind recognizing the limitations in knowledge. He ascribes “the evil in human history” as “the 
consequence of man’s wrong use of his unique capacities.” This wrong use “is always due to some 
failure to recognize the limits of his capacities of power, wisdom and virtue.”473  
 As a theologian, Niebuhr was keen to portray a notion that ideology cannot offer a solution to 
something as inherent as sin in human history. He carried a perspective which could today be 
viewed as unrelentingly pessimistic, something underscored by his continued emphasis on the 
notion that sin cannot be escaped, and as such, it forms a tragedy in human existence.474 When it 
came to the use of force and the matter of pacifism at hand in a 1940 essay entitled ‘Why the 
Christian Church is not Pacifist’, he deemed pacifism itself inadequate in the face of sin. For, “it is 
because men are sinners that justice can be achieved only by a certain degree of coercion and 
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tyranny.”475 Such logic could drive Obama to stand and accept the Nobel Peace Prize whilst 
professing that he was not a pacifist.  
While Niebuhr’s essay was among Obama’s compilations of texts he read while writing the speech 
(Lewis even details some of the notes he made in the margins), it is not to say that Obama was 
directly channeling it, or that it took particular precedence over other texts and other ideas.476 It can, 
nevertheless, be compellingly argued that key ideas of Niebuhr’s writings are reflected in Obama’s 
words. At the very least he echoes them in that forceful entreaty to “make no mistake, evil does 
exist.” Niebuhr made the case for taking requisite action to confront evil but he coupled it with the 
perspective that such action can only be taken with the acknowledgment of one’s own 
imperfections, or status as a sinner. He provocatively argued: 
In its profoundest insights, the Christian faith sees the whole of human history as 
involved in guilt, and finds no release from guilt except in the grace of God. The 
Christian is freed by that grace to act in history… and he is persuaded by that 
grace to remember the ambiguity of even his best actions. If the providence of 
God does not enter the affairs of men to bring good out of evil, the evil in our 
good may easily destroy our most ambitious efforts and frustrate our highest 
hopes.477 
The notion of providence is echoed in a significant manner by Obama when discussing Lincoln in The 
Audacity of Hope. He wrote of turning to Lincoln when confronted with the complexities of his own 
thought, and discussed the notion of reaching “for common understandings, precisely because all of 
us are imperfect and can never act with the certainty that God is on our side; and yet at times we 
must act nonetheless, as if we are certain, protected from error only by providence.”478 
Divine providence represents the notion of God’s intervention in the universe. Both Niebuhr and 
Obama brought forth the notion of God’s wisdom providing grace to “act in history,” an ability to act 
whilst accepting imperfection, whilst accepting the frailties of human existence. It offers a direct 
route in to the tragic pragmatism of Lincoln, and the lines drawn in the previous chapter between 
Obama, tragic pragmatism, and the notion of taking ‘moral wagers.’ 
Joseph Rhodes and Mark Hlavicik emphasize the centrality of embracing original sin in truly 
embodying Niebuhrian thought. They argue “without the concept of original sin, Niebuhr’s realism 
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can quickly denigrate into a resigned form of American exceptionalism.”479 Indeed, “without a sense 
that the human events are guided by a higher power with an unknowable purpose, it is impossible to 
achieve the graceful embrace of moral action in international affairs with the knowledge that it may 
never work out.” Crucially, for Rhodes and Hlavicik, “this divine purpose and sacred view of history” 
was absent from Obama’s Nobel speech.480 Though the speech apparently lacked this sense of a 
higher power and divine purpose, its “embrace of moral action in international affairs with the 
knowledge that it might never work out” is a notion that this thesis has argued Obama 
demonstrated through his engagement with Lincoln. He also showed it in statements on the process 
of making complex and imperfect decisions, as was the case in the Afghanistan review process. An 
absence of humility has never been an issue for Obama’s approach to foreign policy. What Rhodes 
and Hlavicik contend is Obama’s lack of serious engagement with Niebuhr’s core concern with 
original sin, however, poses a more significant challenge to his Nieburhian credentials. Obama’s is, it 
seems, a more hopeful Christianity than Niebuhr’s. 
Niebuhr emphasized there was not a teleological notion of humanity finding a means of overcoming 
evil. But Obama seemed to reject this perspective with his consistent performance of hope for 
improvement in the human condition and a firm and frequently elucidated belief in the enactment 
of progress. For all his Niebuhrian instincts, Obama might fall short of the theologian’s approval. His 
frequently professed belief that the U.S. and the world with gentle prodding, can improve 
themselves is its own exhibition of ‘sin’ which Niebuhr warned so firmly against. 
Whether or not Obama is categorically a Niebuhrian, more significant in the pursuit of intellectual 
history is the means by which Obama himself chooses to interpret and to use the thought of 
Niebuhr. Naturally he does so in a manner that is compatible with his own intellectual 
predispositions. The central humility in Obama’s reading of Niebuhr is instructional and goes some 
distance to tying Obama’s interpretation to a version of pragmatism. It is the humility he 
emphasized in conversation with Brooks, and it is that same humility he weaved in to his Nobel 
acceptance speech. Hitting perhaps its most Niebuhrian note, Obama argued that “adhering to [the] 
law of love has always been the core struggle of human nature. For we are fallible. We make 
mistakes, and fall victim to the temptations of pride, and power, and sometimes evil. Even those of 
us with the best intentions will at times fail to right the wrongs before us.”481 Indeed, “to say that 
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force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the 
imperfections of man and the limits of reason.”482 
But from here, Obama pivoted to an argument which seems at odds with this Niebuhrian humility. 
At this juncture he laid bare the contradictions and paradoxes of carrying forth humility with the 
history of America’s engagement with the world. He grandly declared “whatever mistakes we have 
made the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for 
more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms.”483 Here Obama 
turned to the language of American exceptionalism: A heart of Niebuhr surrounded by the 
musculature of Pax Americana. 
Obama’s assertion that the United States served to underwrite global security speaks to the notion 
of America the superpower, and places a special burden upon itself in a manner that widens the net 
of interests which ensnare American attention. Wrapped up in this perspective is a notion that the 
U.S. carries a unique capability to discern the good for everyone the world over. 
The post-war years loom large in the sense of America setting a course for world order. This was 
something Obama himself detailed in his narrative of U.S. foreign policy in Audacity of Hope.484 And 
it was a notion he carried through his presidency, extolling the virtues of prominent neoconservative 
Robert Kagan’s New Republic article which challenged “The Myth of American Decline.”485  Obama 
channeled Kagan’s arguments in the 2012 State of the Union Address to refute the notion that he 
was presiding over an American decline, emphasizing instead the reinvigorated primacy of American 
influence in world affairs.486 Obama had liked Kagan’s article to such a degree that he spent more 
than 10 minutes talking about it in an off the record meeting with leading television news anchors, 
engaging with its arguments “paragraph by paragraph.”487 It is not surprising that he carried such an 
enthusiasm. Kagan continued to make the case in expanded detail in his book The World America 
Made, concluding that “for all its flaws and its miseries, the world America made has been a 
remarkable anomaly in the history of humanity.”488 It was a case that Obama had made in The 






 Obama, Audacity. p. 284 
485
 R. Kagan, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,"  The New Republic 11 January (2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/99521/america-world-power-declinism. 
486








 R. Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Vintage Books, 2012). p. 140 
115 
 
Audacity of Hope and his Nobel Prize address, and it was clearly a notion he held to be significant in 




In staking a claim that violent conflict will not be eradicated and that the use of force would be “not 
only necessary but morally justified” Obama recognized Martin Luther King Jr’s words from his own 
Nobel Prize address: “violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely 
creates new and more complicated ones.”489 Obama noted “I am living testimony to the moral force 
of non-violence. I know there’s nothing weak – nothing passive – nothing naïve – in the creed and 
lives of Gandhi and King.” But here he stated “as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my 
nation, I cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people.”490 Therein he revealed the 
tragedy and irony at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. He expressed this as a challenge in “reconciling 
these two seemingly inreconcilable truths – that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level 
is an expression of human folly.” But in the pursuit of peace he demonstrated the existence of a 
similar tension, a similar dialectic. He extolled the virtue of human rights as being universal, 
enshrined indeed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet “too often” he argued “these 
words are ignored. For some countries, the failure to uphold human rights is excused by the false 
suggestions that these are somehow Western principles, foreign to local cultures, or stages of a 
nation’s development.” This extended to the U.S. foreign policy realm where “there has long been a 
tension between those who describe themselves as realists or idealists, a tension that suggests a 
stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values 
around the world.” For his part, Obama stated “I reject these choices” instead affirming “no matter 
how callously defined, neither America’s interests – nor the world’s – are served by the denial of 
human aspirations.”491 
In his most overt testament to the tension between particularism and universalism, he argued “even 
as we respect the unique culture and traditions of different countries, America will always be a voice 
for those aspirations that are universal.” He explicitly projected the American particular onto the 
universal. America for Obama represented ideology that is aspirational the world over.492 
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In dealing with transgressors against such human rights, Obama emphasized the importance of the 
world standing “together as one,” in order to bring solutions which avoided the “tragic choices” of 
waging war. He emphasized that “agreement among nations. Strong institutions. Support for human 
rights. Investments in development. All these are vital ingredients in bringing about the [gradual] 
evolution [in human institutions] that President Kennedy spoke about.” Yet, he argued “I do not 
believe that we will have the will, the determination, the staying power, to complete this work 
without something more – and that’s the continued expansion of our moral imagination; an 
insistence that there’s something irreducible that we all share.”493 It could scarcely be more 
universalist. 
The contradiction at the heart of Obama’s perspective on the world, the dialectic between 
universalism and particularism reflect in a broader sense the tragedy and irony which lay at the 
heart of U.S. foreign policy. They are elements which would be at play in matters of foreign policy, 
and challenge him in the firmness of his perspective of American power and the capabilities of the 
international community to solve crises as they arose. This was put to no greater test than in the 
events which spiraled from what became known as the Arab Spring. As Samantha Power, Obama’s 
second Ambassador to the United Nations, would later put it, “these uprisings would end up 
impacting the course of Obama’s presidency more than any other geopolitical development during 




On 17 December 2010 a Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, had his scales confiscated by the 
local authorities of the small rural town of Sidi Bouzid. Unable to pay the necessary bribes to recover 
his property, unable to afford to replace it, and ultimately feeling humiliated by his treatment, 
Bouazizi doused himself in gasoline and set himself on fire.495 This act of total desperation in the face 
of rampant corruption pervading society stirred a sense of injustice in the Tunisian population. 
Protests began to spread, spurred on by anger at President Zine Ben Ali, whose 23 years in power 
had been characterized by a corruption and ruthlessness exemplified in Bouazizi’s treatment.  
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Bouazizi died on 4th January and ten days later tens of thousands of people came out to the streets 
of Tunis and brought the city to a standstill.496 Ben Ali panicked at this show of strength from the 
public, and fled the country. An authoritarian dictator had been forced out by the people. It was an 
inspiring moment for populations all across a region which roiled with disaffection for autocrats who 
ruled with a tight-grip, who had for generations prevented widespread democratic engagement, and 
who retained the nation’s wealth as a personal plaything.497 
On 12 August 2010, four months prior to the events in Tunisia, Obama sent a memorandum entitled 
‘Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa’ to senior figures in the administration’s foreign 
policy team. He wrote that “progress toward political reform and openness in the Middle East and 
North Africa lags behind other regions and has, in some cases, stalled.”498 Ryan Lizza reported in the 
New Yorker that Obama “noted that even the more liberal countries [in the Middle East] were 
cracking down on public gatherings, the press, and political opposition groups.” Obama wrote in his 
memo that there was “evidence of growing citizen discontent with the region’s regimes,” and it was 
likely that “if present trends continue” allies in the region would “opt for repression rather than 
reform to manage domestic dissent.”499 
He continued, “increased repression could threaten the political and economic stability of some of 
our allies, leaves us with fewer capable, credible partners who can support our regional priorities, 
and further alienate citizens in the region.”500 The upshot of this memo was Obama instructing his 
staff to come up with “tailored,” “country by country” strategies on political reform.501 This would 
become Presidential Study Directive 11, in which he requested his advisers challenge the traditional 
idea that stability in the Middle East always served U.S. interests.502 “Obama wanted to weigh the 
risks of both ‘continued support for increasingly unpopular and repressive regimes’ and a ‘strong 
push by the United States for reform.’” He wrote that “the advent of political succession in a number 
of countries offers a potential opening for political reform in the region.” Poor management of these 
projected transitions, he mused, “could have negative implications for U.S. interests, including our 
standing among Arab publics.”503 
It was a prescient foretelling of what would unfold mere months later. But Obama’s memo also 
painted a clear picture of the dilemmas that confronted the U.S. in a region where it had long held a 
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series of relationships which often stretched the meaning of ‘friendship,’ or ‘alliance.’ The paradox of 
the U.S. squaring its historic fervency for freedom and democracy and its tolerance for often 
repressive and undemocratic regimes who nevertheless offered strategic benefits had long cast a 
pall over its foreign policy.  
The seismic events which unraveled would prove the ultimate challenge to Obama’s foreign policy 
worldview. How would he conceptualize America’s role in reacting to change in a volatile region? 
What was America’s role in shaping a world in flux? Could it stand as a disinterested observer, its 
attention turned elsewhere, to more pressing concerns, or did its vast might, and historical 
entanglements in the region still necessitate a strong engagement?  
When a mass wave of protest followed the Tunisian lead throughout the region, Obama’s case-by-
case plan was put into action. Egypt would provide the most vexing initial examination. The heart of 
the Arab world, home to half of its inhabitants, Egypt holds a pivotal place in Arab affairs and for 
many years the U.S. had cultivated its authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak as an anchor of 
stability in an otherwise tumultuous region who, among other things, ensured that fragile peace 
accords with Israel were upheld.504  
When protesters filled Cairo’s Tahrir Square calling for Mubarak’s exit, the Obama administration 
was confronted with a difficult choice as to whether it should join the calls for Mubarak to go, or 
provide support for a staunch ally.505 It was a direct test of Obama’s assertion in his memo that “our 
regional and international credibility will be undermined if we are seen or perceived to be backing 
repressive regimes and ignoring the rights and aspirations of citizens.”506 Lizza suggests that Obama’s 
analysis “showed a desire to balance interests and ideals.”507 
When Mubarak announced that he would stay for the remaining months of his term to “carry out all 
the necessary measures to transfer power,” protesters reacted angrily to what they perceived as an 
equivocation. Obama sensed the tide had turned decisively and, unwilling to push against the will of 
the people in the street, he called Mubarak urging him to leave. He followed this call by publicly 
stating “an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”508 
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Press Secretary Robert Gibbs emphasized the urgency the next day: when asked what Obama meant 
by “now,” Gibbs retorted “now started yesterday.”509 
Lizza noted how Obama “wanted to assure other autocratic allies that the U.S. did not hastily 
abandon its friends” and thus his “ultimate position, it seemed, was to talk like an idealist while 
acting like a realist.” In calling for Mubarak to go, it appeared the talk had won out in becoming 
reality. Other longstanding allies in the region took note. Yet, Obama stayed true to the form of 
responses tailored to each country. Saudi Arabian suppression of protest did not warrant significant 
U.S. attention. Bahrain - home of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet - received cursory condemnation from 
the administration for its violent crackdown on protests by the persecuted majority population Shia - 
but only a muted follow-up.510 In Yemen, despite being an ally in the fight against al Qaeda, sensing 
the tide of opposition against him, the Obama administration urged 30 year incumbent president Ali 
Abdullah Saleh to step aside.511 In Tunisia, at the start of the unrest, Obama had stated his support 
of a holding of “free and fair elections…that reflect the true will and aspiration of the Tunisian 
people.”512 Lizza suggested that in his response to the fast moving events of the Arab Spring that 
Obama “emphasized bureaucratic efficiency over ideology, and approached foreign policy as if it 
were case law, deciding his response to every threat or crises on its own merits.”513 Obama insisted 
in an interview with NBC News that “when you start applying blanket policies on the complexities of 
the current world situation, you’re going to get yourself into trouble.”514 
This acknowledgment spoke to the philosophically pragmatist instinct. It was a rejection of the idea 
that history could be coerced in a single direction. Instead, each crisis demanded a uniquely curated 
response. Yet this bumps up against a starkly different conception of America’s role in the world, 
one which sees it as holding the capability to shape world affairs to its own interests. Case-by-case 
basis or not, Obama was still left navigating the fact that the U.S., by dint of its longstanding roots in 
the concerns of all corners of the world, and its role in curating and upholding an international 
order, carried an outsized influence in the fates of the countries in the grips of the Arab Spring.  
On 15 February, four days after Mubarak finally stood down, Libyan protestors took to the streets. 
As forces loyal to its longtime president - Muammar Gaddafi - killed more than a dozen protesters on 
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12 February, crucial differences in the Libyan situation became apparent. The protesters quickly 
became armed rebels who, beginning in Benghazi, started to take control of the eastern part of the 
country. This in turn only increased Gaddafi’s intent on resting back control.515 A resultant round of 
UN sanctions, an arms embargo, and a referral of Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court did 
nothing to deter the dictator from turning his forces onto the Libyan people. On 22 February, he 
gave a speech in which he entrenched his position, vowing to “purify Libya inch by inch, house by 
house, home by home, street by street, person by person, until the country is clean of the dirt and 
impurities.”516 
As violent crackdowns continued, with reports of arrests, torture, and killings, and amid fears that 
Gaddafi would begin to use air power to attack the uprising, familiar calls emerged for humanitarian 
intervention. Leading these calls were French president Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister, 
David Cameron. Sarkozy initiated the charge in calling for Gaddafi to go. Cameron called for the 
establishment of a no-fly-zone.517 The opposition began to urge the outside world to take action. 
And amidst it all, Gaddafi seemed to show no sign of relenting in his efforts to quell protest. The 
Obama administration however remained conspicuously absent from the back and forth, until a 
somewhat languid suggestion in a “readout” of a call between Obama and German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, that “when a leader’s only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against 
his own people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by 
leaving now.”518 Obama finally followed this up with a firmer statement in a press conference on 3 
March, demanding that Gaddafi “step down and leave” immediately.519 
The military was reluctant to take action. This was demonstrated in no clearer sense than by Defense 
Secretary Bob Gates, who argued against the necessity for any form of war in Libya. In response to 
suggestions that a no-fly-zone might be pursued, he told a Congressional hearing “let’s call a spade a 
spade. A no-fly-zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy its air defenses. A no-fly-zone begins 
with an act of war.”520 It would not be a simple act, but would require the full force of U.S. 
capabilities. This came at a time when the Defense department was already stretched.  The war in 
Afghanistan was costing the U.S. around $10 billion a month, while the Iraq war also continued to be 
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a considerable drain on resources.521 The upshot was clear, the Defense department’s attention and 
resources were finite. Writing in his memoir, Gates reflected: 
What was happening in Libya was not a vital national interest of the United 
States. I opposed the United States attacking a third Muslim country within a 
decade to bring about regime change, no matter how odious the regime. I 
worried about how overstretched and tired our military was, and the possibility of 
a protracted conflict in Libya. I reminded my colleagues that when you start a 
war, you never know how it will go. The advocates of military action expected a 
short, easy fight. How many times in history had that naïve assumption proven 
wrong? In meetings, I would ask, “Can I just finish the two wars we’re already in 
before you go looking for new ones?”522  
Gates leant in to Obama’s own conception of premising U.S. intervention on the measure of 
necessity. The administration more broadly, however, was divided. In favour of intervention was 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton was allied in this instance with Samantha Power, then a 
member of the National Security Council. But it was Power’s previous life as a journalist covering the 
Balkan Wars that provided urgency for her perspective in Libya. Having witnessed the horrors of 
mass killings, Power wrote the Pulitzer Prize winning A Problem From Hell which detailed historical 
U.S. failures to prevent genocide. Power was determined that, should such an occasion arise again, 
the U.S. and the international order must not fail again.523 Power represented a strong voice in the 
administration which favoured the broad strokes of liberal internationalism. Those ideas also carried 
a notable presence in the form of Anne-Marie Slaughter - the administration’s first Director of Policy 
Planning at the State Department until just prior to the Libya crisis. Along with perspectives drawn 
from a successful career as a legal and international relations scholar, Slaughter carried with her 
insights drawn from her stewardship with John Ikenberry, of the Princeton Project on National 
Security.524  
The project produced a report which argued that “America must stand for, seek, and secure a world 
of liberty under law.”525 It was born of an effort to search for a bipartisan alternative to the foreign 
policy of George W. Bush. Certain elements tracked closely with Obama’s own inclinations, or at 
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least inclinations which would find a home in his administration. The report, in essence, advocated a 
deliberate strengthening of the liberal international order.526 According to historian Michael 
Kimmage this order, elucidated by Ikenberry in particular, would be “led by the United States and 
dedicated to rules and norms, strengthening the legal and institutional sinews of an international 
order that would run on deliberation.” In highlighting the prominence of the liberal international 
order as a core concept in the administration, Kimmage suggests that Ikenberry “was the patron 
saint of the Obama administration.”527  
The Princeton Project’s report also endorsed the notion that all UN members formally accept “the 
responsibility to protect,” a doctrine “which acknowledges that sovereign states have a 
responsibility to protect their own citizens from “avoidable catastrophe,” but that when they are 
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the international community.”528 
The crisis in Libya, and then Syria, would fall firmly in the rubric of “R2P.” Within the administration, 
Power was an advocate and had even fervently pushed for the inclusion of an embrace of the 
concept in the Nobel Prize speech.529  Susan Rice, Obama’s first UN Ambassador and final National 
Security Advisor (who also held a leading role in running foreign policy for Obama’s 2008 
presidential campaign) also carried a similar belief in the imperatives of humanitarian 
intervention.530 She had been an NSC aide for Africa policy during the Clinton administration, and 
during the Rwandan genocide, and later said “I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, 
I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required.” 531  
Obama appeared to carry some degree of sympathy for this perspective. Despite Gates’ clear 
emphasis that it was not a war of necessity; circumstances in Libya steadily began to tilt in the favour 
of an intervention. Perhaps the most crucial step occurred on 12 March when, in Clinton’s words, “a 
development in Cairo began to change the calculus.”532 The Arab League, after five hours of 
deliberation, voted to request that the UN Security Council impose a no-fly-zone in Libya.533 This was 
a crucial step which brought legitimacy to the notion of an intervention in Libya that was grounded 
in local concerns, distinct from yet another unwanted Western intervention into a Muslim majority 
country’s sovereignty. Indeed, an Al-Jazeera report noted that ministers from the 22 member states 
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of the Arab league “appeared to leave Gaddafi increasingly isolated, saying his government had ‘lost 
its sovereignty’” and “they also conferred legitimacy on the rebels' opposition National Libyan 
Council, saying they would establish contacts with the umbrella group and calling on nations to 
provide it with ‘urgent help.’”534 
British and French officials made it clear that they expected the U.S. to join them in an intervention, 
suggesting it was time for it to repay favours - instances such as Afghanistan where Britain and 
France had sent troops to aid American efforts.535 France, the UK, and Lebanon proceeded to bring a 
Security Council resolution calling for the implementation of a no-fly-zone. All the while, Gaddafi’s 
forces had begun to overcome their opposition. With air support, government forces were moving 
rapidly eastward into the rebel held territory.536 
The imperative for action had reached a fever-pitch. Gaddafi had already promised that in 
confronting the uprisings there would be “no mercy,” that his troops would go house to house in 
search of “traitors” and he instructed supporters to “capture the rats.” His son Saif had added his 
own horrifying rhetoric to the equation, declaring that “rivers of blood” would run through Libya if 
protests continued, maintaining forces loyal to Gaddafi would “fight until the last man, the last 
woman, the last bullet.”537 As the attention of Gaddafi’s forces were about to be turned fully toward 
rebel stronghold Benghazi, Derek Chollet reflected in The Long Game the sense of urgency at play. 
He wrote “sitting in the White House we had overwhelming evidence of Gaddafi’s intent on mass 
slaughter.”538 Thus amidst the crisis, on 15 March, Obama held a Situation Room meeting to debate 
the administration’s course of action.539  
Having done diplomatic leg-work with meetings with the Arab League, Libyan opposition forces, and 
European powers, Clinton argued diplomatic and military support existed for a no-fly zone, and she 
also supported it.540 Biden, Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen objected to 
any form of intervention, as did Chief of Staff Bill Daley. Susan Rice however was in favour. Rhodes 
reflects how she argued “This is like Rwanda” and as such “we have a moral responsibility to act.”541 
Libya was a test case for many who shared such a perspective, with one participant in the meetings 
reflecting that “the ghosts of 800,000 Tutsis were in that room.” Power offered her own call for 
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action, emphasizing humanitarian factors and noting that Gaddafi “told us what he was going to do 
in Benghazi – he’d go house to house, killing people.”542 Rhodes for his part made a similar case, 
arguing that the Libya crisis fit Obama’s criteria for humanitarian intervention, as laid out in the 
Nobel speech he had helped to write.543 He however also noted in his memoir “as I spoke, I could 
sense Obama’s ambivalence.”544  
Obama proceeded to ask if a no-fly-zone – the goal of Lebanon, France, and Britain’s resolution - 
would prevent the projected scenario from unfolding. His intelligence and military advisers 
answered that it would have no impact on Gaddafi’s ground surge towards Benghazi.545 Obama 
expressed displeasure at “debating an option that won’t even solve this problem,” closing the 
meeting with a demand for more options.546 “It became clear,” Chollet writes, “that the United 
States could not stand aside. The circumstances were the inverse of those that had led to the 
intervention in Iraq nearly a decade earlier: the threat was imminent, the intelligence undisputed, 
and the world was clamouring for America to do something.”547 
Later, reconvening the meeting, Obama was presented with an option that would allow for effective 
action, a UN resolution which would go beyond a no-fly zone, calling in addition for “all necessary 
measures” to protect civilians on the ground.548 This would in effect allow for the U.S. and 
international forces to protect the Libyan rebels through the bombing of government forces. After 
two days of intense diplomatic negotiations led by Rice and Clinton, the resolution was approved by 
the Security Council. Surprisingly, Russia and China abstained, effectively green-lighting the initiative. 
A final vote tally of 10-0 with five abstentions allowed UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to pass 
on March 17th, the first time in its sixty year history that the UN had authorized preemptive action to 
prevent an “imminent massacre.”549 
Obama, despite earlier ambivalence, had come down on the side of action. David Sanger argues that 
Obama assumed the perspective that it was not a credible option to do nothing.550  Indeed, Sanger 
reports that Obama told the NSC that “we can’t play the role of a Russia or a China…If we don’t act, 
if we put brakes on this thing, it will have consequences for U.S. credibility and leadership, 
consequences for the Arab Spring, and consequences for the international community.” In a worst-
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case scenario, Obama argued, a mass slaughter would occur in Benghazi, and despite the 
opportunity presented to prevent such an atrocity, and despite Obama’s rhetoric in support of 
universal rights, the U.S. would be viewed as running away from taking responsibility. He would be 
held morally responsible for failing to prevent a preventable massacre. Obama concluded “That’s 
just not who we are.”551 
As it was, Sanger suggests “it was an American embrace, at least in this one case, of the concept of a 
‘responsibility to protect.’”552 James Mann notes that Obama’s Libya decision was depicted by aides 
as being motivated by realistic concerns as well as moral ones, by factors which suggests a cause 
beyond the simple humanitarianism of “responsibility to protect,” and as such it played in to the 
dynamic of the Nobel Prize speech in more nuanced respects. Rhodes suggested that “there is a 
realist component, which is that a lot of what we have been trying to do is to essentially put forward 
a model of U.S. leadership,” suggesting that there were not only moral concerns at play, but also 
deeper notions of America’s role in global affairs, and how it would position itself in a changing 
world. 553 
Obama had acceded to the interventionist cause of various figures in the administration, yet it was 
under a crucial proviso, and one which sought to forge a distinct direction for U.S. leadership and its 
place in the world order. U.S. intervention would be limited to the initial bombing campaign, and 
logistical and technical support, before turning the operation over to NATO command. The thinking 
on Obama’s part was aimed at making this an intervention for which the U.S. would not be left 
holding the bag. Clinton appeared to buy in to this notion, emphasizing to Lizza the importance of 
having regional support before acting, and how crucial the Arab League’s support for UN action was. 
She stated “so now we’re going to see whether the Security Council will support the Arab League. 
Not support the United States – support the Arab League.”554  
For as much as the Libya decision was a departure from many of Obama’s instincts on American 
power and intervention, he wrapped it up in such a manner that appeared to be clinging to the 
semblance of the more humble America he championed. Lizza noted “the one consistent thread 
running through most of Obama’s decisions has been that America must act humbly in the world.” 
He continued, “unlike his immediate predecessors, Obama came of age politically during the post-
Cold War era, a time when America’s unmatched power created widespread resentment. Obama 
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believes that highly visible American leadership can taint a foreign-policy goal just as easily as it can 
bolster it.”555 
Lizza elicited from an un-named advisor of Obama a quote that termed the efforts in Libya as 
“leading from behind.”556 The line has subsequently been much derided and even rejected among 
Obama people, but in a sense it does capture an important essence of the way Obama approached 
Libya. It reaches back to Obama’s own stated admiration for George H.W. Bush and his curation of 
multilateralism in the lead up to the first Gulf War. The approach to Libya was one which reflected 
in deep and important ways Obama’s preference for multilateralism which he had carefully 
established in The Audacity of Hope and his Nobel address. In international affairs which do not 
threaten U.S. security, multilateralism should be pursued. Libya fell firmly in to this category.  
Tellingly, in her memoir, The Education of an Idealist, Samantha Power recalls that Obama had 
instructed Susan Rice “to see whether she could get a resolution through the Security Council to 
license coercive steps to protect civilians” and crucially, Power notes, “if she could not achieve this, 
he made clear that the United States would not intervene militarily.”557 Intervention was literally 
contingent on multilateralism. Rice for her part reflects “we genuinely favoured the more robust 
mandate as the only approach we thought had merit, if we were going to act.” The ambivalence 
which Rhodes interpreted in Obama was real to the degree that Obama himself had told Gates, 
that, according to the Secretary’s memoir “the Libyan military operation had been a 51-49 call for 
him.”558 We see a picture of Obama requiring all the right pieces to be in all the right places for him 
to take that decision to pursue a more aggressive UN Security Council resolution. Mann reports that 
there “were serious considerations” – about economic feasibility and waging another war in 
another Muslim majority country – “which might in other circumstances have produced an 
American decision to stay out of the Libyan operation entirely.”559 The drop-off from the ultimate 
decision to the alternative was significant. Mann notes that the critics of the decision to allow 
Britain and France to take the lead erred in assuming that the alternative was a military campaign 
dominated by America. The alternative was not for U.S. to take lead. It was for the U.S. to do 
nothing.560 
Such critics ignored Obama’s own previously stated vision of American power in a realm where its 
security was not directly threatened. The importance of multilateralism in Obama’s thinking for such 
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situations had been laid bare, yet given scant attention for how that might shape his perspective on 
American power. Mann reflects on how the approach to the intervention in Libya reflected a 
multilateralism of a “new strain:” 
It went well beyond previous versions, in which the United States simply consulted 
with its allies. This time, the United States started the military campaign and then 
stepped aside while allies took over. It was an approach virtually without 
precedent since World War II. In the Obamian view, the United States should 
preserve its leadership role in the world in the coming decades, but it could only 
do so by making some changes, acknowledging the limits of power and the 
greater need to share the costs and responsibilities of a military campaign.561 
The campaign in Libya started in earnest on 19 March but Obama had imposed strict limitations on 
American involvement. “No boots on the ground” became an oft repeated mantra.562 Chollet notes 
how Obama himself had crafted the idea of an initial U.S. effort being followed up and taken over by 
allies.563 Furthermore, Chollet suggests that the Libya war carried elements of the “Long Game 
playbook,” as “because Libya was not a vital interest, the United States needed to be careful not to 
allow its involvement to overwhelm other priorities. America would lead, but do so in a way that 
only it could, expecting partners to carry a large burden.”564 
While Obama did deem what happened in Libya important, it was not a core interest to the United 
States. Libya fell firmly into the regional interests of European, Middle Eastern, and North African 
countries. It was thus important for those with most at stake to assume the most responsibility. 
Obama’s approach was primed at fostering other nations’ assumption of responsibility. Chollet 
argues that “Obama saw this crisis as an opportunity to show how he believed countries could work 
together, relying more on America’s uniqueness than on its dominance.”565 Or as Mann put it, 
“America could go along, so long as it didn’t have to carry the military burden on its own.”566 True to 
this effort to reduce American involvement and to promote European assumption of responsibility, 
the bulk of the combat would be left to the Europeans.567 Obama’s intent was for the Pentagon to 
use its capabilities to stop the impending massacre before turning the operation over to European 
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and Arab allies within ten days.568 Indeed, Gaddafi’s air defenses were destroyed and his forces 
stopped within three days.569 
The bombing raids would last for seven months, comprising nearly 10,000 airstrikes, nearly 90 
percent of which were conducted by the forces of America’s allies.570 Mann suggests allowing the 
British and the French to be in the forefront enabled Obama to greatly reduce the costs of the 
Libyan operation to the United States. In mid-April “operations in Libya were costing American 
taxpayers roughly $1 million to $3 million a day; by contrast, the war in Afghanistan during the same 
period was costing more than $300 million per day.”571 The entire campaign would cost just over $1 
billion, which was roughly equivalent to what the U.S. spent per week in Iraq or Afghanistan.572 In 
many respects, the intervention was a success in its cost effectiveness and the manner in which it 




In August rebel forces took control of Tripoli. The Gaddafi government had fallen, and in October he 
himself would come to a violent end, discovered and killed by rebels in the coastal city of Sirte. This 
turn of events, however, provoked questions about true limits of the intervention. “All necessary 
measures” to protect civilians facing impending massacre in Benghazi soon became stretched to 
protecting civilians wherever they were.573 The limited intervention to prevent a specific incident 
from occurring was becoming not so limited. So too was the notion of limited U.S. participation, as it 
became clear that America’s unique capabilities were required in greater quantity than previously 
realized. Cracks were beginning to appear in the coalition and its ability to fulfill the mission. Gates 
recalls that “the United States ultimately had to provide the lion’s share of reconnaissance 
capability and most of the midair refueling of planes; just three months into the campaign” the U.S. 
“had to resupply even our strongest allies with precision-guided bombs and missiles – they had 
exhausted their meager supply. Toward the final stages, we had to reenter the fray with our own 
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fighters and drones. All this was the result of years of underinvestment in defense by even our 
closest allies.”574 
The final cataclysm in Libya was to be the total lack of forethought for what would come after, in the 
event that Gaddafi was removed, and a vacuum remained. Obama had made clear that “we are not 
looking to do another Iraq,”575 and in Chollet’s words, “the Europeans were all along saying: ‘No, no, 
no, we’re doing this. We got it. We believe in Libya. This is in our neighborhood.”576 Taking this cue, 
the U.S. set the same “fierce limits” it had for the intervention, providing help only when it could 
offer a unique capability, and then only after Libya explicitly requested it, and in addition, only when 
Libya paid for the services with its oil revenue.577 
At the same time, however, the proliferation of arms that had entered the country during the 
uprising against Gaddafi and the NATO intervention meant there was now also a proliferation of 
armed militias each seeking its own piece of the new Libya. The nation descended into a vicious civil 
war from which it has scarcely emerged. Two rival governments set up opposing claims for control of 
the nation, now divided into east and west. Jon Lee Anderson writing in the New Yorker, summated 
that “effectively, the Libyan state has collapsed, replaced by a series of warring city-states.”578 
Scholar Alan Kuperman suggests that Libya’s human rights situation had gotten worse since 
Gaddafi’s ouster. The rebels perpetrated “scores of reprisal killings, in addition to torturing, beating, 
and arbitrarily detaining thousands” of suspected Gaddafi supporters. They also “expelled 30,000 
mostly black residents from the town of Tawergha and burned or looted their homes and shops,” 
based on claims that some had been mercenaries. Human Rights Watch was prompted to declare 
that abuses such as these appeared to be “so widespread and systematic that they may amount to 
crimes against humanity.”579  
In addition, Kuperman argues the decision to intervene was based on faulty intelligence and an over-
inflation of Gaddafi’s acts of violence against citizens and the true threat of massacre that he 
actually posed.580 Questions about the wisdom of intervening were adding up. It had become 
increasingly difficult to refute a notion the Obama and his administration had effectively sleep-
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walked into making the same mistakes as those which underwrote the Iraqi disaster. A disaster 
which Obama had so relentlessly critiqued years previously. 
The faith in Libyans to rebuild a country riven by tribal divides and the total suppression of civil 
society for the four previous decades, and in the Europeans to live up to their insistence that they 
would take responsibility in their region became obviously and wildly misplaced. No party was 
willing in the aftermath to heed Colin Powell’s famous adage that “if you break it, you own it.”581 
Obama had long maintained a wariness of the fact that it was easy for the U.S. to get into a war and 




In the early hours of 21 August 2013 President of Syria Bashar al Assad used chemical weapons in a 
bombing attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta. The attack killed nearly 1500 civilians including 
over 400 children.582 It also crossed a “red line” laid out by Obama months before. Responding at a 
press conference to an innocuous question on the state of affairs in Syria Obama stated “we have 
been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is 
we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.  That would 
change my calculus.  That would change my equation.”583 Thus the red line was drawn and along 
with it, a set of institutional expectations and assumptions carried throughout the foreign policy 
establishment and media. 
The Syrian chapter of the Arab Spring had begun in a familiar fashion. But with nascent protests in 
the street being suppressed by Assad’s military forces, it began to most closely resemble and then 
ultimately surpass Libya in its violence. This was not Libya, however, and despite continued violence 
wrought on the part of Assad on his own people, an intervention, the sort fostered in Libya, was not 
forthcoming. A crucial difference was the absence of the multilateral support that had prompted 
Obama to take action. The military situation was also different. Mullen’s successor as Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey warned that as many as seventy thousand American troops 
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would be required to dismantle the antiaircraft system and to enforce a no-fly zone over the 
country.584 
Furthermore, Russia held strategic interests in Syria. Its naval base at the port of Tartus is the only 
such base it holds outside of the former Soviet Union, and is thus vital for its continued projection of 
power in the international sphere.585 In addition to the different calculation of interests for Russia, 
there was a lingering sense of anger and distrust that the limited scope of the resolution in Libya 
had transformed into regime change. Russian abstention had allowed the UN resolution on Libya to 
pass. This time, no such abstention was forthcoming.586 
The dilemma for the Obama administration was acute. As in the case of Libya, there were calls for 
action to abate the horrors being inflicted upon the Syrian people, or to, at the very least, arm the 
rebels. The feared massacre of Benghazi and claims of thousands being killed by Gaddafi in Libya 
were being realized in Syria. So why would the international community not take action? 
There had been a growing sense of moral imperative similar to Libya to do something.587 When 
Obama’s professed ‘red line’ was crossed, the sense was strong that finally, force would be used. 
Ben Rhodes reflected on an initial meeting, the tone of which “suggested an imminent strike” and 
that steadily that time began to feel like “an unfolding drama that would inevitably conclude in 
cruise missiles hitting Syria.”588 Power even reflects that “enraged by Assad’s attack,” Obama was 
convinced of the necessity of punishing the Syrian leader.589 
There remained obstacles to overcome, however. Members of Congress from both parties had 
bristled at Obama’s failure to seek Congressional approval before undertaking action in Libya, and 
they were determined that he would not do so again. Furthermore, the Obama legal team had their 
own concerns, Rhodes notes how “there was no firm international legal basis for bombing Syria – no 
argument of self-defense, which justified our actions against al Qaeda; no UN resolution such as we 
had had in Libya.” There was also no “domestic legal basis beyond the assertion that the president 
had the inherent power to take military action that did not constitute a “war” under the 
Constitution, which the Republicans were disputing.”590 
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Chief of Staff Denis McDonough convened a meeting for a call with congressional leaders, who each 
expressed a level of support for strikes, yet crucially, demanded Obama seek authorization.591 They 
even referred to Obama’s own response to a 2007 candidate questionnaire in the Boston Globe in 
which he said “the president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a 
military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the 
nation.”592 
During this meeting the administration learned that David Cameron’s efforts to persuade the House 
of Commons to vote in favour of joining U.S. led strikes in Syria had been rejected by a vote of 285-
272.593 Obama turned to Angela Merkel of whom Rhodes notes “there was no foreign leader he 
admired more. Like him, she was a pragmatist, driven by facts, dedicated to international order, 
deliberate in her decision making.”594 Obama asked Merkel for her support, which could in turn 
bring the rest of the European Union along, but Merkel counselled caution, citing a need for time to 
build agreement among European countries. Rhodes writes of the interaction “it was the first time I 
saw him look uneasy about acting in Syria.”595 Steadily, this collection of reasons for caution added 
up to a picture of hesitancy on Obama’s part. When it appeared inevitable that the U.S. would take 
action, Obama pulled back from the brink. As plans were being drawn up for strikes, Obama took a 
walk in the White House grounds with Denis McDonough. Pivotally, McDonough - Obama’s fifth and 
final Chief of Staff - had been a consistent voice against an intervention in Syria.596  
Upon Obama’s election, McDonough worked on the National Security Council, before becoming 
Deputy National Security Advisor after Tom Donilon had ascended from that role to the top 
position. Obama reportedly personally trusted McDonough more, due to their previous relationship 
(he had been a staffer in Obama’s Senate days), but also because he was, according to Glenn Thrush 
“philosophically in tune with McDonough,” given “both men were allergic to military intervention – 
and McDonough was an enthusiastic executor of Obama’s plan for running foreign policy: 
concentrating as much decision-making power in the West Wing national security staff as possible, 
at the expense of the harder-to-control Defense and State departments.”597 In taking his role as 
Obama’s Chief of Staff, McDonough’s strong bond with his boss ensured he became a fierce 
gatekeeper of Obama’s time, and pivotal to the process of decision-making in the White House 
                                                          
591






 Ibid. pp. 230-231 
595
 Ibid. p. 231 
596
 Ibid. p. 227, 235 
597




itself. The two began a practice of conducting a daily meeting called the afternoon “wrap” which 
would often take place during long walks around the White House grounds.598 McDonough had the 
president’s ear, and in the case of the storied walk on that August afternoon, he appears to have 
represented a perspective which Obama very much wanted to hear. 
True to Rhodes’ impression that the administration was gearing up for action in Syria, Obama had 
ordered the Pentagon to draw up lists of targets for strikes, and five naval vessels were in place in 
the Mediterranean ready to fire cruise missiles at those selected targets.599 But as those doubts 
began to enter Obama’s mind, Jeffrey Goldberg reports, he steadily came “to believe that he was 
walking into a trap—one laid both by allies and by adversaries, and by conventional expectations of 
what an American president is supposed to do.”600 Goldberg notes that he did not randomly choose 
McDonough to sound his doubts to, as “the Obama aide most averse to U.S. military intervention, 
and someone who, in the words of one of his colleagues, ‘thinks in terms of traps.’” In this instance 
Obama, “ordinarily a preternaturally confident man, was looking for validation, and trying to devise 
ways to explain his change of heart, both to his own aides and to the public.”601 
On their walk, Obama told McDonough that he was worried Assad would place civilians as “human 
shields” around obvious targets for strikes.602 He also carried a concern that strikes would do 
nothing to actually remove the threat of the chemical weapons themselves. Perhaps most 
significantly, Obama “also shared with McDonough a long-standing resentment: He was tired of 
watching Washington unthinkingly drift toward war in Muslim countries. Four years earlier, the 
president believed, the Pentagon had “jammed” him on a troop surge for Afghanistan. Now, on 
Syria, he was beginning to feel jammed again.”603 
When Obama returned to the Oval Office from his tête-à-tête with McDonough he informed a 
stunned staff that he had chosen to seek congressional authorization for strikes on Syria. Rhodes 
recalls of the moment “at some point, [Obama] said, a president alone couldn’t keep the United 
States on a perpetual war footing, moving from one Middle Eastern conflict to the next.” Simply put, 
“it is too easy for a president to go to war.” Obama argued.604 “That quote from me in 2007 – I agree 
with that guy. That’s who I am. And sometimes the least obvious thing to do is the right thing.”605 
Rhodes summarized Obama’s logic as being “if we got congressional authorization for an attack on 



















Syria, everyone would be in on the action, and we’d have more credibility – legally, politically, and 
internationally. If we couldn’t we shouldn’t act.”606 
As this process was unfolding, a throwaway comment from John Kerry set in motion an ad hoc 
diplomatic initiative with Russia to persuade Assad to relinquish his chemical weapons stocks. To the 
surprise of many, this initiative succeeded (at least in principle) – with Assad acceding to the 
demands and concrete steps being taken to remove the weapons. This would allow the 
administration to make - admittedly strained - claims that it had indeed taken action after Assad 
crossed Obama’s red line.607 Any action which brought about the removal of harmful weapons from 
an already disastrous war-zone was a laudable achievement. But for many, this was not enough. This 
was, in the eyes of the Washington establishment, opinion writers, old hands of foreign policy, but 
also many within the administration, a matter of credibility. For these critics, when Obama drew a 
red line for action, he was obligated to follow through with the threat or he would lose all credibility 
in the international sphere. For them, the United States had to be perceived as being willing to back 
up its threats of force, otherwise its abilities of coercion will be severely undermined as both allies 
and adversaries would never be sure if they could count on the U.S. to follow through on its word. 
Going to the brink only to step back again provided yet more ammunition to those who wanted to 
pillory Obama for his “dithering,” for his weakness, and for his unwillingness to adhere to clear grand 
strategic thinking.608 It is valuable to note Power’s assertion “on no other issue did I see Obama so 
personally torn – convinced that even limited military action would mire the United States in 
another open-ended conflict, yet wracked by the human toll of the slaughter. I don’t believe he ever 
stopped interrogating his choices.”609 
Obama’s ultimate rejection of military action in Syria spoke to his own reluctance to get the U.S. 
entangled in more wars – but why was it so different from Libya? It is necessary to demonstrate not 
how the approach to Syria was different to Libya, but to instead emphasize the logical consistencies 
which Obama carried from one to the next. Obama’s was not a decision to not act, as such, but it 
was an effort to recreate in Syria some of the conditions which had allowed him to act in Libya. For 
Obama the importance of gaining some version of consensus which approved action was 
paramount. It was the developing tapestry of factors which were demanding he gain purchase 
among other constituencies that ultimately put the brakes on unilateral strikes. This was a search 
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for consensus approval from other leaders, like Merkel, other parliaments like Britain, and from U.S. 
society in the form of Congressional authorization.  
For his part, reflecting at the end of his presidency in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in The 
Atlantic, Obama found great success in the handling of the Syrian “red line” crisis. He described it as 
one of his proudest moments as president.610 This can fairly be seen as a curious assessment. Syria 
was still in crisis. The outcome still catastrophic for those killed in Assad’s brutal assault. Meanwhile, 
fetishists of credibility remained aghast at Obama casting aside the image of a U.S. ready and willing 
to follow through with its threats. But for Obama, at least in his – undoubtedly rose-tinted – 
retelling, this was the triumphal denouement of his own Sisyphean attempt to recast American 
power. It was the moment he felt he had put a stick in the levers and gears of the war machine.611  
Rhodes later reflected on Obama’s approach to the Syria crisis, suggesting there was something of a 
deliberate machination at play: 
I saw what he had been doing – testing Congress, testing public opinion, to see 
what the real maneuvering room was for his office when it came to intervention 
in Syria. It was the same thing he’d done in Situation Room meetings on Syria and 
in his mind, testing whether anything we did could make things better there or 
whether it would turn out to be like Afghanistan and Iraq, if not worse. It wasn’t 
just politics he was wrestling with. It was something more fundamental about 
America, our willingness to take on another war, a war whose primary 
justification would be humanitarian, a war likely to end badly. “People always say 
never again,” he said. “But they never want to do anything.”612 
This was for Obama an important statement to make as it spoke to broader questions about 
American power and what it was for. He was reflecting a perspective that held another American-
led war in the Middle East as anathema to a smarter more restrained foreign policy. Another war in 
the Middle East would be in danger of following the same patterns of the previous efforts: a 
quagmire only serving to detract from other interests. 
Yet it does not escape attention that he couched his deferral of action in such a manner that placed 
a burden on the democratic processes of the country – placing great significance in the manner in 
which American military action abroad can garner political support at home. Was it a burden the 
public were willing to bear? In Syria - for all the reasons Obama felt he could ask Americans to die 
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for the country - upholding hastily drawn red lines and preserving the ephemeral concept of 
credibility, was not one he felt he could do without gaining that popular buy-in.  
In a speech outlining his decision on Syria, he noted that it was his own determination that it was 
“in the national security interests of the United States to respond to the Assad regime’s use of 
chemical weapons through a targeted military strike.” He added a crucial rejoinder however, 
noting “I’m also the President of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy.   So even though I 
possess the authority to order military strikes, I believed it was right, in the absence of a direct or 
imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress.  I believe our democracy is 
stronger when the President acts with the support of Congress.  And I believe that America acts 
more effectively abroad when we stand together.”613 He was pushing the logic of a consensus-
based foreign policy decision making process. He did so in a manner that acknowledged its 
necessity as being “especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in 
the hands of the President, and more and more burdens on the shoulders of our troops, while 
sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force.”614 For 
Obama there was a democratic imperative at play when seeking to make war.  
It was the practice he had advocated in The Audacity of Hope, that “painstaking process of building 
coalitions forces us to listen to other points of view and therefore look before we leap.”615 It was 
once again the reinforcement of a humble outlook on American power. Indeed Bart Schultz reads in 
Obama a sense of “Lincolnesque pragmatism, the pragmatism of this worldly doubt and action.”616 
Schultz suggests that “Lincoln has magnetized pragmatists like no other political figure, no doubt 
because of his deeply experimental temper in grappling with the deeply divisive problems of forging 
democratic community.”617 Schultz argues “what Obama has found in Lincoln just is what the 
pragmatists have always found in him, and this has been the type of pragmatism long associated 
with the University of Chicago. It is a vision of a democratic community as an educating community, 
as an experimental, open community of inquiry that through participation mobilizes our collective 
intelligence and problem-solving abilities”618 In the case of Syria, where he could not secure a broad-
based international consensus, Obama sought to forge a consensus in the democratic community of 
the United States. Reaching a broad-based agreement on the appropriate course to take would 
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create legitimacy for difficult actions. The Chicago lawyer had applied the logic of Deweyan 
democracy. Pragmatism in action. 
Circumspection and humility about the United Sates’ capabilities to shape events in Syria for the 
good served only to raise the threshold for what could persuade Obama to intervene. In a 
Niebuhrian sense, Obama had earlier lamented to Rhodes that “we can’t fool ourselves into thinking 
that we can fix the Middle East.”619 This recasting of American power found a humbler, greater sense 
of the tragedy of history. But he still carried faith in a process of deliberation whereby better 
outcomes can be protected by widening the participation of those who can have stakes in the 
process. 
This circumspection was important in shaping Obama’s generally restrained perspective on the U.S. 
role in world affairs. It represented an idealized vision of how the U.S. could recast its role, re-
emphasizing the value of multilateralism, approaching war-making through seeking political 
consensus at home. These two processes formed part of the same deliberative core of Obama’s 
philosophical outlook, a pragmatist effort to forge - as a community of inquiry - new understandings 
and better outcomes through that consensus. But the reality of achieving this idealized outcome was 
much more difficult, not least for reasons advanced by Obama himself.  
He bristled at notions of American decline, and justifiably so in the respect that American military 
pre-eminence remains real and remains a significant aspect of its status in world affairs. 
Economically it remains dominant. Culturally, U.S. output remains dominant in ways other countries 
do not match. All these arguments make a case for a continued forward presence for the United 
States. And in Libya, this is exactly what happened. The simple material reality was that the U.S. was 
the only nation capable of providing the needed military strength to complete the task. As Gates 
lamented, the underinvestment in military technology by allies necessitated America’s re-entry into 
the battlefield where it had intended to step back having passed control over to NATO. All 28 NATO 
allies had voted to support the mission in Libya, but only eight sent combat forces, and most of them 
ran out of ammunition.620 Steven Erlanger of the New York Times argued “The economic crisis has 
only exacerbated Europe’s unwillingness to live up to its grand ambitions to play a global role in 
foreign and defense matters.”621 Such failings beg the question of whether multilateralism that truly 
shares burdens can ever be accomplished while the U.S. remains so uniquely capable. Will the 
burden not always fall disproportionately to the U.S.? 
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Where Chollet argued Obama saw the Libya crisis as “an opportunity to show how he believed 
countries could work together, relying more on America’s uniqueness than on its dominance,” the 
resulting debacle raised questions about the willingness of nations to participate in vexing 
international issues without the dominant presence of the United States.622 The virtues of 
multilateralism are such that they do indeed facilitate Obama’s desired recalibration of American 
attention. But the catastrophic results of the Libya intervention, pose questions about the merits of 
such an approach if the type of planning for day-after scenarios required an altogether firmer 
commitment than the international and multilateral community were willing to provide. The 
inability to mobilize multilateral or even national support for a Syrian intervention suggests a 
complete inability to confront tragic situations where major buy-in is not secured. It provokes a 
troubling sense that where there is not mass multilateral support, there can be no action taken. The 
absence of Congressional Authorization for taking action does not mean the problem goes away. In 
such a situation those who suffer must do so without the prospect of rescue. 
Obama’s demurral on immediate action in Syria appears in Ben Rhodes’ narrative to deflate Rhodes’ 
own “do something” sensibility. Obama seemed conscious of this dynamic in asking for a vote. He 
argued that to lose the vote and not receive Congressional authorization would “drive a stake 
through the heart of neoconservatism.”623 As with the Afghanistan review, a vexing sense of 
ambivalence in Obama’s thinking is clear. But also laid bare is his long held antipathy and skepticism 
towards the ideology of the neoconservative movement.  
It was his belief instead in multilateralism that curated a specific space for humanitarian initiatives to 
develop. Strict ‘national security’ concerns and their resultant wars of necessity placed such 
initiatives into a box, firmly established in his dichotomy of “dumb” wars of choice and smart wars of 
necessity. This in effect leaves all other military endeavors outside in a roiling uncategorized maw. 
Multilateralism appears as the answer to that problem in Obama’s worldview. It is the box into 
which all other endeavors and the possibilities thereof are placed. Wherein their pursuit and 
attainment depend entirely on the formation of a functioning multilateral framework, but the 
possibility nevertheless exists. 
The marked distinction of Obama’s foreign policy and his foreign policy legacy might well be the 
premium he put on multilateralism and the manner in which he compartmentalized causes for U.S. 
intervention in a fashion that weighed the viability of facilitating multilateralism. This is underscored 
crucially by the manner in which he reflects upon the Syrian and Libyan episodes, as being his high 
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and low points of his foreign policy. Syria was a high point by virtue of the road not taken – a 
multilateral endeavor was not forthcoming, the U.S. was thus on the hook for action that he deemed 
out of its wheelhouse, and its appropriate expense of capabilities. 
“I’m very proud of this moment,” Obama told Goldberg. 
 The overwhelming weight of conventional wisdom and the machinery of our 
national-security apparatus had gone fairly far. The perception was that my 
credibility was at stake, that America’s credibility was at stake. And so for me to 
press the pause button at that moment, I knew, would cost me politically. And the 
fact that I was able to pull back from the immediate pressures and think through 
in my own mind what was in America’s interest, not only with respect to Syria but 
also with respect to our democracy, was as tough a decision as I’ve made – and I 
believe ultimately it was the right decision to make.624 
But more significant is his reflections on Libya. When asked in an interview what he viewed as the 
worst mistake of his presidency, Obama answered “probably failing to plan for the day after, what I 
think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.”625 It was not a failure in the decision to 
intervene itself. But instead it was a failure to plan for the aftermath of the intervention, for a post-
Gaddafi Libya. 
He told Goldberg “we actually executed this plan as well as I could have expected: We got a UN 
mandate, we built a coalition, it cost us $1 billion—which, when it comes to military operations, is 
very cheap. We averted large-scale civilian casualties, we prevented what almost surely would have 
been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict. And despite all that, Libya is a mess.”626  
“When I go back and I ask myself what went wrong,” Obama reflected, “there’s room for criticism, 
because I had more faith in the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-
up.”627 Obama’s reasons for the failure in Libya form the vexing phenomenon of him identifying 
similar failures occurring under his watch as those which he so famously chastised Bush et al for in 
their prosecution of the Iraq War. It also appeared somewhat unbecoming to merely blame allies 
(even if justifiably so) for failings which were ultimately shared by him. 
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But it is apparent the multilateral framework that enabled the Libya intervention, were conditions 
within which Obama would have once again pursued military action. Critics of Obama and the 
intervention can justifiably suggest that he demonstrates inadequate reckoning with the notion that 
the steps taken to intervene militarily were the mistake, they led to the “shit show” – as he has been 
wont to describe the situation in Libya – and the manner in which that intervention was constructed 
did not matter so much as the fact of it. 
But, for Obama, multilateralism was the logical framework within which to translate the 
philosophical mindset which shaped his perspective on America to the international sphere. It was 
the closest approximations of realizing a democratic, deliberative, consensus-building process in the 
international architecture. Obama seemed to carry an outsized hope in the processes of 
multilateralism, as acting as a deliberative mechanism redolent of the devices birthed in the 
Constitution. Reflective of a hope that different groups coming together will be able to source an 
outcome that is beneficial to all. It makes his vivid public excoriation of Nicholas Sarkozy and David 
Cameron for their failures to assume responsibility in the Goldberg interview particularly telling. 
They failed to deliver on the promises of multilateralism. In many respects, it appears that Obama 
was ultimately unprepared for the breakdown of rationality, the breakdown of actors making 
responsible choices that was required to underwrite a successful and consistent multilateralism in 
the international order. But of course, this was rationality as Obama conceived it. He deemed it to 
be in the rational interests of all actors to play their role in upholding a multilateral order, assuming 
responsibilities which would be for the benefit of all. But he disregarded that other leaders would 
make different calculations about their own rationality. It was a failure of imagination on his part, to 
presume others should think the same as him. 
It is perhaps Obama’s steady reckoning with aspects of these ideas, such as the trying persistence of 
tribalism that underpins Goldberg’s notion that he personally “came to see Obama as a president 
who has grown steadily more fatalistic about the constraints on America’s ability to direct global 
events.”628 His accomplishments came in the face of what Goldberg describes as “his growing sense 
that larger forces—the riptide of tribal feeling in a world that should have already shed its atavism; 
the resilience of small men who rule large countries in ways contrary to their own best interests; the 
persistence of fear as a governing human emotion—frequently conspire against the best of 
America’s intentions.”629 The Arab spring seemed to represent a slow motion compounding of 
misery – a vivid demonstration that the U.S. suffers impotence in the face of extrinsic factors. 
Rhodes chronicles this descent into fatalism quite effectively in his memoir. As he seems to develop 







a more credulous perspective on U.S. capabilities to effect change in the world, Obama appears to 
evolve a measure of cynicism.630 He even suggested at one point, in a comment which Rhodes 
professes to have found “jarring,” that “maybe we never would have done Rwanda.”631 Turning to 
notions of public and Congressional support, Obama noted that those who were urging intervention 
in Syria had maintained a silence over the millions killed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He 
reflected “there’s no way there would have been an appetite for that in Congress.”632 
Clinton talked about this notion of knowing where and when to make the choice to intervene, noting 
how every day she would “look around the world” and see “people are being killed in Côte d’Ivoire, 
they’re being killed in the Eastern Congo, they’re being oppressed and abused all over the world by 
dictators and really unsavory characters.” As such, the U.S. “could be intervening all over the place.” 
“What is the standard?” she asked. In response, she suggested “part of it is having to make tough 
choices and wanting to help the international community accept responsibility.”633 
Coinciding with this notion of helping the international community to take necessary actions, 
Goldberg notes how Obama had come to learn that “very little is accomplished in international 
affairs without U.S. leadership.” Obama noted the importance of a president who “has the sense 
that you can’t fix everything” but who also accepts that if the U.S. does not set the agenda, 
something will not happen. “The fact is, there is not a summit I’ve attended since I’ve been president 
where we are not setting the agenda, where we are not responsible for the key results.”634 
Reconciling this with his own avowed acknowledgment of limitations, and the importance of 
tempering hubris, we can begin to see Obama piecing together a multilateralism which functions 
through the active leadership of America.  
The dynamic which still found the U.S. as paramount in world affairs was instrumental in shaping the 
foreign policy echo-chamber which lasted through to the end of Obama’s presidency. Despite his 
notion of driving a stake through the heart of neoconservatism, many of those same assumptions 
which underwrote it would continue to receive prominent airing in the form of a consistent stream 
of commentariat, foreign policy establishment members, and partisan opponents who, in evaluating 
an array of emerging foreign policy crises, never failed to excoriate him for not doing more. Indeed, 
Robert Kagan argued that a “search for normalcy” represented an effort to shed the historic 
responsibilities America carried in the world. Without a forward presence in the project of 
                                                          
630
 Rhodes, The World as It Is. pp. 199-200, 202-203, 205-206 
631




 Lizza, "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy". 
634
 Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine". 
142 
 
promoting and defending a liberal world order, he maintained that order could “unravel.” The world 
depends, he argued, on America sending signals about its reliability that it will act to uphold it.635 
It would become a consistent genre of critique for the administration that it was failing to act 
assertively enough in Syria, in Ukraine, and in response to the rise of ISIS.636 And this in turn became 
a source of increasing frustration for Obama and his administration. Rhodes reflects on this notion - 
of a constant push to do more - in a manner that makes it apparent that over time he had begun to 
mirror Obama’s increased weariness of interventionist policy: “what bothered both of us the most 
about the debates in Washington was the sense that there had been no course correction after Iraq 
– no acknowledgment of the limits to what the United States could achieve militarily inside other 
countries.”637 This was ultimately a course correction that Obama sought, and as new opportunities 
to engage militarily elsewhere arose, the imperative to reckon with this need appeared more and 
more pressing. 
But more than this, the constant din calling for U.S. action prompted Obama, in Rhodes’ telling, to 
reflect on broader questions about the historical moment and its implications for the United States. 
Rhodes himself noted reasons why advocacy for action got traction: 
 There’s something innately American about believing that there must be a 
solution. Many of the people who work in American foreign policy today were 
shaped by the experience of the 1990s, when the United States was ascendant… 
We really could shape events in much of the world.638 
Rhodes effectively channels ideas discussed by authors such as Fred Kaplan in Daydream Believers, 
who detail the overconfidence which accompanied America’s new-found post-Cold War status as 
the world’s sole superpower.639 It reflected a sense of the hubris which had accompanied the post-
Cold war American ascendancy. Rhodes notes that “Obama occasionally pointed out that the post-
Cold War moment was always going to be transitory. The rest of the world will accede to American 
leadership, but not dominance.”640 The implication carries that Obama had an awareness of the 
illusory nature of Post-Cold War dominance as a permanent order of things. For his part, Rhodes 
notes a “global correction” started to take place by the time Obama took office, as China and Russia 
began to assert themselves once more.641 As a tonic to this, Obama “didn’t want to disengage from 
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the world; he wanted to engage more. By limiting our military involvement in the Middle East, we’d 
be in a better position to husband our own resources and assert ourselves in more places, on more 
issues.”642 The kicker though is that despite these best intentions, despite these notions of 
redirecting attention, that attention is not easily controlled. “American politics pushes military 
interventionism, even as public opinion is wary.”643 It forms a mindset, he argues, which kept the 





Whilst on a trip through Asia, Obama took some time aboard Air Force One to make his way back to 
where the press sat on the plane. Rhodes recounts that Obama complained to them “about the 
recent negative coverage of his foreign policy.” He aired grievances Rhodes had heard him express 
privately – “about how the press ignored the steady work of American leadership and legitimized 
every demand that he do more to escalate conflicts.”645 In a meeting held prior to the trip, a 
member of the NSC who focused on strategic planning had reminded those in attendance, including 
Obama and Rhodes, “that the most important foreign policy work often involved incremental 
advances” or, as the NSC staffer put it in baseball vernacular, “hitting singles and doubles.”646 Obama 
agreed with this assessment, and noted how upon re-election he had brought a group of presidential 
historians in to the White House – including Doris Kearns Goodwin, David McCullough, and Douglas 
Brinkley. “It’s interesting” Obama commented, “they made the point that the most important thing 
a president can do on foreign policy is avoid a costly error.”647 
Back in the cabin of Air Force One, Rhodes recalls Obama proceeding to “go on a long tangent about 
how the failures of American foreign policy were ones of overreach, complaining about the lack of 
accountability for Iraq War supporters who were still the tribunes of conventional wisdom.”648 
“What’s the Obama doctrine?” he provocatively asked, before answering with the same conclusion 
he had drawn from his meeting with the presidential historians, from the examples of Johnson in 
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Vietnam, Carter with Desert One, and Bush Jr in Iraq. The lesson, and the newly named Obama 
doctrine was: “don’t do stupid shit.”649 
Mark Landler, a New York Times reporter who was a recipient of the impromptu lecture, later wrote 
of the episode that Obama had meant it as an attempt to “set the press straight about our coverage 
of his foreign policy,” which he noted Obama viewed as shallow, “mistaking prudence for 
fecklessness, pragmatism for lack of ambition.”650 Landler  reflected on Obama’s emphasis that “the 
key to managing a sound foreign policy was to avoid entanglements in places where America’s 
national interests were not directly at stake,” before he then “offered a brisk tour of places his 
White House had not started new conflict: the Middle East, Asia, eastern Europe.”651 
Hillary Clinton famously derided Obama’s coarse summary of his foreign policy, echoing a lot of 
critics when she stated it was “not an organizing principle.”652 Yet from Obama’s perspective, it 
represented an important rejoinder to an atmosphere of assumptions about U.S. power which led to 
an overinflated sense of what it could do in the world. It was a rejection of the sense of intervention 
in any corner of the world as being a cause worthy of expending American blood and treasure. 
“Don’t do stupid shit” was once more a handbrake on these assumptions. It encapsulated a mode of 
thought which recognized limitations. In placing his diatribe to journalists in terms of American 
overreach, avoiding the doing of “stupid shit” would allow for the needed recalibration of American 
power. It was an echo once more of the necessary and the dumb war.  
In the context of Syria and Ukraine, the sentiment provided renewed vigour to Obama’s 
disinclination to act where American interests were not threatened and the burden could not be 
shared multilaterally. In many respects the bar of expectation had been moved erroneously as a 
response to misperceptions of American power coming out of the Cold War. But so much of what 
Obama confronted on a day-to-day basis was borne from such error. In the case of Libya, the error 
was his own. The Goldberg interview and the “don’t do stupid shit” declaration can both be seen as 
watershed moments. Obama’s own self-assigned doctrine did not satiate calls for grand strategy 
initiative, it did not speak to a hard and fast threshold for action, it did not suggest any imperative 
humanitarian compulsion for military intervention. But it did speak to carrying faith in an instinct 
which places circumspection over the assumption that the U.S. can always affect its desired 
outcomes around the world. 
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Obama’s affinity for Niebuhr reflected in his Nobel Prize speech speaks to this instinct, almost to a 
pessimism about human knowledge. While not reaching the stark Niebuhrian territory of original sin 
as a precluding factor, Obama nevertheless depicts in his own reading of Niebuhr the importance of 
humility in confronting choices on the world stage. His reading of Niebuhr echoes his reading and 
rhetorical deployment of Lincoln, that sense of “making choices whilst still admitting doubt.” It is the 
language of The Audacity of Hope which makes the case for the regretful pursuit of absolutes – 
absolutes that might place moral foundations as a core, as a compass point to aim towards.653 But 
the Obama of the “don’t do stupid shit” lecture, of the final stretch of his administration, betrayed a 
jadedness which put a renewed emphasis on a Niebuhrian-Lincolnian predilection. It is one which 
casts a different light on U.S. power and its role and responsibilities in the world. Most pointedly, in 
terms of the rhetoric and concept discussed in the previous chapter of gambling and the placing of 
moral wagers, the jaded, and world weary Obama of “don’t do stupid shit” vintage appeared to be 
making his wagers based upon a very different calculation, one which viewed the deck as being 
stacked much more firmly against him. The odds were no longer as promising for the U.S. to tip the 
scales of world affairs in meaningful ways. The hard lessons of six plus years in the White House 
drilled that in to Obama, compelling him towards more humble instincts.  
Goldberg notes that Obama had told him “if there had been no Iraq, no Afghanistan, and no 
Libya…he might be more apt to take risks in Syria.”654 Obama said “a president does not make 
decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, 
would recognize that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring 
great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with the 
strains that it’s placed on our military—any thoughtful president would hesitate about making a 
renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics 
and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.”655 
Obama expounded to Goldberg of finding ground between the imperative for American leadership, 
and the restraint of humility, stating that “I am very much the internationalist,” admitting: 
 I am also an idealist insofar as I believe that we should be promoting values, like 
democracy and human rights and norms and values…because it makes the world 
a better place.656 
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And yet, “having said that,” he contemplated his own deep contradictions: 
I also believe that the world is a tough, complicated, messy, mean place, and full 
of hardship and tragedy. And in order to advance both our security interests and 
those ideals and values that we care about, we’ve got to be hardheaded at the 
same time as we’re bighearted, and pick and choose our spots, and recognize 
that there are going to be times when the best that we can do is to shine a 
spotlight on something that’s terrible, but not believe that we can automatically 
solve it. There are going to be times where our security interests conflict with our 
concerns about human rights. There are going to be times where we can do 
something about innocent people being killed, but there are going to be times 
where we can’t.657  
This was a near total doubling down on the core tenets of his Nobel speech, pointing to these twin 
elements. The gulf in time between these comments does not disabuse the notion that both say 
much on his broad foreign policy perspective, and each tease out this dialectic of outwardly 
incompatible ideas coexisting alongside one another.  
Goldberg attempted to put a name to this Obamian contradiction. Recognizing in Obama “a tragic 
realist’s understanding of sin, cowardice, and corruption, and a Hobbesian appreciation of how fear 
shapes human behavior” while “consistently, and with apparent sincerity [professing] optimism that 
the world is bending toward justice,” Goldberg argues that Obama is “in a way, a Hobbesian 
optimist.” It is this sense of optimism that strikes at the very heart of the complication in defining 
Obama. It is a simple characterization of Obama that calls back to the heady days of the 2008 
election, of Obama the “hope” candidate. But the notion of hope and optimism for the future has 
been a consistent motif in Obama’s rhetoric from before his ascendancy to the end of his 
presidency. The most grounded theory to expound as a means of explanation is to place this hope 
once more in the context of his reading of the Constitution and in his embrace of the ideals wrapped 
up in the perfection of the nation. 
Bart Schultz acknowledges that pragmatism carries these contradictions at its own core. As a 
philosophy:  
It has always been viewed as peculiarly American, somehow carrying on its sleeve 
the American ideal—for Obama, the Bob the Builderism of “Yes We Can,” because 
“when Americans come together, there is no destiny too difficult or too distant for 





us to reach.” Yet at the very same time, the universalizing, Platonizing, 
Christianizing elements of Americanism are the very things pragmatism usually 
seeks to undercut, albeit in ways that avoid the old dualisms. Against the 
declaration of self-evident truth in the Declaration of Independence, pragmatists 
hold that accepted “truths” are always provisional, experimental, and open to 
revision.658 
It is in this paradox that pragmatism navigates through the divide between the universal and the 
particular. Schultz locates this interplay in Obama’s thought. He notes the consistent theme in 
Obama’s speeches that captures the essence “from the many, one, from the particular, the 
universal, and from the transient, the permanent. We live in the particular and the transient, but we 
live by the universal and the permanent.”659 
He later frames this interaction as Obama “modulating his other worldly side into his this worldly 
side,” noting that “although [Obama] has gone on record as explaining that his most important 
philosophical influences were Gandhi, King, and Lincoln, it is manifest that in his political realization, 
increasingly evident in his speeches, the politics of the first two gets subordinated to the politics of 
the third.”660 In the Nobel address we could also substitute Niebuhr in as standing on the Lincolnian 
side of this divide. But in the speech, Obama overtly wrestles with what it means to subsume one 
type of politics to another, and acknowledges the difficulty at play in choosing to do so. 
Schultz notes great harmony between Obama and King’s universality. But in recognizing King’s own 
sense of being an ‘extremist’ for his beliefs, Schultz asks, “What is Obama’s extremism?” answering 
with a suggestion that “if anything” it is “an extremism of hope—that ‘audacity’ of hope of which his 
second book speaks. But it is an extremism that, like Lincoln’s and unlike King’s, is tied to democratic 
mobilization to change the electoral process, rather than the pacifist direct action that King directed 
against the going political and legal institutions.”661 It is a hope which finds progress in the steady 
processes of institutions and multilateral initiatives. The hope which drove a young Obama to move 
from community organising into practicing civil law, the hope that through the processes of law, 
better outcomes could prevail. 
Schultz draws some lines between Obama’s thought and the latter-day work of Richard Rorty, whose 
1998 Achieving Our Country was a clarion call for the notion of a political Left in America assuming 
the mantle of being the party of progress: “The Left, by definition, is the party of hope. It insists that 
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our nation remains unachieved.”662 This could be an earlier incarnation of Obama’s own writings on 
the Constitution and the opposing visions of the immutability of Constitutional truths. 
But for Obama, as for Rorty, while the United States, and indeed the world, remains imperfect, the 
task before us is to perfect it. Obama’s embrace of multilateral and international institutions, whilst 
tapping into conventional liberal internationalist philosophies, can be argued to also find important 
grounding in a philosophical pragmatism that views the experimental and deliberative possibilities of 
democratic practices as being essential in the pursuit of better outcomes and for progress in the face 
of the irony and tragedies of history.  
Obama’s “extremism” of hope, as Schultz would have it, rests upon a faith that human institutions 
will aid in the progression towards more perfect outcomes. They are the embodiment of the effort to 
achieve something better for a broad swathe of humanity, his is a hope that channels Rorty’s own 
embrace of the imperfect society as advocated historically by the likes of pragmatists Walt Whitman 
and John Dewey. For Rorty “all that can be said in its defense is that it would produce less 
unnecessary suffering than any other, and that it is the best means to a certain end: the creation of a 
greater diversity of individuals – larger, fuller, more imaginative and daring individuals.”663 
But Obama addresses this conceit in his Nobel address with a familiar refrain – “we do not have to 
think that human nature is perfect for us to still believe that the human condition can be 
perfected.”664 He took his central reading of the U.S. Constitution, the core pillar of his ‘More 
Perfect’ speech on race in Philadelphia, and universalized it. “We do not have to live in an idealized 
world to still reach for those ideals that will make it a better place.”665 
Turning again to Gandhi and King, he argued their non-violence:  
May not have been practical or possible in every circumstance, but the love that 
they preached – their fundamental faith in human progress – that must always be 
the North Star that guides us on our journey. 
For if we lose that faith – if we dismiss it as silly or naïve; if we divorce it from the 
decisions that we make on issues of war and peace – then we lose what’s best 
about humanity. We lose our sense of possibility. We lose our moral compass.666 
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Between the Niebuhrian and Lincolnian acceptance of tragedy and belief in the fallibility of 
humankind in navigating the evils of the world, and the Gandhian and Kingian sense of love and 
peace, there is a broad dialectic of the choices which faces all actors in the international sphere. But 
in staking the United States’ centrality in the international order, Obama the Commander-in-Chief 
takes upon himself an outsized responsibility to wrestle with this dynamic. 
In treading this dialectical tightrope, Obama displays a universal sense of duty, but a particular sense 
of capability in confronting it. It is a confident and morally clear perspective on what should animate 
action in the world sphere, what should drive recourse to make things better, to prevent tragedy, to 
stop massacres. But it is accompanied by a humility that recognizes that sense of moral clarity 
cannot always be satisfied, such are the limitations of possibility.  
He started his Nobel address with a Niebuhrian sense of war, but ended it on a Kingian sense of 
peace. He quoted King’s statement that “I refuse to accept despair as the final response to the 
ambiguities of history. I refuse to accept the idea that the ‘isness’ of man’s present condition makes 
him morally incapable of reaching up for the eternal ‘oughtness’ that forever confronts him.” Obama 
urged the watching world to “reach for the world that ought to be – that spark of divine that still 
stirs within each of our souls.”667 For two ideas could be true at the same time. “We can 
acknowledge that oppression will always be with us, and still strive for justice. We can admit the 
intractability of depravation, and still strive for dignity. Clear-eyed, we can understand that there will 
be war, and still strive for peace. We can do that – for that is the story of human progress; that’s the 




At its core, this act of “classifying” or “defining” Obama’s foreign policy and its perspective on 
intervention is a thoroughly unsatisfying pursuit, for it is ultimately definable only in its indefinability. 
Instead it is premised on a series of necessary and contingent factors. It is perhaps a fool’s errand to 
extrapolate from Obama’s actions as president and portray a wider cohesive perspective. In his eight 
years, Obama could only respond to the crises that befell him. Through it all, he maintained that 
American leadership, and the ideals America stands for, were immutable, and drove the world order, 
yet he coupled this with a philosophical pragmatism which emphasized the need for humility and 







fallibilism in recognizing limitations. Crucially though, this pragmatism still maintained the optimism 
of being able to seek better outcomes through a careful process of deliberation and consensus 
building, to form more workable solutions. For historians of foreign policy it is an unsatisfying 
approach, for at its core it is one which is constantly weighing between the twin poles of what is 
possible and what is desirable. The notion that each and every decision, especially those regarding 
use of force hangs upon the balance of these competing factors almost makes outcomes feel 
arbitrary in their “closeness.” A 51-49 decision betrays an unsatisfying elision of decisiveness and 
direction, instead leaving history up to fate. For a gambler intent on taking “moral wagers” however, 
this would be a welcome approach to foreign policy. It is an approach that places humility at the 
centre of decision-making, never presuming to carry ordained knowledge of what is the correct 
course to take. 
The complexity of such an approach, cannot be underestimated. Wendy Sherman, a figure in the 
State Department, offered an instructional metaphor that addresses such complexity, in reference 
specifically to the Iranian nuclear deal: 
The symbol I used all the time was a Rubik’s Cube. There were multiple moving 
pieces, and every time you moved a piece – the number of centrifuges, the level of 
enrichment, the level of the stockpile – it moved the other elements. And so you 
constantly had to recalibrate until all of the pieces fit snugly together and the last 
cube of the Rubik’s Cube locked into place. That is what made this so staggeringly 
complex.669  
This metaphor can be a useful tool in more broadly conceptualizing the mechanisms of Obama’s 
foreign policy. His approach to American intervention in the world often appeared to adhere to this 
Rubik’s cube logic. It too carried a sense of a reliance on all the pieces lining up in a particular way in 
order to provide the solution. It is a logic which carries with it the possibility of one slight piece 
moving in a manner that produces a worse outcome. It is the process of balancing contradictory 
forces and searching for an equilibrium between them. 
In this respect, the Nobel Prize speech remains the most complete exposition of Obama’s foreign 
policy. Its logic remains consistent with his choices in war and peace. The Nobel speech laid out the 
logic that drove the dialectic between pessimism and humility on the one hand, and optimism and 
American exceptionalism on the other. The dialectic between a Niebuhrian emphasis on the 
necessity of contending with evil whilst acknowledging limitations in doing so, and the optimistic 
hope represented by King, advocating for a sense of the universal good, in reaching for a peaceful 
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world despite doubts to the contrary. It is the dialectic of an America constantly having to reconcile 
with itself what its role in world affairs ought to be. 
The following chapter will continue to examine this dynamic. It will consider the means by which 
Obama and his administration sought to affect its vision of American power through the strategic 
dynamic of the Pivot to Asia, but also through its deployment of drone technology. Together, both 
initiatives would stand as vivid representations of the breadth by which the Obama administration 
viewed the possibilities of American power, and its role in the world. But further to this, the chapter 
will also examine in greater depth the very notion of Obama’s identity, and the way in which it was 



























With every element of American power 
 
In The Audacity of Hope Obama starts his chapter on international affairs by discussing Indonesia. 
His encyclopaedia-like entry reflected an important personal connection to the country. As a six 
year-old Obama moved with his mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, to live with her husband - his step-
father - in Jakarta, where he stayed until he was ten.  Forty-three years later, Obama made a 
remarkable return to the nation, as the President of the United States. Speaking at the University of 
Indonesia, in Jakarta, he wasted no time practicing his old language skills, declaring “Indonesia 
bagian dari didi saya” – “Indonesia is a part of me.”670 He recounted aspects of his time in 
Indonesia that shaped him, recalling an idyllic and carefree childhood. Obama’s every use of 
Indonesian language was greeted by cheers and applause from the audience. Here was one of the 
most powerful political figures in the world exhibiting a sense of intimate connection to an 
archipelago thousands of miles and an ocean away. But this connection forged something more 
important for Obama. He noted “because Indonesia is made up of thousands of islands, and 
hundreds of languages, and people from scores of regions and ethnic groups, my time here helped 
me appreciate the common humanity of all people.”671 
This encapsulated a sense of cosmopolitanism that formed a part of Obama’s intellectual make-up. 
In visions of ‘common humanity,’ furthermore, we find an important relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and pragmatism. As will be seen, they are each premised on the recognition of 
different perspectives. Both rely on the notion of not precluding alternative possibilities, but also on 
the notion that often these alternative perspectives can cohere together to forge common ground. 
Pragmatism prizes deliberation in this process. 
Ruminations upon Obama’s childhood exposure to different cultures and the absorption of values of 
‘common humanity’ prompt consideration of a vital aspect of his intellectual make-up. It is perhaps 
the most elemental aspect of his thought - simply who he is as a person. There is, of course, 
enormous difficulty in truly ascertaining this, but it is nevertheless important to try. This is especially 
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the case when considered in relation to what Obama called his own search for a place in America’s 
history that would “admit the uniqueness of [his] own life.”672 
The impact of this “uniqueness” might be hard to pinpoint but it is necessary to examine his identity 
and biography in the context of his foreign policy outlook. As such, this chapter will consider how 
Obama’s own affinities for the Asia-Pacific played a role in shaping his approach to the region. In 
doing so it will build upon the previous chapter in also considering the ramifications for Obama’s 
wider understandings of America’s role in the world and how it should be appropriately directed.  
Obama held an inexorable teleological belief in human progress. In many senses he conditioned such 
progress upon the nurturing of universal tendencies that reflected a broader project of liberal 
internationalism (or American hegemony, to critics). But it was this liberal internationalism and its 
universalism that helped tie his many disparate worlds together. In contending with these ideas the 
chapter will likewise tie together two disparate foreign policy initiatives that - on the surface - do not 
co-habit in the same sphere of foreign affairs: the administration’s much vaunted Pivot to Asia and 
its much deplored drone programme. They run at polar ends of the foreign policy spectrum yet, 
crucially, when considered in the context of one another, make up a coherent picture of American 
power.  
The desire to extend America’s engagement with the Asia-Pacific meant the creation and recreation 
of an imperative for America’s place in the region becoming a core part of the administration’s 
approach. This also bore a relationship to deeper historical roots in America’s long-held process of 
extending its power outwards; be it culturally, economically, or militarily. The military aspect 
encapsulated the administration’s escalation of the use of drone strike capabilities to continue the 
war on al Qaeda. But this extension of military power also played a vital part in the broader 
reconfiguration of American power; the redirection towards more necessary aims.  
For Obama, this meant moving America’s focus away from the folly of Middle Eastern wars and 
instead towards the Asia-Pacific. It was a region of growing economic importance, but also, with the 
emergence of China as a peer competitor, one of immense geostrategic concern too. The U.S. 
wanted to play a role in bringing about a desired shared destiny with its allies in the region. This 
relied on assumptions which had profound ramifications on the way American power was 
conceptualized. This chapter will contend that this conceptualization prompted the administration 
to direct American power towards realizing itself as a Pacific nation. It also found it willing to deploy 
remote weaponry as a means by which to find foreign policy equilibrium. The Pivot to Asia would 
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allow America to enhance its ties to a region, share in its progress, and counter Beijing’s intentions. 




It is tempting to remark on Barack Obama’s mixed-race, continent-crossing heritage and thus label 
him a cosmopolitan figure. His is a life and an identity that does not conform to lines on a map. Yet, 
these factors do not by themselves confer onto Obama a cosmopolitan identity. They do however 
signal his openness to a world beyond borders. And offer a window into a worldview unbound by a 
parochial lens. They reflect broader horizons and an acknowledgment of America as it exists in the 
wider context of the world around it.  
Philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah developed a definition of cosmopolitanism comprising two 
strands that intertwine, one “the idea that we have obligations to others,” the other “that we take 
seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which mean taking an 
interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance.”673 Appiah argues that “people are 
different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences. Because there 
are so many human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor desire that every person or 
every society should converge on a single model of life.”674 Cosmopolitanism is indeed a complicated 
and often conflicted term, nevertheless Appiah’s definition prompts interrogation of the very same 
complications that lie at the heart of Obama’s story.675 With this in mind, what would it mean for 
Obama to exhibit cosmopolitanism as a political thinker and actor? And how did this relate to his 
pragmatism traced in this thesis? Ulrich Beck describes a cosmopolitan outlook as being a “global 
sense, a sense of boundarylessness. An everyday, historically alert, reflexive awareness of 
ambivalences in a milieu of blurring differentiations and cultural contradictions. It reveals not just 
the ‘anguish’ but also the possibility of shaping one’s life and social relations under conditions of 
cultural mixture. It is simultaneously a sceptical, disillusioned, self-critical outlook.”676 In Dreams 
                                                          
673




 S. Vertovec, and Cohen, R., "Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism," in Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: 
Theory, Context and Practice, ed. S. Vertovec, and Cohen, R. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). pp. 3-
14 
676
 U. Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). p. 3 
155 
 
From My Father this perspective appears in abundance as Obama writes openly about a struggle to 
find his identity and his search to reconcile his “many worlds into a single, harmonious whole.”677 
Stuart Hall reflects on a notion that cosmopolitanism means “the ability to stand outside of having 
one’s life written and scripted by any one community, whether that is a faith or tradition or religion 
or culture… and to draw selectively on a variety of discursive meanings.”678 Throughout his own 
narrative in Dreams From My Father Obama sought to draw particularly from his Black and African 
heritage, seeking to uncover the meanings attached to those communal bonds. He recalled “I 
decided to become part of that world,” which writer Ta-Nehisi Coates assesses as “one of the most 
incredible sentences ever written in the long, decorated history of black memoir, if only because 
very few black people have ever enjoyed enough power to write it.”679 Coates argues in part that it 
was the uniqueness of Obama’s background, and his non-hostile introduction to the world of white 
people, with the love of his mother and grandparents who raised him, that enabled this power. He 
contends “Obama’s early positive interactions with his white family members gave him a 
fundamentally different outlook toward the wider world than most blacks of the 1960s had.” This in 
turn enabled him to trust in white people and allowed him to express the hope that underwrote his 
introduction to the nation in his 2004 Democratic Convention Speech.680 
While he was still in high school, confronting his confusion over identity and the apparent 
powerlessness of African-Americans in American society, Obama looked “to corroborate this 
nightmare vision,” gathering books by the likes of James Baldwin, Ralph Ellison, Langston Hughes, 
Richard Wright, W.E.B. DuBois, and Malcolm X, luminaries in the history of Black intellectual 
culture.681 “At night,” he wrote “I would close the door to my room, telling my grandparents I had 
homework to do, and there I would sit and wrestle with words, locked in suddenly desperate 
argument, trying to reconcile the world as I’d found it with the terms of my birth.” The more he 
wrestled with such texts, the more he found “there was no escape to be had. In every page of every 
book…I kept finding the same anguish, the same doubt; a self-contempt that neither irony nor 
intellect seemed able to deflect.”682 Coates’ assertion of the remarkableness in his decision to 
“become part of that world” is laid bare. 
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Obama did reflect on a glimmer of hope he found in this endeavour, where “Malcolm X’s 
autobiography seemed to offer something different.” Obama wrote of Malcolm X that “his repeated 
acts of self-creation spoke to me; the blunt poetry of his words, his unadorned insistence on respect, 
promised a new and uncompromising order, martial in its discipline, forged through sheer force of 
will.”683 This sense of self-realization and determination of the self became themes he would carry 
forth. David Garrow’s biography emphasizes the notion that Obama “willed himself into being” in 
forging an identity as an African American man, but proffers a searing critique that “while the 
crucible of self-creation had produced an ironclad will, the vessel was hollow at its core.”684 Garrow 
adds salt to the wound he inflicts by arguing that “eight years in the White House had revealed all 
too clearly that it is easy to forget who you once were if you have never really known who you 
are.”685 Neverthleless, in contrast to Garrow’s bellicosity, James Kloppenberg suggests that Obama’s 
“early reading and thinking about race laid the groundwork for his exceptional self-awareness.”686 
Whilst Obama sought to root himself in the African-American community, he has stressed that he is 
not “limited” by it.687 Embracing variety in perspective is thus an inherent part of Obama’s identity. It 
is no surprise that he should offer up such an understanding of himself, telling journalist David 
Mendell that “I was raised as an Indonesian child and a Hawaiian child and as a black child and as a 
white child. And so what I benefitted from is a multiplicity of cultures that all fed me.”688 
For Appiah, cosmopolitan engagement with the world entails “moral conversation between people 
across societies.”689 But he reminds us that such disagreements also occur within societies.690 The 
political and cultural polarization of American society attests to this, and Obama’s approach to it 
recognizes and, to an extent, embraces these disagreements. His remains a vision of an American 
community constituted by multiplicity in identity where, through aspiring to the ideals of the 
constitution, people, “black and white, they make their claim on this community we call America. 
They choose our better history.”691 
Reflecting on his time working as a community organizer in the South Side of Chicago, Obama told 
Coates, “when I started doing that work, my story merges with a larger story.” Yet he had some 
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hesitancy once more about his identity in the process.  “How do I pull all these different strains 
together” he mused: 
Kenya and Hawai’i and Kansas, and white and black and Asian—how does that 
fit? And through action, through work, I suddenly see myself as part of the bigger 
process for, yes, delivering justice for the [African American community] and 
specifically the South Side community, the low-income people—justice on behalf 
of the African American community. But also thereby promoting my ideas of 
justice and equality and empathy that my mother taught me were universal. So 
I’m in a position to understand those essential parts of me not as separate and 
apart from any particular community but connected to every community. And I 
can fit the African American struggle for freedom and justice in the context of the 
universal aspiration for freedom and justice.692 
For Appiah, “cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their vocabulary of 
values to begin a conversation.”693  Early in his presidency, in the Cairo speech aimed at reaching out 
to the Muslim world, Obama spoke of how his father came from a Kenyan family “that includes 
generations of Muslims” and noted how, living in Indonesia he “heard the call of the azaan at the 
break of dawn and at the fall of dusk.”694 He spoke in Accra, declaring “I have the blood of Africa 
within me,” and acknowledged the spectre of colonialism as having impacted upon his grandfather, 
not simply as being “the creation of unnatural borders or unfair terms of trade” but something 
“experienced personally, day after day, year after year.”695 Other Presidents may be able to offer 
platitudes, but he has lived a life, and possesses an identity, that speaks more fervently to an 
engagement across societies.  
In both of his books Obama’s reflections upon his time in Indonesia serve to forcefully emphasize the 
world in which he had in-part been raised – the world that was so far removed from the experiences 
of a conventional American childhood. Arriving as a six year old, it was an alien world.696 Yet - 
returning forty-three years later - embracing his broader philosophical tendencies to flatten out 
differences, to find common understandings, Obama emphasized in Jakarta how the promises of 
mutual understanding can serve a purpose. Even where cultures can seem alien and strange, 
common humanity can be uncovered. In reference especially to the Muslim communities of 
                                                          
692
 Coates, "My President Was Black." 
693
 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism. p. 57 
694
 The Obama White House, "Cairo Speech." 
695
 "Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament," news release, July 11, 2009, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament. 
696
 Obama, Dreams. p. 32-35 
158 
 
Indonesia, Obama argued “we do have a choice.  We can choose to be defined by our differences, 
and give in to a future of suspicion and mistrust.  Or we can choose to do the hard work of forging 
common ground, and commit ourselves to the steady pursuit of progress.”697 
Mendell notes how Obama’s mother possessed a philosophy of common humanity “that had been 
ingrained in him throughout his childhood.”698 This notion of ‘common humanity’ has been reflected 
time and again by Obama in speeches to international audiences. In Berlin, Obama referred to 
himself and his audience as “citizens of the world.”699 He spoke to a belief in the connectedness of 
humankind, and indeed a notion that “certain principles are universal” in Yangon, and as noted 
above, used the language of ‘common humanity’ in Jakarta.700 Appiah suggests cosmopolitan 
openness to the world “is perfectly consistent with picking and choosing among the options you find 
in your search.”701 It precludes ignoring other possibilities that lie out there.  
Tensions lie at the heart of cosmopolitanism though. Primary among them is the emphasis placed 
upon global obligations to that common humanity, as opposed to the emphasis that celebrates local 
differences. These complexities and tensions underwrite, to a large degree, Obama’s own 
commitment to both the particular of community and the universal of common humanity. He 
tended towards opening a ‘conversation’ with those of different perspectives seeking understanding 
and to forge common ground. In Appiah’s terms, a cosmopolitan approach acknowledges that there 
is much to learn from differences in perspective and, such are the multitude of possibilities, it should 
not be expected that every person or society should converge on this single model.702 We might 
question, however, the extent to which makers of American foreign policy have ever accepted 
societies that diverge from its own designs. Even Obama’s lived experience and belief in engaging 
across societies would be hard pushed to change that. 
Assessing the impact of a cosmopolitan worldview on the choices of a political actor in office is a 
fraught pursuit. We must be wary of accepting at face-value the notion that awareness of identities 
and openness to the otherness of the world can necessarily engender policy choices that match. 
Ultimately, Obama’s acknowledgment of the fluidity and boundarylessness of identities was always 
subsumed to one identity that mattered above all others: that of President. Obligations to common 
humanity would extend only as far as it did not intrude upon his attendant responsibilities as 
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Commander-in-Chief. Civilian victims of America’s continued efforts at counterterrorism can attest 
to this. The very aspects of Obama’s identity that invoke cosmopolitanism also raised the stakes of 
the imperatives of the presidency. Those imperatives stood as a constant reminder that to not 
maintain America’s hegemony would be to be perceived as un-American. 
It is in cosmopolitanism’s slipperiness as a term – standing for so many things that we can question if 
it stands for anything at all - that its usefulness can be questioned. Nevertheless it is in these 
elements that it overlaps with aspects of philosophical pragmatism. To locate value in simply 
terming Obama a cosmopolitan is a fruitless task. But in the same means by which pragmatism 
stands for a method of interrogating the world, understanding cosmopolitanism in a similar manner 
can hold value: as a mode of thought that rejects the absolutes of one single identity and 
perspective. That Obama was himself constantly engaging in that same self-aware process of 




Obama spent four important years living on Java, but another Pacific island locale was foundational 
to shaping him. Obama’s first biographer (former Chicago Tribune reporter David Mendell) wrote 
that Obama’s wife, Michelle, advised him that “to truly understand her husband, it was necessary to 
visit Hawai’i. No matter how much Obama had philosophized in print about his Kenyan father, she 
told [Mendell], that Pacific island held even more answers to Obama’s complex persona.” Indeed, 
“there’s still a great deal of Hawai’i in Barack,” she said. “You can’t really understand Barack until 
you understand Hawai’i.”703 
Barack himself appeared to share this sentiment. In 1999, at that time merely a semi-notable alumni 
of the prestigious Punahou School, Obama reflected in its newspaper: 
When I look back on my years in Hawai’i, I realize how lucky I was to have been 
raised there. Hawaii’s spirit of tolerance might not have been perfect or complete, 
but it was – and is – real. The opportunity that Hawai’i offered – to experience a 
variety of cultures in a climate of mutual respect – became an integral part of my 
world view, and a basis for the values that I hold most dear.704 
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Hawai’i became an American state in August 1959. It arrived at this fate after an initial half-century 
of missionary zeal mixed with business exploitation, and then another half-century of annexation. It 
was part of the United States, but very much apart from the United States. Through a combination 
of the rapacious practices of American capital, and the islands’ location in between continents, it 
boasts a varied population of native Hawaiians, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, Samoans, 
Okinawans, Portuguese, African-Americans, and whites from the mainland.705 
The Hawaiian language served to designate Obama within its own culture as being hapa - someone 
who is half one race and half another.706 But this was by no means a rarity. From 1960 to 1969 (the 
decade of Obama’s birth) 45.9 percent of all marriages that involved a Black man in Hawai’i were 
interracial. During that decade, more than a third of all marriages in Hawai’i were interracial.707 It is a 
stark reminder to recognize that the marriage of Obama’s parents would have been illegal through 
breaking miscegenation laws in a full twenty-one other states in the union.708 Hawaiians meanwhile 
did not have a word for such a ‘crime.’709 These facts reflect the culture of diversity which Obama 
says shaped his worldview, but they also reflect that it was the particularities of Hawai’i that made 
Obama’s story at all possible. 
David Remnick of the New Yorker notes that “since the nineteen-twenties, scholars have been 
referring to Hawai’i as a kind of racial Eden.”710 Obama himself mused in Dreams From My Father 
that in Hawai’i “there were too many races, with power among them too diffuse, to impose the 
mainland’s rigid caste system; and so few blacks that the most ardent segregationist could enjoy a 
vacation secure in the knowledge that race mixing in Hawai’i had little to do with the established 
order back home” and thus “the legend was made of Hawai’i as the one true melting pot, an 
experiment in racial harmony.”711 Hawai’i represented the aspirations of Obama’s family – and the 
nation more broadly - as “a bright new world where differences of race or culture would instruct and 
amuse and perhaps even ennoble. A useful fiction, one that haunts me no less than it haunted my 
family, evoking as it does some lost Eden that extends beyond mere childhood.”712 
The true realities of Hawai’i’s history of violent occupation and racial struggles – in keeping with 
American society writ-large - should not be obfuscated. Obama himself reflected that in his notion of 
                                                          
705
 Ibid. p. 50; Maraniss, Barack Obama. p. 139 
706
 Barack Obama. p. 165 
707




 B. Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009). p. 180 
710
 Remnick, The Bridge. p. 50 
711
 Obama, Dreams. pp. 23-24 
712
 Ibid. pp. 25-26 
161 
 
a “useful fiction.” But it does bear emphasizing the scale of diversity on the island. Obama grew up in 
an environment in which his differences were in their way typical. David Maraniss helpfully points 
out that his name - Obama - fit “unobtrusively into the ethnic cacophony of surnames of babies born 
in Honolulu that week: Arakawa, Caberto, Clifford, Kamealoha, Walker, Chun, Wong, Nakane, Murui, 
Uyeda, Kanoa, Abele, Torres, Camara, Kobayashi, Ikeda, Kawazoe, and Simpson.”713 
Accordingly, this diversity mattered to Obama, as seen in his aforementioned comment to Mendell 
about being raised an “Indonesian child and a Hawaiian child and as a black child and as a white 
child.” Obama noted this distinction to emphasize its benefit.714 In conjunction with his time in 
Indonesia, his identity as Hawaiian had an indelible effect in shaping Obama’s own self-conception. 
He evinces a comfort with different identities that cut across boundaries.   
Cosmopolitanism can be at once an embrace of difference while simultaneously a sense of the 
overlap that can be shared across communities. In Jakarta, Obama tied America and Indonesia’s 
histories and identities together in this respect. He professed a belief that “the history of both 
America and Indonesia should give us hope.” Importantly, “it is a story written into our national 
mottos.  In the United States, our motto is E pluribus unum -- out of many, one. Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika -- unity in diversity.” Despite their differences, both nations represented for Obama a notion that 
“hundreds of millions who hold different beliefs can be united in freedom under one flag.”715 
“Such is Indonesia’s spirit.  Such is the message of Indonesia’s inclusive philosophy, Pancasila” he 
argued. Obama found in the country “the ability to bridge divides of race and region and religion -- 
by the ability to see yourself in other people.  As a child of a different race who came here from a 
distant country, I found this spirit in the greeting that I received upon moving here:  Selamat 
Datang.” In celebrating the openness of different religions towards one another, he reified “that 
spark of the divine lives within each of us,” and argued that: 
We cannot give in to doubt or cynicism or despair.  The stories of Indonesia and 
America should make us optimistic, because it tells us that history is on the side of 
human progress; that unity is more powerful than division; and that the people of 
this world can live together in peace. May our two nations, working together, 
with faith and determination, share these truths with all mankind.716 
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In the sense of Jamesian philosophical pragmatism, scope exists for common understandings to be 
forged to serve the best function for a wider community. It is in this respect that Obama’s 
cosmopolitanism, such that he exhibited it, reflected an inherent teleology. It possessed a certain 
direction of travel and logic of telos. Here it is important to note his deep belief that, despite 
whatever differences might exist within and between communities of people, the progress of 
humanity can be assured through the realization of these common bonds. 
This hopeful vision of humanity reflected once more the mark his mother’s philosophy left on 
Obama. His grandmother Madelyn told Mendell that Stanley Ann “was an Adlai Stevenson liberal… 
and he got a heavy dose of her thinking, you know, as a youngster.”717 Obama told him that his 
mother’s influence was ever-present in his life. And Mendell reflects that “it is apparent from private 
and public conversations with him that he set his moral compass not only from his readings of 
Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and the Bible but from his mother’s guidance.”718 As an 
example Mendell noted: 
Obama said his mother’s extreme idealism – her continued ability to see the good 
in people, even when they failed to live up to her lofty ideals – was the quality 
that he most admired. It is also the central message that he imparts in his 
political speeches – that all of us are bound together as one, and if we are to 
prosper as a country and, indeed, as a species, that we must focus on the good 
we see in others.719  
Mendell’s assessment locates fervency in Obama’s belief in coming together for progress. But it also 
reflects how his mother’s values played a similarly lofty role in his rhetoric.  It was also found in his 
conception of progress on an international level, reflected in his speech in Indonesia where he 
emphasized the same “out of many, one” idea that shapes both Indonesia and the United States. 
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Following Michelle Obama’s advice, David Mendell visited Hawai’i. Upon taking a tour of Obama’s 
former school, he wrote that “absorbing the atmosphere” of its campus gave him “a sense of the 
cool, unflappable Hawaiian nature at Obama’s core.”720  This cool persona is often attached to 
notions of the serenity that must naturally accompany a childhood and adolescence in Hawai’i. Part 
of that was the opportunities such an environment accorded young people looking for leisure 
activities. Much has been made of Obama’s own admitted (frequent) enjoyment of marijuana.721 His 
group of friends became known as the “Choom Gang,” who “enjoyed drinking beer, playing 
basketball, bodysurfing when the waves were up, and getting high whenever they had enough 
money.”722 David Maraniss writes “for teenage boys in pursuit of good times, the island of O’ahu was 
a wonderland.”723 Indeed, David Remnick suggests that “Hawai’i does not much resist the image of 
paradise: the physical beauty, the isolation from the mainland (from everywhere), the languid pace 
of life, the self-marketing as the “Aloha State,” the ultimate vacation spot, are intoxicating.”724  
Obama himself could not resist such rhapsodizing about his home-state, “you know,” he told a 
coterie of aides whilst visiting the state for a summit, “everything is just better in Hawai’i.”725 
Yet Hawai’i the island paradise also stands in a paradox with another significant element of the 
state’s place in the wider American story. In Dominion From Sea to Sea, his sweeping history of 
America’s ‘Pacific ascendency,’ Bruce Cumings notes that Hawai’i - as home to the headquarters of 
the United States Indo-Pacific Command - is “a base of a great armada of naval, land, and air forces 
and the unrivalled core of American power in the Pacific.”726 As such, Hawai’i is “the earthly 
foundation for a truly awesome power projection across some 100 million square miles of land and 
sea, just about half of the planet’s entire surface.”727 In effect, it holds military power and 
responsibility over an area that contains two thirds of the Earth’s population.728 It is, Cumings 
suggests, “the core of the nation’s global power.”729  
Writing in 2008, Cumings argued that “Edenic Hawai’i…was and is the most militarized state in the 
union” and it appears difficult to argue much differently over a decade later.730 The islands sitting as 
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a hub of America’s military concern stands in sharp contrast to visions we might carry of the sun, 
surf, and drug-hazed good times of Obama’s youth. The laid back paradise of postcards and palm 
trees, the home of the “perpetual state of serenity in the air” that Mendell observed at Punahou was 




Hawaii’s own set of contradictions – its diversity (created in part through empire and exploitation), 
its remoteness (whilst representing an American bridge to the Pacific world), and its serenity (whilst 
housing some of the might of the American war machine) - usefully illustrates the promises and 
perils of Obama’s much vaunted pursuit of a ‘Pivot to Asia.’ The recasting of America’s relationship 
with the Pacific region was a complex undertaking that posed questions about the very nature of the 
relationship as it existed historically and could exist in the future.  
The Pivot - more officially referred to as the ‘rebalance’ - was an initiative taking root from priorities 
shaping the overall strategic direction for the administration. The strategy was pushed into motion 
in November 2011 when a landmark visit by Obama to the region followed hot on the heels of a 
Foreign Policy op-ed penned a month earlier by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.732  Titled 
‘America’s Pacific Century,’ Clinton’s article was the first prominent effort to articulate the 
administration’s initiative. She wrote “the Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics” and 
as a result “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic 
interests and a key priority for President Obama.” She floated arguments which would become 
familiar to observers of the administration’s Asia policy, suggesting that “open markets in Asia 
provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to 
cutting-edge technology.” Economic recovery in the U.S. would “depend on exports and the ability 
of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.”733 She emphasized how 
multiple visits as Secretary of State allowed her to see “the rapid transformations taking place in the 
region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2014-11?r=US&IR=T.; Hawaii Defense Economy, "Defense Personnel in Hawaii,"  
http://hawaiidefenseeconomy.org/defense-economy-personnel/. 
731
 Mendell, Obama. p. 37 
732






future of the Asia-Pacific.” Consequently, she wrote “a strategic turn to the region fits logically into 
our overall global effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership.”734 
For his part, in a speech to the Australian Parliament, Obama outlined the core tenets of this grand 
strategic initiative. The “larger purpose” of his visit to the region was to address U.S. efforts “to 
advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia Pacific.” He argued that for the U.S. 
this reflected “a broader shift” as, crucially, “after a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us 
dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the 
Asia Pacific region.”735 
He placed this in the context of simultaneous policies of troops leaving Iraq and the initiation of a 
transition to allow an exit from Afghanistan. In doing so he optimistically advised the audience to 
“make no mistake, the tide of war is receding, and America is looking ahead to the future that we 
must build.” That tide of war was bound inextricably to the Middle East. But now, the U.S. could 
direct its attentions, unobstructed, to the Asia-Pacific – “here, we see the future.”736 This shift in 
direction would be a boon for Obama’s own ambitions for the United States. Similarly to Clinton, he 
argued “as the world’s fastest-growing region -- and home to more than half the global economy -- 
the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that's creating jobs and opportunity 
for the American people.”737 
Obama grandly proclaimed “as President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic 
decision,” and proceeded to enunciate a theme which became important in the administration’s 
rhetoric on the policy: “as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in 
shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our 
allies and friends.” He established just what was meant by the U.S. “shaping” the region: speaking 
first of security and the continued unique projection of power; second, of advancing “shared 
prosperity” through free markets and “an open international economic system, where rules are clear 
and every nation plays by them.” Third, he spoke of supporting fundamental human rights.  
Combined, this was “the future we seek in the Asia-Pacific – security, prosperity, and dignity for all.” 
“That’s what we stand for,” he noted. “That’s who we are.” That’s the future the U.S. would pursue 
“in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American power.” This was a 
crucial statement of intent. It was also a significant indicator of how Obama would conceive of the 
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appropriate direction of U.S. power. As a punctuation mark on this point, he added “let there be no 
doubt:  In the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.”738 
In many crucial respects, Obama’s Pivot was focused on enhancing ties with the region, developing 
overlap between cultures that could enable consensus, and to thus enable progress. This 
inexorable march of progress was part of Asia’s future, and it could be shared by the United 
States. Obama told the Australian parliament that “across a vast ocean, it’s impossible to know 
what lies beyond the horizon.  But if this vast region and its people teach us anything, it’s the 
yearning for liberty and progress will not be denied.” People’s collective fight for that progress 
stood as a reminder of an idea “the world must never forget,” and crucially an idea that:  
The currents of history may ebb and flow, but over time they move -- decidedly, 
decisively -- in a single direction.  History is on the side of the free -- free societies, 
free governments, free economies, free people.  And the future belongs to those 
who stand firm for those ideals, in this region and around the world.739 
Perhaps the most vivid representation of this collective push for progress can be seen in the 
administration’s more purposeful engagement with a range of regional multilateral organisations. 
Often derided as a veritable “alphabet soup” of organisations, Southeast Asia is home to several 
international organisations such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation), ARF (Asian Regional Forum), and regional fora such as the East Asia 
Summit, which had often lacked legitimacy and sway in the region.740 Obama argued, however, 
that he would emphasize the importance of engagement with such regional organisations.741 Clinton 
did likewise, highlighting the potential for the reinforcement of “the system of rules and 
responsibilities” that undergird an effective international order. This would go some way, she 
maintained, to curating “a web of partnerships and institutions” throughout the Pacific “as durable 
and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic.742 
These were endeavours that spoke to the same pragmatist ideals of consensus building and 
sustained collective process of deliberation that Obama deemed so important in shaping a 
functional international order. 
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In his speech in Jakarta, Obama argued that “America has a stake in Indonesia.” He made apparent 
this stake in its development and prosperity, and in pointing to the interconnectivity of the two 
nations he noted that “above all, America has a stake in the success of the Indonesian people.” He 
continued, “underneath the headlines of the day, we must build bridges between our people, 
because our future security and prosperity is shared.” Simply, “as vast and diverse countries; as 
neighbors on either side of the Pacific; and above all as democracies,” he maintained, “the United 
States and Indonesia are bound together by shared interests and shared values.”743  
In collapsing the sheer scale of the Pacific, in casually naming the U.S. and Indonesia as 
“neighbours,” it was not merely an emphasis of friendly bonhomie between nations. Instead, it 
was an idea born of a broader effort to reshape understandings of the United States as being itself 
a Pacific nation. It was the understanding of it not being a nation with Pacific borders, but being a  
nation of the Pacific. Indeed, in his speech to the Australian Parliament in Canberra, Obama was at 
pains to emphasize “our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth -- the United States 
has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.”744 This became a commonly reflected notion in the 
administration. 
Kurt Campbell - who served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 
2009 to 2013 - played a prominent role in curating the policy. He is also the figure who has, arguably, 
most taken it upon himself to be the chief articulator and defender of the Pivot to Asia, especially 
with his post-administration book – The Pivot.745 At its core, Campbell’s vision is underwritten by a 
staunch belief in the centrality of the U.S. to the region’s future. He establishes that “the United 
States has deep and enduring interests in Asia dating to the earliest days of the republic.” And 
what’s more, “American power has long been a calming and welcome factor in the region.”746 He 
projects an almost messianic quality to the United States’ role in Asia – indeed arguing it carries a 
“vital and leading role in the Asian Century.”747 He traces this role in a particular reading of history 
that holds the U.S. as having been the benevolent protector of China against European imperial 
interests. He then sets forth the modern incarnation of this benevolent role – one of leading in the 
curation of multilateral relationships that can promote international norms to benefit all members. 
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In Canberra, Obama offered up his own summary of America’s history as a Pacific nation, recognizing 
the cultural and economic importance of Asian immigrants to the U.S., and the more martial 
connections of America’s numerous military engagements in the region, where generations of 
Americans served and died “so democracies could take root; so economic miracles could lift 
hundreds of millions to prosperity.” Americans, he maintained “have bled with you for this progress, 
and we will not allow it -- we will never allow it to be reversed.”748 For Campbell “the U.S. pursuit of 
its own economic interests, and its dedication to a liberal and open economic order has been one of 
the longest, most enduring, and most successful American traditions in Asia.” In this conception, the 
fusing of American interests with those of the region was an indelible part of America’s history in 
interacting with it, and according to Campbell, is “a tradition that the U.S. Pivot to Asia is designed to 
continue.”749  
The presence looming over the administration’s articulation of the Pivot was that of China. China’s 
rise was an important reality underlying the Pivot. Every effort was made to emphasize the 
integrated and co-operative relationship the U.S. sought with China, while acknowledging points of 
contention such as its economic practices, human rights violations, and territorial disputes.750 Yet it 
also obfuscated that much of the Pivot aimed at stressing the importance of the U.S. as a leading 
force in the region, leaving people aware, in no uncertain terms, that the U.S. – and not China - had 
made Asia into what it is today. And though some of the administration’s rhetoric obscured it, that 
was intended to continue in the face of China’s emerging competition. 
Jeffrey Bader, who served for the first two years of Obama’s presidency as the senior director for 
Asian Affairs on the National Security Council, wrote of the administration’s Asia policy that “the 
major geostrategic challenge facing Asia, and the United States in Asia, was how to react to the 
dramatic rise of China in the previous decade.” China’s economic growth and integration into the 
economies of the region “had permanently altered the geopolitical landscape.”751 
The U.S. was wary of such competition but so too, Bader argued, were the countries of the region, 
especially when it came to China’s military spending.752 As such, the administration concluded that 
“more active U.S. participation in regional organizations was a necessary component of an effective 
Asia policy.”753 It believed, Bader suggested, “that an America embedded in emerging multilateral 
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institutions would give comfort to countries uncertain about the impact of China’s rise and provide 
important balance and leadership.”754  
According to Bader, America was viewed by other states in the region as a source of economic 
innovation, a strong security presence, and a partner in responding to disasters. “In their eyes,” he 
argued, “America is an essential stabilizing force” as rising powers (principally China) “gain in 
influence.”755 As such, the administration held the perspective that “a sustained and strong U.S. 
presence” was “welcomed by most of the states of the region.”756 
Obama told Jeffrey Goldberg that he believed the relationship of the United States with China was 
“going to be the most critical” in terms of “traditional great-state relations.” He argued that “if we 
get that right and China continues on a peaceful rise, then we have a partner that is growing in 
capability and sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an international 
order.” He conceded, nevertheless, that Chinese failure on this front, would prompt not only 
“potential for conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with 
these other challenges that are going to come.”757  
The perspectives that constituted the Obama administration’s approach to the region and China all 
held that China, in its pursuit of its self-interest, would be “a threat to peace and equilibrium.”758  In 
contrast, the U.S. would uphold that equilibrium. It was the role it played in the region. Chinese 
aspirations for its own rightful interests of regional dominance, necessary for its maintenance of 
economic growth and social stability, were to be somehow accommodated or subsumed by this 
greater American role.759 Campbell argued that the U.S. was doing its part to ameliorate against bad 
outcomes in the region, as the multilateral framework it sought in Asia could “set the contours for 
China’s rise.” This approach, he maintained, “informed the U.S. Pivot to Asia.”760   
But here, the specific nature of this rendering of America’s role should be noted. Campbell’s and 
Obama’s histories of America the Pacific nation elide the history of America the imperial power that 
had over time annexed the Philippines, Hawai’i, and Guam, among others and which now maintains 
vast number of military bases across the region. Bruce Cumings notes “the seizure of Hawai’i and the 
Philippines, the proclamation of the Open Door, and the intervention in the Boxer Rebellion marked 
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a new outward advance, a thrust fully embodied in Teddy Roosevelt – it was empire, and it all 
happened in the Pacific.”761 For Cumings, the pursuit of the Pacific was a consequence of feted 
instincts of American power. Its “empire grew out of the western thrust across the continent by 
expansionists who disdained Europe, its power politics, and its colonies, desiring instead maximum, 
unhindered American freedom in the world.”762 
America’s relationship with the Pacific was therefore altogether more complex (and bloody) than 
Obama and Campbell allowed. Nevertheless, their versions of history informed enunciations of the 
policy. In this it formed one plank of a twin effort by the administration to emphasize the 
importance and necessity of the Pivot for America’s global concerns. This twofold logic was self-
reinforcing: the U.S. future, prospects of progress, and visions of future U.S. greatness all lay in the 
Asia-Pacific. This was coupled with the notion that the U.S. was inherently a Pacific nation, sharing a 
common bond with nations and peoples in the region. Clinton reflected in her memoir that Asia was 
“where we expected much of the history of the 21st century to be written.”763  Kurt Campbell, for his 
part, suggested the Pivot was “motivated by a simple set of unrelenting truths; the lion’s share of 
the history of the twenty-first century will be written in Asia; the path to progress on every major 
global governance challenge runs through Asia; and the dynamism of Asia’s economies will be 
central to American economic prosperity for generations to come.”764 The turn to such a strategy 
would “prove critical for positioning the United States to prosper, thrive, and protect in the coming 
Asian Century.”765 This became an oft-repeated notion by figures throughout the administration.766 
In The Long Game, Derek Chollet concluded his discussion of the Pivot by evaluating that, despite 
setbacks, “the rebalance to Asia has been a significant strategic shift, positioning the U.S. for the 
future.”767  It is notable that in his book, one of the earliest post-administration defences of Obama’s 
foreign policy, Chollet himself turned to David Milne’s assessment that “the pivot toward Asia may 
be viewed as the Obama administration’s principal foreign-policy legacy thirty years hence” and 
particularly so in respect to the rise of China into the great-power arena.768 The very nature of the 
policy was so future oriented, that defenders of it might locate success in an unseen, distant legacy. 
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Yet this only served to emphasize its import, as what else is grand strategy but a matching of means 
towards future necessities, and long term objectives? In the immediate sense, Chollet added his own 
assessment by noting that “administration officials often remark how much better America’s 
standing in Asia is today, saying that when they attend Asia summits, they don’t hear much about 
U.S. “retreat” or “credibility” or “red lines” – terms that dominate the conversation in other regions, 
especially the Middle East.”769 
This last notion here hints at a fundamental pillar of what the Pivot to Asia represented. The more 
official name of the strategy – the ‘Rebalance’ to Asia – reflected a crucial ideal that underpinned it, 
just as it underpinned the Obama presidency. This was a deeply held desire to steer the United 
States out of its ill-fated wars in the Middle East, and to instead turn its attention to a more 
appropriate direction of its power. Tom Donilon - who became National Security Advisor in 2010 - 
succinctly outlined this notion in a speech given at the Asia Society: “After a decade defined by 9/11, 
two wars, and a financial crisis, President Obama took office determined to restore the foundation 
of the United States’ global leadership—our economic strength at home.”770 The argument Obama 
had made on the campaign trail - and as far back as his anti-Iraq War speech in 2002 - held at its core 
that America’s global leadership been sapped by Bush’s profligate adventurism. Remedying this, 
Donilon argued, necessitated focusing “efforts and resources” on the regions that would “shape the 
global order in the decades ahead.” It was Obama’s judgment, he reflected, “that we were over-
weighted in some areas and regions, including our military actions in the Middle East.  At the same 
time, we were underweighted in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, we believed this was 
our key geographic imbalance.”771 From the outset of the Obama administration there was a core 
sense that the balance of American energies had been tilted off-kilter, and it was necessary to 
restore them. We can recognize once more the pragmatist imperative to site U.S. actions in places 
where material (and not simply ideological) benefits could be achieved. 
Reflecting in his memoir, Ben Rhodes emphasized this notion, arguing “many of the issues that 
motivated Obama… depended upon cooperation in Asia.” And most pointedly, “while the Middle 
East represented the past – its religious wars, American-backed autocrats, Iranian revolutionaries, 
terrorist threats – Asia seemed to represent the future.”772 But this dichotomy between the different 
regions and their import to American interests was perhaps most vividly expressed by the president 
himself. His interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic came late in his term, where he appeared 
willing to offer more forthright opinions than he had previously. But even still, Obama’s comments 
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on the matter of the Middle East and its impacts on U.S. policy found him at perhaps his least 
guarded in his whole presidency, and with regards to the Middle East, found him at his most jaded 
and cynical.  “Right now, I don’t think that anybody can be feeling good about the situation in the 
Middle East,” he said.  
You have countries that are failing to provide prosperity and opportunity for their 
people. You’ve got a violent, extremist ideology, or ideologies, that are 
turbocharged through social media. You’ve got countries that have very few civic 
traditions, so that as autocratic regimes start fraying, the only organizing 
principles are sectarian.773  
He continued, “contrast that with Southeast Asia, which still has huge problems – enormous 
poverty, corruption – but is filled with striving, ambitious, energetic people who are every single day 
scratching and clawing to build businesses and get education and find jobs and build infrastructure. 
The contrast is pretty stark.”774 
His comments betrayed scathing, dismissive feelings about the failings of the Middle East. We might 
ask where this impugning of individuals and their motives comes from. Is it the result of years of 
frustration with the Middle East as a region? An outcome of the U.S. having spent years of toil 
ultimately for little gain? Fatigue at the continual gravitational pull exacted by the region on his 
foreign policy efforts? He was not finished in expressing his dismay. Goldberg wrote how “in Asia, as 
well as in Latin America and Africa, Obama says, he sees young people yearning for self-
improvement, modernity, education, and material wealth.” Obama provocatively argued of such 
people, that “they are not thinking about how to kill Americans… What they’re thinking about it is 
How do I get a better education? How do I create something of value?”775 He then made an 
observation which Goldberg posited “was representative of [Obama’s]  bleakest, most visceral 
understanding of the Middle East today – not the sort of understanding that a White House still 
oriented around themes of hope and change might choose to advertise.” Obama argued “if we’re 
not talking to them,” referring to young Asians and Africans and Latin Americans, “because the only 
thing we’re doing is figuring out how to destroy or cordon off or control the malicious, nihilistic, 
violent parts of humanity, then we’re missing the boat.”776 
Such causational logic is also proffered in critical assertions that Obama’s rebalance away from the 
Middle East is what allowed for the rise of that “malicious” and “nihilistic” element. Under such a 
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view, the staggering and violent emergence of ISIS resulted from the group eagerly filling a vacuum 
created by America’s absence.777 But crucially, Obama held fast to a notion that the general malaise 
that beset the United States arose largely through its efforts to manage the affairs of the Middle 
East. Such efforts had only served to leech on to American foreign policy more broadly, reshaping it 
in a deleterious manner. In important respects, these sorts of statements served as a signal on the 
part of the administration that notions of American decline were premature, and assessments of 
Obama’s strategic failings were wrong-headed. For Obama, instead, it was the prescriptions that 
America need do more in certain parts of the world that led it down blind alleys – that led it to risk 
“missing the boat.” A redirection of American attention to other – neglected – parts of the world 
would allow it to once more take a lead in seizing global opportunity.  The violence of ISIS, under this 
conception, was itself an unpleasant distraction from what actually mattered for American power. 
For Obama and his administration it had become a simple equation, the Asia-Pacific offered the 
opportunity to address problems such as those raised by Obama in his 2002 speech – domestic 
political and economic concerns. As noted above, Obama told the Australian parliament that “the 
Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that's creating jobs and opportunity for 
the American people.”778 Just as he had in 2002, throughout his presidency he still held this 
perspective that the military entanglements of his predecessor (and those he argued to be favoured 
by the Washington establishment) were the obstacle to achieving America’s true interests, those 
interests which would redound to benefit Americans at home.779 
This necessitated a recalibration of what it meant to use American power; reconfiguring the 
allocation of resources, time, and attention for its different tools’ direction of use. This version of 
grand strategy held no place for outright militarism, unilateralism, pre-emptive wars, or democracy 
promotion. It was a vision that instead leant on the sort of multilateralism that reinforced notions of 
consensus building, and shared institutions for economic and security issues. These would be a more 
effective means of contending with the still necessary task of dealing with threats to U.S. interests, 
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To realize its entrance into the so-called Pacific century, emphasis was placed on America’s historic 
bonds with the region. The quest for progress through its relationship with the region formed part of 
an immutable logic that would not be denied. It was desirable for the U.S. to pursue what came 
naturally to it; an extension of rightful U.S. policy. The Middle East adventurism left over from the 
Bush years was the aberration as instead it made logical and historical sense for American power to 
be directed towards the Asia-Pacific. 
On more than one occasion, Obama declared himself to be “the first Pacific President.” This sense of 
identity carried important implications for how an American president could relate to another part 
of the world. In the first instance, his connection to Indonesia had a profound impact on shaping an 
understanding of the world that existed beyond the parochial confines of American life. David Milne 
suggests that Obama, having grown up in Hawai’i and Indonesia “lacks the habitual eastward 
orientation of his predecessors. Most American presidents have had a strong Atlanticist perspective, 
believing that Europe is the continent in which the world’s most significant geostrategic conflict 
plays out.”780 We find in Obama instead a reflexive Pacificist orientation.  
This played a latent role in the broad initiative of the Pivot to Asia. The geostrategic imperative 
located in Asia took its place in a complex vortex of Obama’s own identity and intellectual 
predilections, the westward orientation formed an irreducible part of his outlook on the world, as 
did a cosmopolitanism and its attendant belief in shared humanity and the march towards common 
shared understandings. This telos had its own curious relationship with the necessity of the United 
States’ direction of power towards the Asia-Pacific region. Obama and his administration placed 
America’s own progress – and its long recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 – in the context of 
the anticipated growth of the Asia-Pacific region. This became almost received wisdom in the Obama 
administration.  
Obama was by no means driving this initiative by himself. Whist recognizing notions of his identity 
itself being the decisive factor, it would be reductionist to suggest that was entirely so. But the 
coinciding of an administration staffed with figures who consistently argued for the necessity of such 
a rebalance with a President who was uniquely situated in his remove from traditional Atlanticism, 
does place a level of import on the decisive role a President’s preferences can carry. In this respect, 
where Obama came from and the places he encountered are worthy of engaging with, to the extent 
that they played a role in shaping his assumptions about American power. Ben Rhodes writes in his 
memoir of spending an evening with Obama in Hawai’i, and finding him in a reflective mood, where 
“he started talking about Asia more broadly – the mix of cultures, religions, and races, he found so 
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familiar.” Obama said “Hawai’i has a lot in common with Jakarta…There’s a certain communal spirit. 
Americans are more individualistic.” Rhodes recounts Obama’s suggestion that “when you spend 
time growing up in Jakarta like I did, and see the masses of humanity in a place like that, it makes it 
harder for you to think purely of yourself.”781 Obama, in Rhodes’ retelling, is a figure prone to 
reflecting on where he has come from and how that shaped his own thought. It is a reflection we 
must take seriously. Rhodes certainly did so, in suggesting of Asia, “this part of the world, which had 
shaped Obama, was going to be more important to the future than the familiar battlefields of the 
Middle East, but it was distant from the debates that dominated in Washington.”782 Rhodes both 
centred Obama’s identity, and where he came from, whilst acknowledging that, in some sense, that 
centre of interest was remote from the direction of travel of U.S. foreign policy – mired in its 
concerns for its post-9/11 Middle Eastern wars. 
Cumings argues that, over time, isolated Hawai’i became “a strategic centrepiece rather than a 
bunch of Polynesian islands almost equidistantly remote from Los Angeles or Shanghai,” in the 
transformation of “the seemingly limitless North Pacific into an American lake.”783 Just as Hawai’i 
was “now sat in the middle,” the hapa kid from Honolulu by way of Kansas and Kenya, the street-
running kid of Menteng Dalam - America’s “first Pacific president” - was at the centre of a significant 





The ‘progress’ to be found in the Asia-Pacific marked out the necessity of a re-direction away from 
the Middle East and served to emphasise the failures of those wars that had defined America’s 
recent presence in the region. Yet, amidst talk of turning America’s attention to more pressing 
concerns, one could risk obscuring the ways in which the United States still had vital military 
priorities to attend to in the Middle East. The United States would remain for the entirety of 
Obama’s presidency at war with al Qaeda. 
Obama had emphasized he would not hesitate to act in order to prevent threats to America’s 
national security. He took this grave duty as Commander-in-Chief seriously as the war entered its 
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eighth year when he assumed the presidency. Barely a full year into his first term, on December 25 
2009, a 23 year old Nigerian national - Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab – attempted to detonate an 
explosive device that would have decimated the plane bound from Amsterdam to Detroit on which 
he was a passenger.785 He came to be known as “the underwear bomber” (in reference to the 
location of his explosives) and he had committed to jihad after being trained and instructed by al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).786 
In the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11, George W Bush’s White House set about designing its 
military response. In doing so it secured ‘The Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001’ which 
shaped the parameters of what use of American force would be legal. The AUMF stated: 
The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations 
or persons.787  
This was an authorization which the Bush administration took to its limits. The Obama 
administration’s legal team, for its part, also sought those limits out, determining that the president 
had authority to direct efforts against not only members of al Qaeda, or indeed the Taliban, but also 
“associated forces” that were fighting against the United States and its partners.788 
The “war on terror” initiated against al Qaeda - specifically as it operated out of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan - had steadily become more nebulous in its focus. Al Qaeda affiliates were emerging across 
a range of nations further afield, and thus expanded the urgency of that question of how to 
prosecute a war against a criminal organisation that did not adhere to laws of conventional warfare. 
Compounding these issues, fighters affiliated with these groups could slip through cracks and hide 
out in countries that lacked strong centralized government, often far from traditional war zones 
where U.S. ground forces were engaged in sustained armed combat.789 In addition to Afghanistan 
and the mountainous tribal regions of Pakistan, this meant Yemen, Somalia, and later the wreckage 
                                                          
785
 C. Savage, Power Wars: The Relentless Rise of Presidential Authority and Secrecy (New York: Back Bay 
Books, 2017). p. 11 
786
 BBC News, "Underwear Bomber Abdulmutallab Sentenced to Life,"  BBC News 16 February (2012), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17065130  
787
 Congress.gov, "Public Law 107-40-Sept. 18, 2001," Congress, 
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf  
788
 Savage, Power Wars. p. 119 
789
 Ibid. p. 240 
177 
 
of post-Gaddafi Libya, became prime locales for such groups. Afghanistan aside, these were not 
places where U.S. forces could legitimately form a ground presence. In this context it is important to 
acknowledge journalist Charlie Savage’s note that “without ground forces or a functional 
government, there is no way to capture a terrorism suspect.”790 
This posed a significant problem for the Obama administration in its efforts to win its fight in the 
post-9/11 war. How could the U.S. reach in to ungoverned and insecure countries and appropriately 
disarm an enemy intent on attacking again? Furthermore, in the context of Obama’s Pivot to Asia 
and his overwhelming desire to shift American focus from the Middle East, how could this be 
achieved absent an enormous investment of resources in manpower, munitions, and - perhaps most 




The development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles was a profound leap forward in the ways in which 
America would conduct military affairs. More commonly referred to as ‘drones,’ they initially merely 
offered capabilities of flying over an area of interest, providing the benefit of surveillance and 
reconnaissance. Crucially, they were a technology that could be operated remotely at no risk to 
those responsible for its flight. The vessel in which the greatest potentials of this Unmanned Aerial 
revolution were realized was officially called the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator. The Predator was 
designed originally by Iraq-born Israeli aeronautics engineer Abraham Karem, but after the General 
Atomics Corporation took ownership of the technology, undertaking further development, it began 
to attract the interest of the Pentagon and the CIA.791  
Predator drones could fly at an altitude of 25,000 feet, for twenty-four hours straight, carrying a 
sophisticated set of communications equipment and a camera fixed on the ground below.792 After 
initial teething problems (including the propensity to be blown off course in anything but calm 
weather) the advent of GPS technology and a simultaneous revolution in communications 
technology meant the potentials of drones were expanded in a significant way.793 
After the Air Force wrested control of the Predators from the Army, they were utilized in the air 
campaign against Serbia in Kosovo, at first purely as a reconnaissance tool. Despite disputation of 
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the actual effectiveness of the aerial campaign in bringing about Slobodan Milosevic’s negotiation of 
a peace settlement, the Air Force nevertheless sought to highlight it as a success. As such, journalist 
Andrew Cockburn argues “the campaign’s apparent confirmation that precisely targeted bombs and 
missiles could achieve victory at no cost in friendly casualties, and in a good cause, too, prepared the 
political landscape for the wars of the next century.”794  Politically it fit in to the logic of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs, the notion of modernizing the military which had long been a project 
of key figures who became part of the Bush administration.795 As the potentialities of drones in 
warfare became apparent, the extension of their use to other theatres and, more pressingly, the 
onrushing “global war on terror” became the next step. 
On 3 November 2002, in a watershed moment, a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator successfully 
killed Qa’d Salim Sinan al-Harithi in Yemen. He was a leader of al Qaeda in Yemen, reputed to be a 
mastermind behind the bombing of the battleship USS Cole. Whilst there had been previous such 
strikes in Afghanistan, this was notable in being the first such targeted killing by drone in a country 
with which the U.S. was not at war.796 The Predator became part of Bush’s war on terror, offering 
the ability to take out such targets in the perceived broader fight against al Qaeda. The Obama 
administration for its part would come to vastly accelerate this use of drones. 
In answer to the problems of capturing terrorism suspects without ground forces or a functional 
government, Savage notes that “the rise of drones has made it increasingly possible to penetrate 
inaccessible regions and kill people from the air.”797 It followed that “under Obama, remote-
controlled aircraft were becoming the weapon of choice for strikes away from traditional 
battlefields.”798  He recognizes that the increase in their utilization by Obama was in part because 
“he had far more of them to deploy than Bush had had.” But, crucially, “Obama was also enraptured 
by their potential for risk reduction. Conventional air strikes put American pilots – and sometimes 
Special Operations spotters on the ground – at risk.” By contrast, however, “if a drone crashed or 
was shot down, its pilot still went home for dinner.” The technology “also enabled operators to 
watch a target for a long period before unleashing a missile, which held out the promise of greater 
precision and fewer civilian deaths.”799 Dave Deptula, formerly a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force, 
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and a key theorist of air war affirmed that “the real advantage of unmanned aerial systems is that 
they allow you to project power without projecting vulnerability.”800 
Drone technology offered a significant alternative – an ability to continue the fight against the 
enemies of America, without the same commitment and risk encountered before. For Obama, the 
tragedy was no longer contained in asking American men and women to die for the cause of a 
complex war. As Andrew Cockburn relays, “sooner or later, U.S. officials and diplomats toiling to 
implement what they believed was American policy came to realize that there was really only one 
issue at stake: the domestic U.S. political fortunes of the Obama administration.” In the wake 
especially of the attempted Christmas Day bombing of 2011, the imperatives of not wishing to 
answer searching questions the day after the successful perpetration of such a tragedy, became 
overwhelming. “‘No bombs on my watch,’ that’s all they wanted to be able to say,” explained a 
former Obama White House official to Cockburn. Crucially, in searching for a solution, the official 
reflected, “drones were a cheap, politically painless way of dealing with that. No one even talked 
about it very much.”801 The consequentialism of Obama’s broad pragmatist ‘sensibilities,’ shines 
through here. The ends were clear, and drones offered a means to achieve those ends without 
compromising them. But the tragic pragmatism discussed previously nevertheless also carries 
obvious bearing in the issue of drone strikes. That expediency was weighed up against the moral 
questions posed by the strategy. 
As such, in examining Obama’s foreign policy record, failure to reckon with his approach to drone 
warfare would be negligent. Such is the strength of opinion on the matter in some quarters, that this 
very set of policy choices is, in part, what marks Obama out as the disappointment he became 
(especially to many on the left) by the end of his presidency. The prolific use of weapons 
technologies that frequently caused the deaths of innocent civilian bystanders was a moral failing 
beyond the pale of what many should bear from their leaders.802 Whilst the tragedy of American 
service people dying in war was eliminated by the use of such technology, tragedy nevertheless 
remained. In addition to this, critics ably point to the potential blowback effects that the drone war 
could unleash, the despair and fury provoked by an unseen enemy reigning death from the sky was 
enough to radicalize a whole new set of populations now determined to fight Americans. By this 
measure it was not only a moral failing but also a strategic failing in merely expanding the list of U.S. 
adversaries in its war on terror.803 Cockburn reflects that “Yemenis would experience  a lesson in 
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drone warfare all too often lost on far-off officials who authorize the killings: though it may appear 
that drones offer a remote, sanitized mode of warfare, to their victims they are very much a local 
affair.”804 
The most severe criticisms of Obama’s use of drones argue that the term targeted killings - which 
would become the preferred administration nomenclature - was merely a euphemism for what was 
in reality nothing more than a process of systematic assassination. Jeremy Scahill of The Intercept 
termed it “The Assassination Complex.”805 At the core of Scahill and other such critics’ argument lay 
the notion that whatever the drone programme was called, it resulted in a government sanctioned 
process of extrajudicial killing. 
In his book Drone Theory - a “philosophical investigation” of the drone - Grégoire Chamayou 
suggests that the use of drones in warfare marked a particularly virulent dawn of “one-directional 
injuring,” which thus made warfare “absolutely unilateral.” Most damningly, he argues that through 
the utilization of drones, “what could still claim to be combat is converted into a campaign of what 
is, quite simply, slaughter.”806 He suggests that drones led to a transformation of the paradigm of 
war, into one of “a hunter advancing on a prey that flees or hides from him.”807 This is a theme 
Chamayou returns to time and again; one of a “hunt,” that the use of drone technology is reflective 
of a disparate power dynamic, where the predator the U.S. is hunting the prey, those deemed to be 
threats to it.  
Consistent critic of the Obama presidency, Glenn Greenwald, wrote on Obama’s record as a Senator 
where he had advocated in favour of acceding to judicial procedures before treating suspects as 
terrorists, fearing the danger of casting “too wide a net” and accusing “the wrong person.” But 
Greenwald argued that “as president, Obama not only ignored those lofty statements but trampled 
all over them.” He argued that “the centrepiece of his drone assassination programme is that he, 
and he alone, has the power to target people, including American citizens, anywhere they are found 
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in the world and order them executed on his unilateral command, based on his determination that 
the person to be killed is a terrorist.”808  
Notwithstanding the arguable inaccuracies in Greenwald’s notion that suspects can be targeted 
“anywhere they are found” (there are still laws and strictures in place – as are designations of who 
falls under the 2001 AUMF), there is nevertheless a strong case to be made that Obama exhibited a 
disappointing lack of consistency in not extending the clamour for due process to those targeted in 
the drone programme.809 Greenwald sardonically commented that “somehow it was hideously 
wrong for George W. Bush to eavesdrop on and imprison suspected terrorist without judicial 
approval, yet it was perfectly permissible for Obama to assassinate them without due process of any 
kind.”810 This ably demonstrates the dissonance between Obama’s previous opposition to Bush in his 
prosecution of the war on terror, and his own approach to the issue. It could also be termed 
hypocrisy. 
In key respects, both critics of Obama and admirers of Bush were surprised to find that the case 
could be ably made by the likes of General Michael Hayden (Bush’s final CIA Directory, whose 
appointment Obama had opposed) that “there’s been a powerful continuity between the 43rd and 
the 44th president.” Former vice-president Dick Cheney, meanwhile, suggested the experience of 
assuming office and taking consequential decisions had changed Obama’s perspective.811 In 
comparing Obama’s pre-presidency responses to a candidate survey on presidential power, as well 
as his record upon assuming office, Charlie Savage observed “the problems of the world and 
presidential war powers would look more complicated from the Oval Office than they had from the 
campaign trail.”812   
This matter of perspective proved a crucial factor in determining the responses to Obama’s 
deployment of the drone programme and his broader approach to counterterrorism. Yale legal 
scholar Harold Koh argued at the end of Bush’s presidency that “to regain our global standing, the 
next president and Congress must unambiguously reassert our historic commitments to human 
rights and the rule of law as a major source of our moral authority.”813 Savage assessed, however, at 
the conclusion of Obama’s presidency, that “the marks were ambiguous and inextricably entangled 
in whether the observer thought particular counterterrorism policies were necessary or bad 
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ideas.”814 Savage makes the Obama administration’s perspective on this matter apparent, writing 
that it “clearly accepted that the United States was at war with al-Qaeda and its allies.”  The Obama 
team did not think this war had ended upon his replacement of Bush at its helm.  As such “in the 
team’s legal-policy view, the powers available only to a nation that was literally at war remained in 
the government’s toolbox – and Obama would use them with vigor.” 815 We are returned once more 
to Obama’s conception of the ‘necessary’ war. His pragmatist sensibilities here found the approach 
to this issue as one grounded not in abstractions, but in reality. 
At the core of the discussion of drone policy lays a pivotal distinction. Savage notes that there are 
indeed “important policy considerations in weighing the rise of drones,” but vitally, “they are not 
legal factors.” 
In public debate, people sometimes conflate the legality of targeted killings with 
the use of drones. This is a fallacy. There are some weapons systems, like 
chemical and biological weapons, that are inherently indiscriminate – a cloud of 
poisonous gas or a virus is not controllable enough to be targeted – and are 
banned. But drones are not one of those systems, and so the use of a drone is 
legally irrelevant: killing someone with a missile from a drone is the same as 
killing him with a missile fired from a traditional manned aircraft, or with a bullet, 
or with a rock to his head; sometimes that would be legal, and sometimes not. 
From the legal angle, the killing is what matters, not how the killing is done.816 
Jeremy Scahill, noting the “intense focus on the technology of remote killing” which he argues often 
“serves as a surrogate for what should be a broader examination of the state’s power over life and 
death,” put this distinction more bluntly: “Drones are a tool, not a policy. The policy is 
assassination.”817 
International Relations scholar Stephanie Carvin, in her article ‘Getting drones wrong,’ warns against 
focusing on the technology and debates around it as anything particularly new or unique, doing so 
can obscure a preferable focus on “the strategic rather than the tactical level.” Meaning “scholars 
could and should be focusing on the second- and third-order effects of drone/targeted killing 
campaigns, rather than getting caught up in the nitty-gritty details.”818 Importantly, she argues “by 




 Ibid. p. 61 
816
 Ibid. p. 273 
817
 J. Scahill, "The Drone Legacy," in The Assassination Complex: Inside the Government's Secret Drone Warfare 
Program, ed. J. Scahill and the Staff of The Intercept (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2016). p. 2 
818
 S. Carvin, "Getting Drones Wrong," The International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 2 (2015). p. 137 
183 
 
avoiding a magpie-like distraction from the ‘shiny-object’ that in the drone, scholars can focus on the 
larger issues at stake, such as proportionality…and necessity.”819 
These terms are significant. Carvin defines (military) necessity as the principle which acknowledges 
the necessity of measures which are “indispensable for securing the end of the war” yet which are 
also “lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” It is a recognition that states “have to 
actually wage war in an effective manner so as to be able to achieve their aims.”820 Proportionality 
refers to the principles of Just War, namely jus ad bellum (“proportionality of a military action in 
response to a grievance”) and jus in bello (“proportionality in the conduct of hostilities”).821 Carvin 
also discusses a third key term, that of distinction, which she defines as “the notion that a weapon 
should, as a matter of law, be capable of adequate control both as to the place of its impact and the 
nature and extent of its effects.” It is a concept that “balances humanitarian concern for civilians and 
civilian objects and military interest in directing their destructive effects as accurately and reliably as 
possible.”822 Altogether, she argues, “these principles acknowledge that militaries have a job to do 
and must be allowed to accomplish their goals within the boundaries of law. They also clearly 
acknowledge and presuppose that some suffering is inevitable in warfare and a normal consequence 
of the use of weapons.”823 
These legal distinctions proved vital for the Obama administration. On 25 March 2010, Harold Koh, 
by then appointed as the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, gave a speech to the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in which he delivered a paper titled “The 
Obama Administration and International Law.”824 Addressing the use of drones Koh put forth the 
argument that “it is the considered view of this Administration…that U.S. targeting practices, 
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all 
applicable law, including the laws of war.” He emphasized this point by reiterating that “as a matter 
of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban 
and associated forces” in response to the 9/11 attacks “and may use force consistent with its 
inherent right to self-defense under international law.”825 He argued that al Qaeda was still intent on 
attacking the United States, thus “the United States has the authority under international law, and 
the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by 
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targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.” In conducting this 
fight, he assured that the administration had “carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting 
operations” to ensure that the operations carried out, were “conducted consistently with law of war 
principles” among which he emphasized distinction and proportionality.826 
It was a very legalistic discussion of matters of war. But legalism mattered in the Obama 
administration. Savage argues this was a key and defining feature of Obama’s entire presidency, 
especially in its approach to matters of prosecuting the “war on terror.” He suggests “lawyerliness 
shaped Obama’s governance as a matter of style and thought, not just process.” Indeed, “Obama 
was a lawyer and a law teacher, not a CEO,” who staffed his administration with many other holders 
of law degrees. For Savage this is important to note, with lawyers being trained to think in “very 
particular ways.”  In analysing a problem “they try to identify all the issues and grapple with the 
strongest arguments against their own position. They demand good writing. They attempt to keep 
options open as an end in itself. They prize rigorous adherence to process. They consider it a judicial 
virtue to move incrementally and stay within the narrow facts at hand.”827  
In an interview with the author, Edward Fishman – a former member of John Kerry’s Policy Planning 
Staff – similarly identified “almost a lawyerly process” in the Obama administration’s approach to 
policy. Addressing “one of the biggest misconceptions about Obama era foreign policy” - that the 
White House centralized power to the exclusion of other agencies of government – Fishman 
suggests instead: 
Obama’s revolution in foreign policy from the Bush era wasn’t just in terms of 
substance, it was really primarily process… He demanded a very rigorous process 
to occur before any decision was made. And so what that meant, I think relative 
to other administrations, there were far more National Security Council meetings 
than ever before.828 
This was felt by some to be an excessive mode of “micromanaging,” but Fishman argues that “just 
because there was a process that was very clearly defined and followed – almost a lawyerly 
process… it doesn’t mean that decisions are centralized.” Adherence to process was a means of 
ensuring an effective interagency process; making coherent perspectives from multiple parts of the 
foreign policy apparatus. What appeared to be the White House reaching for total control over 
policy was instead its implementation of a process that, if adhered to, actually empowered other 
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agencies to shape their policy area. What mattered was basing decisions upon a rigorous 
examination of the matter at hand. Indeed, Fishman recalls “oftentimes, meetings at the White 
House would feel more like legal reviews than policy meetings.”829 
He notes that Obama “as a lawyer and legal thinker is an important theme” in examining an 
intellectual history of his presidency and, in many important respects, this “lawyerliness” identified 
by Savage and Fishman accords with the pragmatism this thesis has emphasized in Obama’s 
thinking.830 It entails working in a manner that prioritizes the deliberate establishment of facts, 
keeping options open as a virtue, holding closed modes of enquiry as problematic, and warns against 
dogmatic attachment to ideological precepts. This lawyerly approach very much played a crucial part 
establishing a process that embedded these modes of thought into foreign policy both in and out of 
the direct control of the White House. We clearly see in this William James’ notion of pragmatism as 
‘method.’831 In drawing the connection between the two, we can make the case that the process-
centred focus of Obama’s ‘laywerliness’ was as clear a sign as any of how pragmatism became a part 




For most of the first term the administration remained tight-lipped on matters of the drone 
programme. Obama himself never addressed it. This lasted until January of 2012, where Obama 
broke this silence in the unlikely forum of a Google+ “Hangout.”832 It was a question and answer 
session in which one question came from a young participant who - referring to the civilian toll from 
drone strikes - asked Obama to explain whether the programme was beneficial to the United States 
and if the strikes were worth these civilian costs.833 Obama’s own rules on secrecy dictated that he 
was supposed to give, as journalist David Sanger termed it, “a bland recitation of American combat 
rules, without ever acknowledging that the CIA uses drones to mount attacks” but instead, he 
launched a broad defence of the programme. “I want to make sure that people understand, actually, 
drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties… For the most part they have been very 
precise precision strikes against al-Qaeda and their affiliates. And we are very careful in terms of 
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how it’s been applied.”834 He rejected the perception that the U.S. was “just sending in a whole 
bunch of strikes willy-nilly” and asserted instead that “this is a targeted, focused effort at people 
who are on a list of active terrorists, who are trying to go in and harm Americans, hit American 
facilities, American bases and so on.” He added, “it is important for everybody to understand that 
this thing is kept on a very tight leash. It’s not just a bunch of folks in a room somewhere just making 
decisions. And it is also part and parcel of our overall authority when it comes to battling al-Qaeda. It 
is not something that’s being used beyond that.”835  
This relative informality in discussing the matter would be superseded on 23 May 2013, when 
Obama gave a speech at Fort McNair, the home of the National Defense University in Washington 
D.C.836 In typical Obamian style, he opened the address by establishing the historical context which 
would animate his speech, culminating in 9/11 and the nation’s abrupt turn to war. He proceeded 
into a defence of the administration’s policies for reshaping that war. In its initial response to 9/11 
the U.S. had driven al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, but its shift of focus to war in Iraq “carried 
significant consequences for our fight against al Qaeda, our standing in the world, and -- to this 
day -- our interests in a vital region.”837 As a response, after assuming office, Obama’s 
administration “stepped up the war against al Qaeda” but also “sought to change its course.”  This 
involved “relentlessly” targeting al Qaeda’s leadership, ending the Iraq war, a new strategy in 
Afghanistan, and “unequivocally” banning torture.838 He outlined what challenges still faced the 
U.S. in its efforts to defeat terrorist threats, conceding that “neither I, nor any President, can 
promise the total defeat of terror.  We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some 
human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society.” Nevertheless, he maintained 
“what we can do -- what we must do -- is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and 
make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and 
ideals that we defend.” He noted that the ideology which drives the majority of such terror ism 
persists, and as such “in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our 
response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone.” He then echoed a 
phrase he had used in Canberra two years prior, “we need all elements of national power to win a 
battle of wills, a battle of ideas."839 
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In this context, at Fort McNair, he openly admitted for the first time in a formal setting that in 
those areas which ground troops cannot easily access, and the national government is ineffectual, 
“the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, 
including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.”840 Accepting that this 
new technology raised “profound questions,” about “who is targeted, and why; about civilian 
casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and 
international law; about accountability and morality,” he began to address these questions. In the 
first instance, he argued for the efficacy of the drone strikes as a strategy, citing intelligence 
gathered from the operation to kill Osama bin Laden, which showed dismay among al Qaeda at 
losses sustained and disruption such strikes caused to its plots. “Simply put,” Obama argued, 
“these strikes have saved lives.” He proceeded to justify the strikes by emphasizing their legality, 
with the United States being at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, “and their associated forces.” As 
such, he maintained, “we are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many 
Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war -- a war waged 
proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.”841 He was re-affirming the logic Harold Koh had 
previously outlined, but was also returning to the Just War concepts he had utilized in his Nobel 
Prize speech.842 
At this point, his speech at Fort McNair assumed a noteworthy intellectual and moral slant. Just as 
upon accepting the Nobel Prize in Oslo, where he contended with the moral weight of using 
American force, Obama conceded that “America’s legitimate claim of self-defence cannot be the 
end of the discussion.  To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or 
moral in every instance.”843 He was wrestling with the moral criticisms that had plagued the 
administration for as long as it had escalated the practice of targeted killing. Acknowledging the 
risk of abusing such power, Obama noted how the administration had worked to establish a 
governing framework for its use of force against terrorists, “insisting upon clear guidelines, 
oversight and accountability” which he had codified in a Presidential Policy Guidance signed the 
day before.844 These were again those same processes which centred a pragmatist method as a 
means of achieving outcomes grounded strictly in necessity and not on ideological abstraction; the 
abstraction that could unleash the weapon on a myriad of targets. 
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A pressing concern of critics, nevertheless, was how these policies were being extended outside of 
the confines of the Afghan theatre. Obama emphasized that “America cannot take strikes 
wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state 
sovereignty.” Where it does strike beyond the confines of the Afghanistan War, he noted the U.S. 
only targeted al Qaeda and its “associated forces,” and only did so if it was unable to “capture 
individual terrorists” the preference being “always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute.”845 
Here he addressed one of the key points of contention over the drone strike programme, first 
establishing the criterion for how a target is selected and confirmed as suitable: 
America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who 
pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there 
are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat.  And 
before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be 
killed or injured -- the highest standard we can set.846 
Much has been written about this process, and what has variously been called Obama’s “kill list” 
or later in more official-ese, the “Disposition Matrix.”847 Obama was reported to have insisted on 
approving of each new name added to the “kill list,” examining the biographies of terrorist 
suspects as exhibited on so-called “baseball cards.” Such meetings would occur regularly, 
becoming colloquially known as “Terror Tuesdays.”848 With counterterrorism chief, and later CIA 
director, John Brennan at his side, Obama would carry a hands-on role in bringing a driving theory 
of Just War to the targeting practices of the CIA and the Pentagon in its use of drones . Obama had 
to approve any name, and sign off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia, in addition to the “more 
complex and risky strikes in Pakistan.”849  
Despite Brennan’s grizzly reputation and history as a senior figure in the CIA during the era of the 
Bush administration’s most brutal interrogation practices, Harold Koh argued that “if John Brennan 
is the last guy in the room with the president, I’m comfortable, because Brennan is a person of 
genuine moral rectitude… It’s as though you had a priest with extremely strong moral values who 















was suddenly charged with leading a war.”850 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, whose reporting was crucial 
in bringing information on the drone programme to light in 2012, wrote that “aides say Mr. Obama 
has several reasons for becoming so immersed in lethal counterterrorism operations. A student of 
writings on war by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, he believes that he should take moral 
responsibility for such actions.”851 Brennan, educated by Jesuits, shared this affinity for Just War.852 
Meanwhile Becker and Shane wrote how Obama also knew that “bad strikes can tarnish America’s 
image and derail diplomacy.”853 Here we must be cautious in considering such accounts. Brennan’s 
“moral rectitude” and Obama’s assumption of “moral responsibility” do nothing to guarantee a 
process that is free from error. Nor do they assuage fears about what it means to have such an 
opaque process reliant on the judgment of so few. Those fears are exacerbated by those very claims 
of morality attached to Brennan and Obama. The realities of American democracy meant that their 
Just War theories would not always remain the determinant factors in the room. Successors in such 
roles might not have done the requisite reading of the previous millennia’s pre-eminent Christian 
ethicists.   
In his speech at the National Defense University, Obama noted that “much of the criticism about 
drone strikes…understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties.”  Whilst providing some 
meagre pushback against critics, anaemically arguing “there’s a wide gap between U.S. 
assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports,” he nevertheless conceded “it is a 
hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war.”854 He 
admitted that “for the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their 
loss.  For me, and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live, 
just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout conventional 
fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.”855 
But here he turned to more arguments familiar from his Nobel address. He reflected on the 
dilemmas posed by the prospect of civilian casualties: “as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh 
these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist 
networks would invite far more civilian casualties” not only in American cities, but also in cities 
such as Sana’a, Kabul, and Mogadishu, where terrorist networks sought to gain footholds.856 In 
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Oslo he invoked the examples of Martin Luther King Jr and Gandhi and the pacifism they 
advocated as being testimony to the “moral force of non-violence.”857 But he also emphasized that 
“as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples 
alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American 
people.” Indeed, in Oslo, Obama also argued “there will be times when nations – acting 
individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.”858 
He maintained that “the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace. And 
yet this truth must coexist with another – that no matter how justified, war promises human 
tragedy.”859 In stating “where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding 
ourselves to certain rules of conduct,” Savage suggests that this was once more the lawyerly 
instincts of Obama shaping his response in reconciling those clashing truths.860 This was also 
reflected in Obama’s rhetorical approach, “bringing up the best arguments against his own position 
and not rebutting them so much as acknowledging their strengths and looking for procedural rules 
to resolve the tensions.” Savage emphasizes again how “lawyers prize rigorous adherence to 
process” and as such “confronted with ambiguous situations where the right outcome may not be 
clear” they “tend to look at whether the right procedures were followed and take satisfaction if they 
were.”861 The impetus for a legalistic framework became especially important for Obama in early 
2012, when he was facing the prospect that he might lose his bid for re-election. As such, “he 
decided to institutionalize the targeted-killing procedures that had evolved over his three years in 
office so he could hand it off to any successor. He also wanted to tighten up the standards for 
targeting.”862 Ben Rhodes told Savage “he would like to leave his successor with a sustainable 
approach, not open questions… On drones and the direct action side, that means nesting it in clearly 
established guidelines.”863 
Brian Abrams’ oral history of the Obama administration holds interesting reflections on the drone 
programme. One such reflection comes from Nick Shapiro, who rose to be Deputy Chief of Staff of 
the CIA. He suggested that: 
The counterterrorism structure that President Obama built with the help of John 
Brennan was, I thought, one of the crowning achievements. I’d say a couple 
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things to support that. Yes, ISIL had grown, but al-Qaeda was the one who could 
conduct those large-scale attacks – the 9/11s. They were very skilled. They had 
the ability to move people and cause significant damage. The counterterrorism 
operations that this president did – instead of invading countries like Afghanistan 
or Iraq – were dealt with surgically, using drones. We dealt with it in a way that 
had the least civilian casualties and inflicted the most damage against the enemy, 
which was al-Qaeda in the AfPak region or in Yemen. Those were really the two 
areas we focused on the most.864 
Shapiro reflected on “a higher [legal] standard” that was met in order to carry out the extremely 
controversial strike on Anwar al-Awlaki – an American citizen killed by a drone strike in Yemen - and 
this fit the pattern of how the administration approached targeting.865 “When you looked at the 
structure that the White House put in place” he argued, it was going after the most significant senior 
leaders, the folks who could afflict the most harm against Americans and who were plotting to kill 
Americans, but it was brought under the rule of law.”866 
Koh once more noted to Abrams the importance of curating a legal standard: “when you’re fighting 
a terrorist network, you’re invoking the laws of war. That meant that you’re lawfully entitled to 
make decisions as long as you’re hitting legitimate targets and doing it in accordance with the rules.” 
Koh forcefully emphasized that “Generals need lawyers to help them make distinctions – whether 
something was a lawful act of war or murder. And so, as a lawyer, that’s my job: to make sure that 
my client didn’t break the law and commit murder.”867 
Barbara Lee, a member of Congress from California, perhaps most notable for being the lone 
member to vote against the 2001 AUMF (warning that it “was a blank check to the president to 
attack anyone involved in the Sept. 11 events” and as such “a rush to launch precipitous military 
counterattacks runs too great a risk that more innocent men, women, children will be killed.”)868 
nevertheless offered a modicum of praise for the Obama administration’s approach to drones, 
suggesting it “was very deliberative in how they approached this. They were always concerned about 
unintended consequences, collateral damages.”869 Such a critic finding merit in the operation of the 
programme offers at least the patina of a process that was not merely engaged in the indiscriminate 
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murder of civilians. It is a low bar, perhaps, but nevertheless important. Obama held a faith that the 
implementation of that deliberative process – a signature of philosophical pragmatism – would reign 




Writing in his 2012 book Confront and Conceal David Sanger noted that Obama was not the first 
president to use drones, nor to employ cyberweapons, each being relatively new technologies that 
allowed the president to fight ‘secret wars.’870 Sanger argued instead that Obama: 
 Will go down in history as the man who dramatically expanded the use of those 
new weapons. Quietly, he is attempting to fit them into a new concept of how the 
United States can ensure its military predominance around the globe without 
resorting to the lengthy, expensive, and unpopular wars and occupations that 
dominated the past decade. They are the perfect tools for an age of austerity – 
far cheaper than landing troops in remote deserts and mountains, and often more 
precise. Obama’s aides, when persuaded to talk about the subject, are the first to 
volunteer that these new tools are exactly that – tools, useful in some situations, 
useless in others.871 
While discussing these weapons as ‘tools’ and indeed tactical means of conducting warfare, 
Sanger hits upon a crucial idea which lay at the centre of justifications for the strategic use of such 
tools.872 At Fort McNair, Obama reminded the audience that “the terrorists we are after target 
civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of 
civilian casualties from drone strikes.” As such “doing nothing is not an option.”873 For him, the 
imperative was clear. But that would necessitate a strategic means of confronting the situation.  
Grégoire Chamayou contends that “what is important is not so much to grasp how the actual device 
works but rather to discover the implications of how it works for the action that it implements.” He 
suggests that the means adopted – the deployment of drones – “not only make it possible to take 
action but also determine the form of that action.” With this, “rather than wonder whether the ends 
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justify the means, one must ask what the choice of those means, in itself, tends to impose.”874 This is 
a significant point for consideration. We are prompted to ask, what did the choice of utilizing drones 
say about Obama’s approach to American power?  This is thus where placing drone strikes and the 
Pivot to Asia upon the same spectrum of elements of American power forms part of the same 
picture. Many of the assumptions which underlay Obama’s Pivot to Asia would interact indelibly 
with the strategic logic of the continuing war against al Qaeda. It also interacted with Obama’s 
own determination to conduct that war in a manner which moved beyond more conventional 
attempts of boots-on-the-ground warfare. It was an approach that was pre-limited, or determined, 
in the sense suggested by Chamayou, by the pursuit of “precision” and most importantly of avoiding 
entrapment in ground-wars. The means were “light-footprint” and the consequences which followed 
would allow the U.S. to maintain its attentions on perceived core interests. 
Obama argued that “where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in 
their territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of conventional 
military options.” But he had already rejected such options as “even small special operations carry 
enormous risks” where “conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and 
are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage.”875  
Obama argued that: 
It is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in 
civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world.  The results 
would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with 
local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that 
could easily escalate into new wars.876 
The drone programme was framed by Obama as being a means of preventing the inexorable slide 
of America’s military into the quicksand of mission creep.  Obama’s first CIA director Leon Panetta 
placed the use of drones in the context of more force intensive options. “When you consider the 
alternatives” he argued, “if we had to go to full-scale war against al-Qaeda, I’d think history would 
say” that the drone programme “was an effective way to decimate our enemy in a way that resulted, 
really, in much less collateral damage than otherwise would have been the case.”877 Obama himself 
turned to that history to emphasize the utility of the drone programme. “Our efforts must be 
measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile 
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populations” he maintained. “In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where 
the boundaries of battle were blurred.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage 
and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed.”878  
“Yes,” Obama conceded, “the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy.  But by 
narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide 
among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent li fe.” He 
made the case that morality was not necessarily a panacea in confronting this dilemma, arguing 
that “neither conventional military action nor waiting for attacks to occur offers moral safe 
harbor, and neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning 
police or security services -- and indeed, have no functioning law.”879 
The case he made is interesting, and exemplified a rhetorical tactic he was criticized for using time 
and again, that is, the utilization of straw-man arguments to bolster his perspective.880 In this 
respect, it can be readily argued that the alternative to a drone war is not necessarily a ground 
war on the scale of Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Such straw men represented specious reasoning 
on the part of Obama. More than anything else they obscured questions about the very 
assumption that any form of military action was the solution. The opposite of ground forces was 
not drones, it was a complete re-evaluation of America’s entire counterterrorism framework. 
Nevertheless, Obama’s argument was noteworthy in its acknowledgement of the risks any ground 
war carries to escalate uncontrollably to the scale of America’s catastrophe in Vietnam. In part, we 
can trace this fear of Obama’s from his own scepticism of Washington’s Defense establishment 
and how it errs not on the side of caution, but instead historically has favoured options which will 
steadily increase involvement in distant lands. As a tonic to this poison-pill, we see why Obama 
might be tempted by an option that renders even a nascent ground presence obsolete. Crucially, 
whatever the recourse of action, Obama believed firmly in the absolute, inviolable necessity of 
some form of action, in what he firmly believed to be a necessary fight. Pragmatism’s rigorous 
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As noted above, the connection between Obama’s Pivot to Asia and his drone policy – such that they 
can form part of a coherent thematic chapter – might seem strained. Yet, in the means by which 
they each demonstrate Obama grappling with concepts of American power and its strategic 
deployment, they intermingle. 
The simple rendering of this relationship is that Obama and his team diagnosed a misappropriation 
of American resources in their outsized direction towards militarism in the Middle East, and an 
overall squandering of America’s standing in the world. In an interview with the author, Charles Edel, 
who worked on the Asia-Pacific portfolio on the Policy Planning Staff in John Kerry’s State 
Department suggests that amongst the broad contours of Obama’s foreign policy approach to the 
world lay “a need to recalibrate what was sustainable from an American point of view, in terms of 
American foreign policy.” More pointedly, the administration directed its attention to a “need to 
recalibrate and re-orient to the Asia-Pacific region as, in many ways, a possible driver of geo-
economics [and] geo-political affairs in the twenty-first century.”881 
But Edel also expressed an important notion that “there is a limited bandwidth any presidency has 
to deal with” given the national security issues and international economic issues that always falls 
onto the president’s plate.882 Crucially, this means that “when an American president, particularly, 
has U.S. forces not only stationed abroad, but in harm’s way and engaged in war-fighting, that is 
inevitably going to take up more of their time” and entangle more of the interagency process “than 
it would if they were just stationed abroad.”883 The recalibration of American foreign policy was vital, 
as much as anything, to free up some of that limited bandwidth. Drones fulfilled their part in this 
equation and its overall sense of strategic balance by providing a method by which the United States 
could expend the smallest amount of resources – and indeed “bandwidth” - in the wider Middle East 
while still achieving its continued military necessities in fighting al Qaeda. This balance would ensure 
that the administration’s drive towards a re-orientation to the Asia-Pacific could be preserved. 
This is not an entirely radical assessment, yet it serves as a potential answer to some of the more 
persistent criticisms of Obama: that he lacked a grand strategy and was ceding ground in America’s 
perpetual quest for exceptional greatness. The introduction of this thesis acknowledged critiques of 
Obama’s foreign policy that held him responsible for overseeing and underwriting a process of 
American retreat. Bret Stephens, Robert Singh, and Colin Dueck all found Obama guilty of being 
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naïve, feckless, and reckless in his approach to American power.884 Criticisms from the likes of Vali 
Nasr also held Obama as lacking strategic direction.885 These failings combined, in this perspective, 
to allow America’s crown to slip and for cracks to appear in its leadership of the liberal world order. 
The crises that arose under Obama’s watch, as such, resulted from an abdication of responsibility on 
the global stage, and an unwillingness to use American power to re-assert adherence to the rules of 
its road.886 
Yet, the Pivot to Asia (and the utilization of drones as a ballast to achieve it) stands as a strong 
indication that Obama did carry a sense of largescale strategic thinking, premised on addressing 
issues and crises which he and his administration deemed of vital interest to the country. 
Pragmatism in this sense did not preclude the grand and the long term. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 
China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, ISIS’s violent surge across Iraq and Syria, and the 
subsequent establishment of its caliphate, were all important issues and asked probing questions of 
American foreign policy making. But Obama’s foreign policy outlook had established its own 
hierarchy of what were the most pressing concerns for America’s future. And it differed from that of 
his critics. The Pivot to Asia was reliant upon an ideational foundation that held U.S. power and 
global leadership as paramount, and the reinforcement thereof as a normative pursuit. Contrary to 
those critiques which held Obama in contempt for abdicating America’s position as the world’s 
superpower, he was still very much engaged in the pursuit of this primacy. The Pivot to Asia and the 
use of drones were necessarily a largescale change in how America ordered its priorities in the 




If the fit between the Pivot and drones seemed incongruous, perhaps more challenging to fit in to 
this mix is the importance of Obama’s identity which opened the chapter. But alongside Obama’s 
conceptualization of American power and the direction in which it might be channelled, we should 
also consider the cultural artefacts that helped to shape those directional instincts. One’s experience 
of the world matters a great deal when you are making choices in how to interact with it. 
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In a work of intellectual history, it behoves us to once more take seriously David Milne’s suggestion 
that Obama lacks the “habitual eastward orientation of his predecessors.”887 The threads of Obama’s 
identity might each be loose when pulled individually, but when pulled together they form a strong 
bond between Obama and a world beyond the confines of a merely ‘national’ life. Specifically, in 
terms of this chapter, and threading the needle of the Pivot and drones, it is in the vortex of 
cosmopolitanism and a re-orientation to the Asia-Pacific – away from the European trappings of old, 
and the failed Middle East campaigns of yesterday – that Obama located the intellectual credibility 
to pursue a core platform of re-orienting American power towards the very notion of America the 
Pacific power. 
In many respects, the “first Pacific President” stood as a representation of America’s own Pacific 
ascendency. He reflected the nation’s tensions and paradoxes in its approach to the region. Obama’s 
America in the Asia-Pacific stood simultaneously as both the new: the Pivot towards the region, the 
fresh sense of energy for approaching and being in the region it had neglected for too long. Yet it 
also stood as the old: the America that had always been a power in the region, or at least as long as 
it had stretched what Bruce Cumings called its ‘Archipelago of Empire’ into the region.888 The 
America that had always been a Pacific nation as it brutalized and colonized those same paradise 
islands of Obama’s birth. A Pacific nation as it extended its empire through Alaska, the Philippines, 
Guam, the Northern Marianas Islands, Wake Island, and American Samoa. A Pacific nation with a 
military that still resides in vast numbers in South Korea and Japan. That is the picture of a 
relationship based on force and economic exploitation. As often is the story of American foreign 
policy writ large. As such, we see how these two policy initiatives that shape this chapter - the Pivot 
to Asia and the drone programme - worked in tandem but they also worked in tension.  
In key respects, drone warfare is an inevitable consequence of America’s vast military reach. The 
‘archipelago of empire’ allows what is on its face a ‘light footprint’ approach as the U.S. can deploy 
its technology quickly and readily without the long draw-up of troops. But the footprint is not so 
light for those trampled underfoot.  The omnipresence of that military reach fuels fears abroad of 
America’s ability to perpetuate bombings that cause the suffering of innocents. The omnipresence of 
American power looms large, always on the horizon, able to exact violence on those unlucky enough 
to be in its path.889 
This omnipresence also fuels domestic fears of descent into fighting a ‘forever war.’ In 2009 Cumings 
wrote that the U.S. ran “a territorial empire – the archipelago of somewhere between 737 and 860 
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overseas military installations around the world, with American military personnel operating in 153 
countries.”890 In 2015, sociologist David Vine put the figure at “nearly 800 bases in more than 70 
countries and territories abroad.”891 In his book Dirty Wars, Jeremy Scahill makes the case that there 
existed a continual pull of a mindset that held “the world is a battlefield,” from Republican to 
Democratic administrations.892 On this front, for the drone campaign specifically, the U.S. operates a 
string of outposts and installations in countries such as Djibouti, Seychelles, and Niger to name just 
three of the ten in Africa alone.893 Daniel Immerwahr, in his insightful book How to Hide an Empire 
notes the persistence and centrality of empire in the American experience. He terms its most recent 
form, a ‘pointillist empire’ where “small dots on the map,” representing its military bases around the 
world, are the “foundation” of that empire today.894 And furthermore, drones, Immerwahr suggests, 
“carried pointillist warfare to its logical endpoint.”895 
The Pivot to Asia carried goals of aiding American prosperity – but there was also a significant 
element factored around the rise of China as a competitor. Indeed Charles Edel notes that within the 
administration “there was a high amount of attention paid to China as a rising power.”896  The vast 
military presence in Japan, South Korea, and under Obama, the installation of a base in Darwin in 
Northern Australia as well, serve to emphasize the implicit role an enduring American military 
presence is expected to play in checking any perceived challenges to its Pacific hegemony.  Even 
America’s benign search for prosperity in the region is also guarded by the Navy’s defence of 
shipping lanes. Whichever way it is considered, America’s “Pacific Century” and America as a Pacific 
power, is inextricably linked to its military power in the region.  
Cumings suggests that the “military instillations around the world persist and perdure; they have an 
eternal writ all of their own” their permanence “predictable” and “ineradicable.”897 Crucially, he 
quoted a 1970 Senate Foreign Relations Committee statement as saying “once an American overseas 
base is established it takes on a life of its own.”898 Cumings’ own take on that was to remark with 
respect to this “archipelago of empire” that, somewhat fatalistically, “it exists, therefore it 
persists.”899 
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It bears returning to Cumings’ discussion of American military might in the Hawaiian islands. There is 
a powerful irony in siting aspects of Obama’s ideational background with its development in such a 
hub of American power. But we must consider the notion that, in part, the development of Obama’s 
ideational perspective in such a place helped shape an overarching conception of how that power 
should be calibrated. It was a focus away from the strife of the Middle East and the trappings of 
ground wars, and towards economic opportunity in a part of the world he felt an affinity to, and by 
extension felt the United States held its own affinity to. 
The tragic pragmatism this thesis has previously examined once more played a role in informing a 
nuanced and complex approach to questions of using American force in balance with its less 
militaristic concerns. It informed a circumspect approach to exacting acts of violence whilst not 
outright precluding their necessity. But critics such as Jeremy Scahill push back on the notion that 
Obama’s approach resembled a “smarter” form of war.900 Indeed, we must be wary of arguments 
that found any necessity in knowingly committing violence against civilians, and indeed in 
perpetuating a vast empire of military installations which provide the temptation of constantly 
escalating any manner of violent contretemps in any corner of the world. 
The drone programme was steadily shaped, designed, and systematized in such a manner that was 
aimed at streamlining America’s military output to the most efficient scheme possible to achieve 
victory in its war against al Qaeda, but also to prevent that effort from detracting from and 
overtaking the priorities of engagement that Obama advanced.  A vital aspect of Obama’s approach 
to the use of “every element of American power” was the balance it struck once more between the 
necessary and the chosen. It was the balance between the power of engagement and the power of 
violence, and seeking to treat the appropriate direction of each of these as the profound task of 
every President.   
At the National Defense University, Obama argued that “Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but 
in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a 
credible threat to the United States.” He re-formulated this profound task, conceding that “unless 
we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t 
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need to fight, or continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed 
conflicts between nation states.”901  
Chamayou suggests that this might be a struggle that has already been lost. “The partisans of the 
drone as a privileged weapon of ‘antiterrorism’ promise a war without losses or defeats,” but “what 
they fail to mention is that it will also be a war without victory.” As such, he warns, “the scenario 
that looms before us is one of infinite violence, with no possible exit; the paradox of an untouchable 
power waging interminable wars toward perpetual war.”902 This is an important point. It reflects the 
prospect of a “forever war” that is maligned and feared by so many, especially on the left of U.S. 
politics. But further to this, if we return to Obama’s concession that neither he, nor any president 
“can promise the total defeat of terror” nor to “erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some 
human beings,” nor to prevent “every danger to our open society,” Obama, perhaps unwittingly, 
provokes a question of what the ultimate aim could possibly be of drone warfare? What is the U.S. 
achieving through it?  
Chamayou persuasively argues that “the dronization of the armed forces” lowers the threshold of 
recourse to violence, and as such allows it more readily to become the “default option” for foreign 
policy.”903 The availability of drone technology indelibly raises the prospects of its utilization. The 
“low cost” of its use has a profound impact on the wielder of such technology’s decision-making, and 
thus prompts a pattern of behaviour which, whilst being less risky for themselves, is riskier for 
others. It is, Chamayou suggests, a “moral hazard - a situation in which being able to act without 
bearing the costs of the consequences relieves agents of responsibility for their decisions.”904 This is 
a poignant reminder that such technology would also be conferred upon Obama’s successors, as 
they assume the seat of the figures inured to the risk of such military actions. To what ends might 
such violence be turned in the future? What wars will they service?905 
It is worth considering, nevertheless, how in his book Drone Theory Chamayou never quite addresses 
the purpose, or ends, to which drones were directed. As such, he elides that there was a reason such 
“manhunts” were taking place. We must consider that this is where we can separate his 
philosophical investigation into the drone as a tool, as a process, as a means – from actors such as 
Obama who are confronted (to a greater or lesser degree) with real threats, or real imperatives to 
take actions aimed at defeating a specific enemy. The notion that there are very real threats to 
America’s security out there held a firm grasp over Obama’s decision making, and indeed on the 
                                                          
901
 The Obama White House, "National Defense University Speech." 
902
 Chamayou, Drone Theory. pp. 71-72 
903
 Ibid. p. 188 
904
 Ibid. p. 189 
905
 Scahill, Dirty Wars. p. 517 
201 
 
wider consciousness of his administration. In recognizing this, we are presented with a sense of 
means being subsumed by ends.  
It is necessary to emphasize that not only did the logic of the Pivot and the importance of the Asia-
Pacific become canonized in the thought of Obama and his team, it was accompanied by an 
acceptance and continued adherence to the logic of the war on terror and its precepts that 
necessitated it. How to do so alongside other priorities was to be the pressing consideration of the 
Obama administration. This was an important part of the logic which drove the administration’s 
advocacy of strong counterterrorist measures, where Obama saw the dangers posed by the 
attempted Detroit bombing, and leaned frequently into the notion of Commander-in-Chief, the 
protector of the nation. Pre-emption became the only means under this conceptualization – the idea 
of responding to an “actual attack” was unthinkable. Keeping it that way animated the approach. 
The fears of being labelled soft on terrorism, nevertheless reflected a reality that any Obama agenda 
would be threatened by the success of such an attack.906 The reported mantra of “no bombs on my 
watch” hung as a spectre. 
In key respects the Pivot reflected an all-encompassing American hegemony, one which finds a 
natural place for American interests in far-flung places the world over, and which unquestioningly 
placed American interests as congruent with those of another continent, a wider region - in the Asia-
Pacific specifically. It was a vision which, whilst being mindful of curating humility in America’s 
approach to leadership, was still premised upon the existence of that leadership. It fit into a broader 
picture of where America found its interests. The argument for turning wasted attention from failed 
wars in the Middle East to that which really mattered. The utilization of drones to accomplish this 
represented an important signal of how the pursuit of American primacy need not be compromised 
under Obama’s vision, but instead required an alternative understanding. Helpfully, Chamayou 
suggests “in the history of military empires, for many years ‘projecting power’ meant ‘sending in 
troops.’ But it is precisely that equation that now has to be dismantled.”907 
This new paradigm poses significant questions, however. Especially concerning the use of drones: 
how was the administration able to justify its process of targeted killings? What of the innocent 
civilians at the mercy of such legalistic mechanisms? How could the extension of that reach of 
American air power be justified as it stretched into lands not actually part of a recognized 
battlefield? But also, how could the U.S. justify its turn to another part of the world and its implicit 
assumption of some form of hegemonic weight to throw around? What of the imperial legacy of the 
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United States in the Asia-Pacific? All these questions tied in to the tangled web of how Obama saw 
the world and America’s place within it. But he also faced up to questions of how he saw himself in 
the world.   
Barack Hussein Obama II, who was “raised as an Indonesian child and a Hawaiian child and as a black 
child and as a white child,” who benefitted “a multiplicity of cultures that all fed [him]” was charged 
with navigating what it meant to wield American power in such a world that he felt pulled on him 
from multiple directions, but also which he felt called on America, as a “neighbour” to Indonesia, as 
a Pacific power, but also as a superpower with vast and solemn duties incumbent upon it.908 The 
“first Pacific president” with eyes on the future to be unlocked “across a vast ocean” to the west 
nevertheless had to wrestle with settling the old accounts of the world left behind, Atlanticist 
concerns, and the near perpetual pull of Middle Eastern strife. This necessitated a complicated tight-
rope walk of seeking to pivot to Asia, seeking to rebalance America’s priorities towards those that 
were of most concern, whilst all the while seeking to never fall off-balance, to never fall victim to a 
world which still threatened to exact its evil upon those not vigilant enough to keep it at bay. 
This stands as a broader representation of what Obama’s foreign policy as a whole tried to 
accomplish. It was rooted in the search for the steady calibration of what truly mattered to 
America’s ever-sprawling sense of self and its own sense of interests; a pragmatic process of 
experimentalism, searching for what works. Whether he succeeded moreover - whilst not 
necessarily being a pressing concern for this thesis - is indelibly tied to the consequences of his 
choices. The consequentialism of pragmatism stands as both method, but also as means of 
judgment. 
The degree to which Obama accomplished this strategic search for the appropriate re-calibration of 
America’s output of its power might necessitate the testament of time in its assessment. The large 
sweep of history which has been captured by the post-9/11 wars stands as a poignant reminder of 
the depth of the well from which Obama sought to extricate the nation. To the extent that U.S. 
forces remain in in Afghanistan, and returned to Iraq to confront ISIS, the effort was a failure.909 The 
Middle East remains an anchor which the U.S. cannot raise. But by the same token, those conflicts 
have not been joined by new ground force entanglements in the region. This is a success. So too is 
the cultivation of multilateral and bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific, and the means by which 
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the policy was a valuable signal of intention for serious engagement in a region that will remain 
important in shaping U.S. interests and prospects.  
What it meant morally and philosophically, however, stands as a different, and in some respects 
much larger question which carries a much smaller scope for escaping unanswered, as it carries with 
it inherent, broader questions about the assumptions which lay at the core of Obama’s thought, and 
its place in the wider story of American foreign policy. Thus, it is a question which must necessarily 
be contended with in the ensuing, concluding chapter. 
At its heart, in conceptualizing and accepting Obama’s circumspect approach to the world, to 
matters of war and violence, peace and diplomacy, the question is “what difference did it make?” 
What difference did it make to those under fire from unseen drone strikes? To those in a state that 
has collapsed from an international intervention? To those in a country ravaged by violence absent 
an international intervention? To a country that would soon be governed by a figure most unlike 
Obama? 
In considering broader questions about the legacy and morality of Obama’s foreign policy, it will be 
beneficial to view the Pivot to Asia and the drone programme as inextricably linked. They each 
reflected a fundamental reality of a war-weary nation seeking a route out from deeper 
commitments to a region that had brought little but trauma to its collective psyche. Drones offered 
an expedient means of continuing a fight against lasting enemies. But they nevertheless also 
functioned to enable a broader desire to direct American attentions elsewhere. The moral costs of 
the programme at least in the first instance, were justified by the clamour to emerge out from the 














How we have come this far 
 
On 5 August 2015 Obama spoke at the American University in Washington to advocate for the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action - the Iranian nuclear deal. He urged the public to contact their 
members of Congress and “remind them who we are.”  It was a plea to the American people to 
support an American foreign policy that prioritised diplomacy and that used its status as “the most 
powerful nation on Earth” to “try to bind nations together in a system of international law.”910 
The Iran deal was the signature achievement of Obama’s foreign policy. It was the careful calibration 
of multilateral diplomacy aimed at the achievement of a distinct goal – the removal of an Iranian 
nuclear threat – therefore avoiding an Iraq-style conflagration. The desired outcome was 
accomplished, the administration suggested, in a manner that could bring a lasting solution. It was 
an act of overcoming historical enmity with Iran to achieve a common goal with other nations as 
well, pushing aside ideological impediments, finding common solutions that could work for all and 
yield desired consequences. This was the idealized vision of Obama’s foreign policy, its banner 
success, the triumph of his worldview taken to its idealized ends. And crucially, in Obama’s recasting 
of what American foreign policy was, it was a vivid representation of what he believed America 
stood for on the world stage. Along with the Paris Climate Accords, Michael Kimmage writes that the 
Iran deal served as “proof that an international society could be used to address policy challenges on 
a par with global warming and nuclear proliferation.”911 This gave vigour to his claim that “through 
the liberal international order and by seeking to scale back military action, President Obama 
reoriented American foreign policy.”912 
A competing vision nevertheless persists of an America that still conducted itself in a more forthright 
manner, more in keeping with the post-war expectations of superpowerdom. This vision still sees 
America as an immense power whose every action (and inaction) carries with it significant 
implications. It is the United States that proclaims the importance of institutions in shaping an 
international order, whilst also being the entity most responsible for shaping those institutions. 
Obama understood this. His foreign policy, in accordance, stands as a record of trying to walk the 
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line between the two worlds of American possibility: between primacy and tempering the logic 
which holds shaping the world to be of American provenance. 
This concluding chapter will consider what remains from Obama’s foreign policy presidency. This is 
not as such a concern about legacy but, in an Obamian sense, what remains will be the clearest 
reflection of his intellectual dispositions, borne out by his search for policy outcomes and modes of 
thinking which could stand the tests of time. They are a reflection of what a foreign policy influenced 
by philosophical pragmatism could look like. What Obama’s foreign policy ultimately meant not only 
prompts some fraught moral questions but also the continual contemplation of what American 
foreign policy should stand to represent, and what America’s appropriate place is in the world. 




This thesis has primarily discussed challenges to America’s security and its use of power. America’s 
commitments, obligations, threats, and follies – historical and contemporary - confronted Obama at 
every turn, and thus necessitated consideration of his foreign policy as he encountered the world “as 
it is.”913 Obama rationalized the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through the prism of choice and 
necessity. The president drew up this architecture to delineate where ideological abstraction must 
necessarily give way to grounded reality. The catastrophe of the Iraq war left an indelible mark not 
only on Obama, but also U.S. foreign policy writ large. It problematized ideology as being a suitable 
driver of the direction of American power. Impugned by Obama as being based “not on reason but 
on passion,” the Iraq War was based on a flight of fancy which he argued ought to be roundly 
rejected in favour of basing decisions upon conceptions matched firmly to the realities on the 
ground. For Obama, this meant an evaluation of what constituted a national security threat. In his 
role as Commander-in-Chief, Obama took seriously the notion that he was responsible for 
maintaining U.S. national security. The question of what constituted a security threat provoked an 
important challenge, and the imperatives of counterterrorism carried a vast spectrum of possibilities 
that each demanded varying commitment of U.S. force. Charlie Savage’s astute observation that in 
assessing Obama’s foreign policy “the marks were ambiguous and inextricably entangled in whether 
the observer thought particular counterterrorism policies were necessary or bad ideas,” is invaluable 
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in this respect.914 It is a useful indication of an inconsistency we can find at the core of Obama’s 
foreign policy. He was animated by an aversion to abstract ideology as a driver of policy. Yet the very 
concept of ‘necessity’ was flawed in this respect. It relied itself on ideological assumptions that 
determined what constituted a ‘necessary’ use of American power. The Obama administration 
broadly continued the Bush administration’s conception of the war on terror, changing it only in 
name and some tactical senses. This did not necessarily have to be the case. It was a choice made by 
Obama and the administration.915 
Savage’s observation is particularly pertinent in evaluating the drone programme’s place in Obama’s 
foreign policy. Considerations of its effectiveness as a means of counterterrorism were matched by 
considerations of its effectiveness in enabling a rebalance of U.S. attention from the wider Middle 
East to the Asia-Pacific. But its necessity went unquestioned in the Obama White House, as did the 
necessity of redirecting diplomatic, economic, and military focus towards the Asia-Pacific region. 
Obama and his administration partook in an ideological project that shaped U.S. engagement in the 
region as being not only necessary for its future, but also a natural corollary to its past. This was to 
be achieved “with every element of American power,” a notion that encompassed the spectrum 
from its use of drones to multilateral diplomacy.  
In the invocation of power and the willingness to yield it for America’s benefit, Obama’s foreign 
policy was not completely free of notions of American hegemony, and even empire. Nevertheless, 
his identity as a figure distant from the old world Atlanticism of his predecessors, aided by a 
cosmopolitanism that put him at ease with a plethora of identities, ideas, and cultural perspectives, 
was in some respects a salve to these worst instincts of American empire. His openness to the world 
and to the plights of those less fortunate, though, sometimes jarred with the realities of wielding 
that American power. In Libya and Syria, Obama was confronted with crises of conflicting demands 
on how, when, and where that power is appropriately used. Ultimately, his ambivalence over the 
appropriate course of action in Libya is a reminder that designations of wars of ‘necessity’ and 
‘choice’ are complicated by interactions with moral concerns. ‘Necessity’ and a threat to U.S. 
national security did not animate American involvement in Libya. Instead it was the realization of a 
multilateral initiative in the UN that compelled action to stop an oncoming slaughter. The same 
idealized scenario never materialized in Syria. Instead, the tragedy continued. Obama’s pride in not 
entangling the U.S. in Syria portrayed an unwillingness to follow abstraction unthinkingly.  
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In light of moral considerations, however, Obama’s pride over his inaction in Syria appears callous. 
Likewise, the drone programme was a cruel and unyielding expression of willingness to kill civilians, 
to utilize the might of American military to terrorize people offering minimal threat to the 
hegemonic power. The continuation of the Afghanistan war through a review process that served 
only to emphasize the president’s reticence before pushing ahead with a surge was similarly 
troubling, as was, ultimately, the intervention in Libya with no plan for what came after, premised as 
it was on an ambivalence that found it to be a “51-49” decision. These were all examples that 
prompt questions about the morality of Obama’s approach to foreign policy. At its most unsettling it 
demonstrated a flippant disregard for human life, be it civilians in countries afflicted by drone strikes 
and military action, or American soldiers sent into war. The criticisms of the moral outcomes of 
Obama’s foreign policy bring necessary focus to the larger questions of what American power is for 
and how it is used. Could those resources that are directed at a seemingly unending prosecution of 
war instead be directed to causes of peace and economic justice? 
Obama sought to recast American primacy so that it was pursued in a manner more appropriate for 
the needs and interests of the United States, often deeming appeals for more active measures as 
unwarranted. Obama nevertheless professed his firm belief in not shying away from exercising that 
power through a vast range of means. In this respect, Obama answered those critics who held him in 
disrepute for his presiding over American decline, and for being unwilling to use American force. 
In their book America Between the Wars Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier examine the ideational 
climate of the 1990s as the end of the Cold War prompted a search for a new sense of direction in 
U.S. foreign policy.916  Ultimately, they suggest that this search for a replacement of Cold War 
doctrine is not only elusive, but also illusory. “No single expression illuminated America’s purpose 
after the Cold War. And it was folly to believe one could” Chollet and Goldgeier write.917 Obama 
understood this in a manner that his critics from the foreign policy establishment did not. His 
dismissal of doctrine, his affirmed sense of being “comfortable with complexity,” and his 
determination that “I don’t even need a George Kennan right now” were red meat for those whose 
understandings of foreign policy were based on rigid displays of doctrinal certainty.918 It was 
precisely this judicious understanding of what constituted a more well-reasoned direction of foreign 
policy that meant he nevertheless was a caring custodian of American primacy. 
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Writing in Foreign Affairs, Stephen Wertheim is less equivocal in identifying what has driven policy in 
the post-Cold War decades.919 Advocating the necessity of American military retrenchment, he 
argues that after the Cold War the U.S. erred in adopting grand strategy that was premised upon the 
maintenance of overwhelming military superiority, which ultimately became an end in itself, and 
damaged its relationship with the rest of the world.920 Obama was plainly complicit in that raw 
attempt to maintain American primacy. He never made any claims to the contrary. Together, 
Wertheim and Samuel Moyn note that “Obama won [the] election in part because he ran against the 
Iraq War.” They argue, however, that once in office “he cemented more than reversed America’s 
disregard of international constraints on warmaking.”921 Here again, we must consider the moral 
costs of Obama’s foreign policy. For critics such as Moyn, Wertheim, Daniel Bessner, Andrew 
Bacevich, Emma Ashford, and Thomas Meaney there is an inherent failure in America’s continuing 
“forever war,” as it detracts from domestic priorities, and incurs enormous costs in civilian life. It 
draws America in to ever expanding conflict, justified by its military omnipresence. For such critics, 
Obama’s failure lay in subsuming his foreign policy to the mores of American empire. From this 
perspective, he offered no change from his predecessors in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, America’s 
entire foreign policy history could be viewed through the same lens. And Obama happened to be the 
latest cog in its machine.  
Here, however, we might take seriously historian Leo Ribuffo’s notion that “body counts should 
weigh heavily in retrospective evaluations of international morality and immorality.”922 In such a 
consideration, the impact of the Iraq war by itself takes Bush’s to levels that any president would be 
hard-pressed to reach absent another major war.923 That was, in part, Obama’s purpose. Avoiding 
embroilment in another such war would, at the very least, preclude that scale of catastrophe. That 
amount of moral cost was too much to bear again. 
In considering the impact of drone strikes – the most vivid expression of ‘forever war’ - Obama’s 563 
strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen dwarfed Bush’s 57. Here, Obama’s estimated civilian death 
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toll in these countries of between 384 and 807 is sizeable.924 Such figures nevertheless provide risk 
of falling into the ghoulish trap of comparing casualties, and worse, the spectacle of referring to 
comparatively small numbers as merely so many deaths. We risk erasing the sanctity of each and 
every human life. But for the president - the scale of whose decisions are unmatched in world affairs 
- numbers of dead might necessarily serve as a barometer. We are coaxed by such logic into finding 
success in the smaller numbers wrought by drone warfare compared to conventional warfare. 
Obama had acknowledged the value of the finding presidential triumph in avoiding “costly error.”925 
For him, none could be more costly than another Vietnam, another Iraq. 
As noted in the introduction of this thesis, Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen suggests that it is not the 
duty of the intellectual historian to impugn the morality of the subject at hand. But she also offers 
further useful counsel on the means by which intellectual history can help us understand how moral 
positions are assumed: 
One of the primary aims of intellectual history is to understand the ideas 
undergirding competing moral viewpoints… It seeks to comprehend the factors 
that shape historical actors’ intellectual options, and to see how their moral 
horizons and habits of thought played decisive roles both internally in their acts of 
intellectual volition and externally in their actions in the world.926 
It is thus a necessary task to consider the ‘moral horizons’ and ‘habits of thought’ through which 
Obama made those decisions that drew opprobrium. It is a consideration of the way in which the 
morality of his thought was bound. Whilst not necessarily passing judgment on moral content, it is 
important to consider the context and mode by which Obama constructed and justified his foreign 
policy choices that would carry moral consequences. 
Building upon the work of James Kloppenberg, this thesis has proposed that philosophical 
pragmatism offers a means of sorting through the contradictions of Obama’s foreign policy. In effect, 
these apparent contradictions in Obama’s thought can be smoothed over by the incorporation of 
philosophical pragmatism into understandings thereof.  But how did this pragmatism shape Obama’s 
“moral horizons?” The foreign policy dilemmas discussed in this thesis were reflections of Obama 
grappling with imperfection in America’s way of being in the world. And the imperfection of the 
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world as it confronted America. These were dilemmas that did not necessarily lend themselves to 
processes of experimentation, nor ongoing perfection.  
Political offices carry their own imperatives and none more-so than the presidency. The office carries 
responsibility over the twin poles of the might of American power and the pressing fear that such 
might could slip away or be challenged if not handled correctly.  This animates the dilemmas that 
confront all presidents. But an intellectual biography of Obama suggests there is something notable 
in the consciousness of his own humility in contending with these imperfections. The worldview he 
brought to bear was one grounded in the appreciation of the difficulty of the task at hand, and the 
importance of not presuming to carry a silver bullet in seeking a remedy. Obama reclaimed a vision 
of American primacy rooted in epistemic humility. It could be a nation which exercised more power 
through previously neglected avenues of diplomacy and multilateralism. A nation that did not 
equate having the biggest hammer with an impetus to use it, nor with every problem being a nail to 
hit.  
However, Obama’s commitment as Commander-in-Chief to protecting the security of the country 
under his charge was unwavering. It formed the basis of many decisions that many of us will remain 
deeply uncomfortable with. His philosophical pragmatism, his ‘tragic’ sense of history, and his 
certainty of action amounting only to that which could justify a ‘moral wager,’ was reflective of a 
worldview that did not hide from the threats posed to America’s national security. That was an 
imperative, of ‘necessity,’ which captured Obama’s willingness to deploy American military force. 
While he told the audience in his Nobel address that “inaction tears at our conscience” he 
nevertheless also stated that even “those of us with the best intentions” would at times “fail to right 
the wrongs before us.” He rooted this in the notion that humankind is fallible, that humans “make 
mistakes, and fall victim to the temptations of pride, and power, and sometimes evil.” But 
“recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason” can also prompt a call to 
force. Obama greets those two imposters of action and inaction just the same. The difference 
between them for him is minimal, his intellectual and moral humility dictates considerations that 
right and wrong courses of action are sometimes separated only by the choice that picks between 
them. This invocation of Reinhold Niebuhr is crucial in understanding Obama’s moral framework. 
Niebuhr invites a mode of thinking that rests upon humility, but also acknowledges the tragedy 
inherent in a world of human sin.  
Pragmatism offers the facilitation of a deliberative and experimental process that enables the 
pursuit of progress. This was borne out in Obama’s determination towards diplomatic consensus. 
But it is the debt he paid to “tragic pragmatism” that provides significant insight into his use of 
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American power, and the moral consequences it provokes. The modes by which such decisions were 
justified can be refracted through a process that reckons with that difficulty of choosing between 
complicated options. 
In his Dissent article, ‘The Obamanauts,’ political scientist Corey Robin’s most withering critique of 
Obama addresses the president’s ‘moral minimalism.’ Robin impugns a “smallness” in Obama’s 
approach which came from “the idiom of bare life, the wariness of deep foundations that had come 
to characterize liberalism.” Here we might recognize the aversion to dogma that lies at the core of 
philosophical pragmatism, but for Robin it betrayed a weakness, a failing, where “in retrospect, it 
seems obvious that such a smallness of vision could never withstand the largeness of the [political] 
right.”927  
But Robin himself acknowledges that for Obama, “opposing largeness with smallness was the 
point.”928 This is something that Cass Sunstein – a friend and colleague of Obama from his days of 
teaching at the University of Chicago - also reflected, but in a more deliberate sense. Sunstein wrote 
in The New Republic in January 2008, of Obama the “visionary minimalist.”929 Sunstein’s version of 
minimalism carries a more explicit legalistic definition than Robin’s, yet its moral intention is 
redolent. In a legal sense, Sunstein wrote that minimalists “like consensus and favour incompletely 
theorized agreements -- that is, agreements about how to settle a particular dispute in the midst of 
disagreement or uncertainty about the fundamental questions that underlie it.” As such “Like all 
minimalists,” Obama believed “that real change usually requires consensus, learning, and 
accommodation.” Sunstein suggested that “minimalists are fearful of those who are gripped by 
abstractions, simple ideologies, and large-scale theories.” They “respect traditions, and they do not 
believe that long-standing practices should be altered lightly or without a careful analysis that 
includes many voices.” Crucially, such ‘minimalism’ does not preclude willingness to “think big and 
to endorse significant departures from the status quo” but instead it emphasizes that such change 
requires a process of “accommodating, learning from, and bringing on board a variety of different 
perspectives.” Sunstein suggested that, for Obama, this meant “reconciliation is change, and it is 
also what makes change possible.” This minimalism accords with “the art of the possible,” it is 
grounded in core pragmatist tenets, and acts as a vision of progress, for it holds that “real 
transformations require a degree of consensus.”930 
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In a May 2007 profile of Obama in the New Yorker titled ‘The Conciliator,’ Larissa MacFarquhar 
examined the nascent presidential candidate’s propensity towards seeking middle ground between 
opposing perspectives.931 Sunstein told MacFarquhar of what he perceived was Obama’s reluctance 
to push against people’s deep moral convictions. MacFarquhar wrote “this is not, Sunstein believes, 
due only to pragmatism; it also stems from a sense that there is something worthy of respect in a 
strong and widespread moral feeling, even if it’s wrong.” Sunstein noted John Rawls’ notions of 
“civic toleration as a modus vivendi, a way that we can live together,” but crucially, he likened 
Obama’s thinking to that of a legendary federal judge and legal scholar: “I think with Obama it’s 
more like Learned Hand when he said, ‘The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is 
right.’” Sunstein maintained that Obama took that notion “really seriously.”932 This assessment of 
Obama is congruent with ideas that this thesis has circled back to time and again. Hand’s notion of 
the “spirit which is not too sure that it is right” is a conduit for Menand’s notion of tolerance being 
the key value of the early pragmatists, for the promise of a conception “designed to make it harder 
for people to be driven to violence by their beliefs.”  And yet it also captured the Lincolnian tragic 
pragmatism that Obama exhibited in office when violence appeared inescapable.  
Obama’s debts to Lincoln are manifold and none more so than in his moral framework for making 
difficult choices. He emphasized value in Lincoln’s character - which he also tied to “the American 
character” – “that aspect which makes tough choices, and speaks the truth when least convenient, 
and acts while still admitting doubt.”933 This notion has been born out in this thesis as being one 
predicated on the gamble represented by taking ‘moral wagers.’ His moral horizons therefore 
contained multitudes. They carried a reluctance to rely on a presumption of certainty. Each drone 
strike was a wager that its necessity outweighed the moral costs that would trail behind.  The drone 
programme itself a wager on the necessity of maintaining counterterrorism efforts, whilst also 
wagering on the imperative to remove ground forces from the Middle East. It was a wager that 
America’s future lay in the Asia-Pacific, and any means to help it achieve that future was a cost 
worth bearing. The same embrace of ‘moral wagers’ animated his approach to Afghanistan. And all 
formed part of the same Niebuhrian humility of acting despite being conscious of the frailties and 
limitations of human knowledge. The same embrace nevertheless of the notion that even in taking 
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action, you must be wary of the presumption that it is the right course. Sunstein, for his part, 
suggested that Obama was notable as being a political figure who “knows he might be wrong.”934 
This is a means of approaching the world that might strike us as deeply unsatisfying in our attempts 
to conceptualize a foreign policy framework. It is especially poignant when considered through the 
lens of what solace those on the receiving end of American power might gain from such an approach 
being taken. What difference does it make if the decision to order a drone strike was a difficult one 
for the president? The consequences of the decision taken even “while admitting doubt” have a 
disproportionate material impact on those on the ground. It is in this doubt - in this minimalism – 
that we find opportunity for better outcomes to arise.  
Libya and Syria stand as two sides of a coin through this concept. At its core, the solace in such an 
approach lies in the representation of what it is not. It is not the blind dogmatism of Obama’s 
predecessor, George W. Bush. Nor even what he castigated as an unthinking foreign policy 
conventional wisdom common to all the post-Cold War presidents. It is, instead, an elevation of 
basing foreign policy decisions on firmer grounds. Matching means to ends, realizing limitations, 
being humble in what American power can and should do in the world.  
But was this good enough? In a sense this conception of what was better for the United States in 
terms of its involvement in the world had narrow moral implications. This, for some, was too narrow 
a concept. It relied on the same tired logic of numbers of dead American troops, American strategic 
interest, and counterterrorism strategies born of the imperatives of national security. These were 
each concerns of American power that have wrought pain and misery not only internationally but 
also domestically; a stain on the moral conscience of the nation.  
Advocates of American retrenchment, such as those figures noted above, now notably represented 
in the think-tank sphere by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, emphasize that remedy 
for the dilemmas of American power lay in restraint and in ending the dominance of militarism in 
U.S. foreign policy.935 There is a concerted effort to mainstream these ideas and cut into the 
assumptions of the Washington foreign policy establishment. Future presidents, particularly 
Democrat candidates to succeed Obama, might hope to attend to foreign policy in a manner 
consistent with this higher aspiration for morality. David Milne and Christopher McKnight Nichols 
note, however, that “previous form suggests that they may well respond in similar ways,” to Obama. 
They add vitally, “the burdens of office have a way of sullying the purest-sounding pre-presidential 
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intentions.”936 The reality is stark. Biases of American history have tended towards the same way of 
doing things because those methods have matched what has long been perceived as the overriding 
need of American primacy. As such, it will be difficult to know what it means to have an adequately 
‘retrenchist’ foreign policy until we see it. Scepticism must remain over whether it can be vastly 
different from what Obama tried. The vagaries of holding office will always perform the most 
exacting of 'purity' tests.  
Writing in 2004, Leo Ribuffo warned that “liberals” who directed protests at Bush needed “to learn 
the fundamental Niebuhrian lesson that foreign policy does involve hard choices that cannot be 
resolved on the basis of reflexive denunciations of American imperialism, earnest pleas to give peace 
a chance (when war is opposed), or equally earnest pleas for “humanitarian intervention” (when war 
is favoured).”937 This serves as an important reminder - to both those who critique use of American 
power and those who charge it should be used more - that foreign policy choices are difficult and not 
made lightly. They each carry a universe of moral and material implications. The philosophical 
pragmatism of Obama’s foreign policy embodies the very essence of learning this lesson. Obama’s 
worldview is one that at its core is grounded in an awareness of the fallibility that inhibits human 
efforts to shape the world around them. It also recognizes the difficult moral choices that confront 
those who make decisions in foreign policy. Extending Kloppenberg’s engagement with Obama as a 
thinker to the realm of foreign policy has enabled us to see the means by which Obama drew these 
connections, and the imperative he thus accorded them in shaping his own decisions. 
In this respect, pragmatism offers perhaps the cleanest insight into how foreign policy that is 
grounded in 'responsibility' can be achieved when accounting for the exigencies of crises that throw 
the best laid plans for restraint into peril.  “Don’t do stupid shit” is but one visage of “responsible” 
statecraft. Obama carried aims for rebalancing U.S. foreign policy, tailoring it towards the priorities 
of rebuilding the nation at home. But the significance of the ideas and modes of thinking which 
pragmatism put forth in Obama were significant. They helped formulate a view of the world in which 
Obama carried no grand ideological project, save the pursuit of progress. It was a way of operating in 
the world absent dogmatism, rejecting abstraction and absolutes. It is thus here that we find the 
answer to the key question that animated this thesis, of what it would mean to carry philosophical 
pragmatism into foreign policy. 
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The pressing concern for Obama’s approach then, was whether indeed it could gain purchase in the 
long term, and to what degree it would stand up to the variances of an American politics that was 




On 9 November 2016, the day after the shocking election of Donald Trump, Obama held a press 
conference in the White House’s Rose Garden. He prosaically offered assurances of a smooth 
transition, noting the peaceful transition of power as one of the hallmarks of American democracy. 
But in recognizing the despondency that many in the country felt upon Trump’s election he 
meditated once more on the nature of American history. He reached back deep into his intellectual 
roots to note that: 
Sometimes you lose an argument. Sometimes you lose an election. The path that 
this country has taken has never been a straight line. We zig and zag, and 
sometimes we move in ways that some people think is forward and others think is 
moving back. And that's okay.938 
He emphasized the importance that Americans “all go forward, with a presumption of good faith in 
our fellow citizens -- because that presumption of good faith is essential to a vibrant and functioning 
democracy.” His belief in centring “fair-minded words” was on show again. The notion that 
disagreement can be held with humility that accepts alternative views are valid. “That's how this 
country has moved forward for 240 years” he said in the Rose Garden. “It’s how we’ve pushed 
boundaries and promoted freedom around the world. That's how we've expanded the rights of our 
founding to reach all of our citizens. It’s how we have come this far.”939  
A couple of months previous, facing up to the end of his presidency, Obama welcomed historian 
Doris Kearns Goodwin into the White House for an intimate but broad ranging discussion about his 
time in office, his legacy, and his wider sense of place in American presidential history.940 Reflecting 
on his temperament and its suitability for office, he told Goodwin “there is a writer’s sensibility in 
me sometimes, where I step back. But I do think that I am generally optimistic. I see tragedy and 
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comedy and pain and irony and all that stuff. But in the end I think life is fascinating, and I think 
people are more good than bad, and I think that the possibilities of progress are real.” He suggested 
that “this basic optimism and capacity to take the long view on things” had served him well in the 
Oval Office.941 
In an early-presidency trip to Cairo, after his famous speech – an “opening” to the Muslim world – 
Obama and his staff visited the pyramids at Giza. “They’re elemental in ways that are hard to 
describe” Obama told Goodwin of the ancient tombs. He recalled thinking to himself that, in the 
time of the pyramid’s construction, there were people who thought they were important figures, 
and “there was the equivalent of cable news and television and newspapers and Twitter and people 
anguishing over their relative popularity or position at any given time” but crucially, now “it’s all just 
covered in dust and sand. And all that people know [today] are the pyramids.” This thought left a 
profound impact on Obama. He carried with him “that perspective, which tells me that my particular 
worries on any given day—how I’m doing in the polls or what somebody is saying about me … for 
good or for ill—isn’t particularly relevant.” Crucially, he maintained “What is relevant is: What am I 
building that lasts?”942 
In the United States he hoped that “what we’re building are not just pyramids, are not icons to one 
pharaoh.” Instead “what we’re building is a culture and a way of living together that we can look 
back on and say, [This] was good, was inclusive, was kind, was innovative, was able to fulfil the 
dreams of as many people as possible.”943 This part of his temperament, he thought, had served him 
well. But it also serves us well in contemplating an intellectual history of Obama. This sense of a 
“long view” is a familiar theme in Obama’s intellectual make-up and the history thereof. 
Martin Luther King Jr’s testament that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards 
justice” adorned the carpet in Obama’s Oval Office, while Derek Chollet’s The Long Game reflected a 
sense of the deep hold such a perspective carried within the administration and reflections on it 
thereafter.944 Obama’s pragmatism was indebted to its own teleology. It carried an inherent telos of 
progress. Pragmatism helps in the movement toward progress, through its dedication to ideas that 
work and that will, as such, last.  
Paramount for Obama was the notion of perfection and its ensuing progress but, specifically, 
progress pursued on grounds that could withstand the tests of time, the vicissitudes of an imperfect 
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world. This was reflected in the solemnity with which Obama carried the dual contentions that the 
world was imperfect, yet nevertheless could be perfected. The world that confronted Obama as 
president appeared to fray at its seams, as the culture wars reanimated itself into wide scale 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which societies were organized and how conflicting identity 
interests could be met. This culminated in the triumph of the Brexit campaign and the election of a 
string of right-wing populist leaders with authoritarian tendencies. Obama nevertheless gave the 
appearance of being sanguine about this turn of events. On 16 November 2016, two weeks after 
Trump’s victory, Obama gave a speech in Athens intended to be an affirmation of the lasting value of 
the idea of democracy forged in that very place.945 Crucially though, it was not only about 
democracy, but also the idea that “to have meaning, principles must be enshrined in laws and 
protected by institutions, and advanced through civic participation.” And whilst “across the 
millennia that followed, different views of power and governance have often prevailed” he argued 
that “through all this history, the flame first lit here in Athens never died.”946 
In grounding the value and functioning of democracy in the practises that upheld it, he reinforced a 
facet of his worldview that has become apparent throughout this thesis: Obama was an 
institutionalist to his core. This was explicitly reflected by Ben Rhodes, who wrote Obama is “at his 
core an institutionalist, someone who believes progress is more sustainable if it is husbanded by 
laws, institutions, and - if need be – force.”947 Institutions for Obama offered the most effective 
mode of instigating progress. They accorded with his faith in that process of deliberation and 
experimentalism that formed the basis of his understanding of America and the world.  Crucially, 
that firm belief in institutions is sited in notions that those institutions themselves have withstood 
the processes and challenges of time. They are what works, they are eminently possible, they ably 
contend with the world as it is.  In his speech discussing the Iran deal, Obama admiringly quoted 
John F. Kennedy. The thirty-fifth president argued for a “practical” and “attainable” peace during the 
Cold War, through American leadership, “based not on a on a sudden revolution in human nature 
but on a gradual evolution in human institutions -- on a series of concrete actions and effective 
agreements.” Obama had cited that same evolution of human institutions in his Nobel address. 
They were a means by which the world could “concretely” pursue mediation between the 
determination towards peace and the sometime necessity of war.948 
In an interview with the author, Michael Kimmage, a historian who worked on the Policy Planning 
Staff in John Kerry’s State Department suggested that Obama’s worldview in this respect reflected a 
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view that “there is a right way to do politics…the right kind of institutionalism.”949 Kimmage noted 
that Obama is a universalist, but in “a specific way” - through a particular means of “technocratic 
universalism.” This for Kimmage is a universalism that avoids “the dilemmas of culture and 
civilization.”950 This notion reflects Obama reaching for a universalism that is attainable, one that he 
could readily advocate in speeches in Cairo, Accra, Yangon, and Athens. Obama found means by 
which ideals can be shared across and between cultures through institutions and their processes 
that work in a functional manner. Once again the “lawyerliness” Savage and Fishman observed in 
Obama’s approach to matters of national security comes to the fore.951 
In Athens, Obama re-affirmed the principle he had expressed in the aftermath of Trump’s election, 
that “progress follows a winding path -- sometimes forward, sometimes back.” This time he 
conditioned this on the proviso that “as long as we retain our faith in democracy, as long as we 
retain our faith in the people, as long as we don’t waver from those central principles that ensure 
a lively, open debate, then our future will be okay, because it remains the most effective form of 
government ever devised by man.”952 In this sense we return to one of pragmatism’s core facets as 
established by William James, that “it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no 
doctrines save its method.”953 As a method of governance, Obama maintained that democracy “is 
better than the alternatives because it allows us to peacefully work through our differences and 
move closer to our ideals.” He reified its promise as a means of yielding progress, as it “allows us 
to test new ideas and… to correct for mistakes.” And he emphasized that “any action by a 
President, or any result of an election, or any legislation that has proven flawed can be corrected 
through the process of democracy.”954 “Moving closer to our ideals” is Sunstein’s vision of 
minimalism at work.955 Testing new ideas and correcting mistakes is the experimentalism of James 
and Dewey. Together it is Obama’s own eminent belief in perfection as a process. 
In the international setting, Obama’s belief in America’s outsized role in shaping the order of liberal 
institutionalism might prompt critiques of a self-interested projection of American hegemony. But 
vitally, Obama emphasized the importance of recognizing the stubborn reality that “history does 
not move in a straight line.” He conceded that “progress is never a guarantee.” Instead, he warned 
that it “has to be earned by every generation.”956 The continual shoring up of democracy and the 
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institutions that reinforce it were a mode of ‘earning’ that progress. More so than any 
alternatives, he believed they channelled the necessary humility, a sense of fallibility, imperfection, 
and pragmatism into the pursuit of the better alternative.  They were the methods that would allow 
for perfection. For Obama, the United States could be a protagonist in pursuing these methods 




This thesis has sought to demonstrate that one’s intellectual starting point matters. The way you see 
the world matters a great deal to the means by which you confront it. The epistemology that shapes 
the way you view the world carries its own implications. With this in mind, given the topics discussed 
and their emphasis on America’s war-making and the attendant criticisms that have subsequently 
come to define a lot of retrospective attitudes to the administration, to consign Obama’s approach 
to foreign policy as congruent with the imperialist U.S. foreign policy machine misses something. To 
accept such a perspective resigns us to a hopeless structural rendering of history in which its actors’ 
agency is subsumed to forces which lay beyond reach of their control. But the very essence of 
pragmatism is to push back against that vision of history. Pragmatism takes at its very core the 
perspective that truth is made. Not merely made by one all-powerful, omniscient force, but instead 
made by the careful synthesizing of understanding, a palimpsest of meaning, added piece by piece 
until steadily, over time, a consensus emerges of a perspective that is shared through its usefulness 
to all those who have shaped it. 
Given this, it mattered that Obama’s approach itself was predicated upon this vision of history. His 
belief in the steady march of progress, based on careful deliberation and experimentation mapped 
itself on to a foreign policy approach premised upon a conscious detachment from ideological pre-
occupations and dogmatic pursuits. 
Future studies can examine in closer detail the decisions that were made, discern further distinct 
ideological choices, and draw firmer lines between the ideas Obama held and their transformation 
into policy choices. Such studies can uncover the degree to which Obama’s philosophically 
pragmatist instincts were born out in memos, policy discussions, and in broader engagement with 
people within the administration’s own awareness of Obama’s philosophical predilections. A future 
Obama memoir will be a crucial source for interrogation as, if it demonstrates a similar degree of 
thoughtful examination of philosophical ideas to his previous volumes with an added context of his 
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presidency, it will stand as a serious addition not only to the genre of presidential memoirs but also 
to meditations on America’s philosophical moment.  
In conversation with Goodwin, Obama made clear that he viewed his approach to politics and the 
world, as much as anything, as one that could be emulated in the future. It was something that could 
be aspired to, an approach to the world that could outlast him. He saw persisting value in this 
approach to the world precisely because it was one premised on that indelible travel towards that 
which would work, because it is in the site of such mutual understanding and common goals that 
progress could be located.  
At the close of his 2006 speech at the Sojourners conference, Obama shared with the attendees that 
he said a prayer every night, one he felt he shared with a lot of Americans. It was one of “a hope that 
we can live with one another in a way that reconciles the beliefs of each with the good of all.”957 In a 
sentence he captured the essence of the universal and the particular, the orthodox and the 
progressive, and the space for pragmatism to bind them together. The reconciliation of varying 
modes of thought without compromising them. It was a recognition of the importance of plurality of 
experience in the American life. A notion that America and its enduring success is itself predicated 
on a constant effort to allow differing ideas to come together and to find a way of working in a 
manner that benefits the whole society. It envisions a broad community of inquiry aimed at 
achieving something that works for as many people as possible, before it no longer works as well, 
and can be replaced by something new. For Obama “it's a prayer worth praying, and a conversation 
worth having in this country in the months and years to come.”958 A return to this notion of a 
conversation again highlights Obama’s commitment to the process of building up new visions of 
society in a deliberative manner. Communication between and across plural understandings of truth 
would be emphasized. The continual bridging through words and deeds of seemingly intractable 
divides pursued. This was an approach that Obama sought throughout his two terms in office to 
bring to bear on his foreign policy. It was a mindset which readily expanded to a worldview.  
The world America confronted was one that carried its share of imperfections, but the foreign policy 
of Obama’s America shared those imperfections as well.  The tragic pragmatism he brought to bear 
on matters of war stood as an example of his seeing that imperfection and being aware of the 
limitations held in confronting it. Susan Rice reflects in her memoir that “Obama was by nature a 
pragmatist,” yet, crucially, “his pragmatism neither rendered him cold nor tempered his high 
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aspirations for America’s capacity to do better at home and abroad.”959 Philosophical pragmatism 
more broadly captured the idea that those limitations need not confine the pursuit of progress. 
Instead it helped shape a worldview that saw hope in the embrace of what William James called “the 
open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in 
truth.”960 Democracy - held so preciously by Obama - acts as a forum for those ideas to play out, for 
processes of experimentalism and deliberation to test those possibilities and consequences in a 
search for consensus that will last. 
Obama believed that in those moments of recognition between different experiences, worldviews, 
and perspectives is “where the perfection begins.”  This was his vision of how America could 
progress. But he also carried it into his vision of what America’s foreign policy should be as it 
contended with the rest of the world. It was a worldview that resisted the path of ideological 
abstraction. “Dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth” promised only violence, war, 
and ruin. Instead, his vision affirmed the value of a steady process of confronting the world as it was. 
It cultivated the possibilities of diplomacy and engaging in a search for common ground solutions to 
the problems that beset the foreign policy realm. This vision did not just build a pyramid to stand as 
an icon to Obama. Instead it built something to last.  Something to stand testament to the pursuit of 
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